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  1. Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Basic Books.
    Winner of the 1975 National Book Award, this brilliant and widely acclaimed book is a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age--liberal, socialist, and conservative.
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  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • Personal Identity and Practical Concerns.David W. Shoemaker - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):317-357.
    Many philosophers have taken there to be an important relation between personal identity and several of our practical concerns (among them moral responsibility, compensation, and self-concern). I articulate four natural methodological assumptions made by those wanting to construct a theory of the relation between identity and practical concerns, and I point out powerful objections to each assumption, objections constituting serious methodological obstacles to the overall project. I then attempt to offer replies to each general objection in a way that leaves (...)
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  • How to Be a Conventional Person.Kristie Miller - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):457-474.
    Recent work in personal identity has emphasized the importance of various conventions, or ‘person-directed practices’ in the determination of personal identity. An interesting question arises as to whether we should think that there are any entities that have, in some interesting sense, conventional identity conditions. We think that the best way to understand such work about practices and conventions is the strongest and most radical. If these considerations are correct, persons are, on our view, conventional constructs: they are in part (...)
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  • Many, but Almost One.David K. Lewis - 1993 - In Keith Cambell, John Bacon & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-38.
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  • All the World's a Stage.Theodore Sider - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453.
    Some philosophers believe that everyday objects are 4-dimensional spacetime worms, that a person (for example) persists through time by having temporal parts, or stages, at each moment of her existence. None of these stages is identical to the person herself; rather, she is the aggregate of all her temporal parts.1 Others accept “three dimensionalism”, rejecting stages in favor of the notion that persons “endure”, or are “wholly present” throughout their lives.2 I aim to defend an apparently radical third view: not (...)
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  • How to Defend the Cohabitation Theory.Simon Langford - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):212–224.
    David Lewis's cohabitation theory suffered damaging criticism from Derek Parfit. Though many have defended versions of Lewis's theory Parfit's criticism has not been answered. This paper shows how to defend the cohabitation theory against Parfit's criticism.
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  • Identity, Consciousness, and Value.Peter Unger - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
    The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his (...)
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  • Persons and Bodies: Constitution Without Mereology? [REVIEW]Dean Zimmerman - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):599–606.
    Lynne Rudder Baker and many others think that paradigmatic instances of one object constituting another—a piece of marble constituting a statue, or an aggregate of particles constituting a living body—involve two distinct objects in the same place at the same time. Some who say this believe in the doctrine of temporal parts; but others, like Baker, reject this doctrine. Such philosophers, whom one might call “coincidentalists”, cannot say that these objects manage to share space in virtue of sharing a temporal (...)
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  • Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    What is a human person, and what is the relation between a person and his or her body? In her third book on the philosophy of mind, Lynne Rudder Baker investigates what she terms the person/body problem and offers a detailed account of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Baker's argument is based on the 'Constitution View' of persons and bodies, which aims to show what distinguishes persons from all other beings and to show how we can be (...)
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  • Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness.André Gallois - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Occasions of Identity is an exploration of timeless philosophical issues about persistence, change, time, and sameness. Andre Gallois offers a critical survey of various rival views about the nature of identity and change, and puts forward his own original theory. He supports the idea of occasional identities, arguing that it is coherent and helpful to suppose that things can be identical at one time but distinct at another. Gallois defends this view, demonstrating how it can solve puzzles about persistence dating (...)
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  • With Infinite Utility, More Needn't Be Better.Joel David Hamkins & Barbara Montero - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):231 – 240.
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  • Temporal Phase Pluralism.David Braddon-Mitchell & Caroline West - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):59–83.
    Some theories of personal identity allow some variation in what it takes for a person to survive from context to context; and sometimes this is determined by the desires of person-stages or the practices of communities.This leads to problems for decision making in contexts where what is chosen will affect personal identity.‘Temporal Phase Pluralism’ solves such problems by allowing that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making problems when (...)
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  • Infinite Utilitarianism: More is Always Better.Luc Lauwers & Peter Vallentyne - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):307-330.
    We address the question of how finitely additive moral value theories (such as utilitarianism) should rank worlds when there are an infinite number of locations of value (people, times, etc.). In the finite case, finitely additive theories satisfy both Weak Pareto and a strong anonymity condition. In the infinite case, however, these two conditions are incompatible, and thus a question arises as to which of these two conditions should be rejected. In a recent contribution, Hamkins and Montero (2000) have argued (...)
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  • Ethics and the Generous Ontology.Eric T. Olson - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):259-270.
    According to a view attractive to both metaphysicians and ethicists, every period in a person’s life is the life of a being just like that person except that it exists only during that period. These “subpeople” appear to have moral status, and their interests seem to clash with ours: though it may be in some person’s interests to sacrifice for tomorrow, it is not in the interests of a subperson coinciding with him only today, who will never benefit from it. (...)
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  • Well-Being and Time.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):48-77.
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  • Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory.Peter Vallentyne & Shelly Kagan - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):5-26.
    000000001. Introduction Call a theory of the good—be it moral or prudential—aggregative just in case (1) it recognizes local (or location-relative) goodness, and (2) the goodness of states of affairs is based on some aggregation of local goodness. The locations for local goodness might be points or regions in time, space, or space-time; or they might be people, or states of nature.1 Any method of aggregation is allowed: totaling, averaging, measuring the equality of the distribution, measuring the minimum, etc.. Call (...)
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  • How Things Persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Katherine Hawley explores and compares three theories of persistence -- endurance, perdurance, and stage theories - investigating the ways in which they attempt to account for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, she concludes by advocating stage theory.
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  • Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?Denis Robinson - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (3):299 – 319.
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  • Consequentialism and Respect for Persons.Philip Pettit - 1989 - Ethics 100 (1):116-126.
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  • Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy.Matti Eklund - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):489-511.
    Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are (...)
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  • Transcending the Infinite Utility Debate.Tim Mulgan - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):164 – 177.
    An infinite future thus threatens to paralyze utilitarianism. Utilitarians need principled ways to determine which possible infinite futures are better or worse. In this article, I discuss a recent suggestion of Peter Vallentyne and Shelly Kagan. I conclude that the best way forward for utilitarians is, in fact, to by-pass the infinite utility debate altogether. (edited).
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  • Identity, Personal Identity and the Self.John Perry - 2002 - Hackett Publishing Company.
    This volume collects a number of Perry's classic works on personal identity as well as four new pieces, The Two Faces of Identity,Persons and Information,Self-Notions and The Self, and The Sense of Identity. Perry’s Introduction puts his own work and that of others on the issues of identity and personal identity in the context of philosophical studies of mind and language over the past thirty years.
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  • Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
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  • Persons, Compensation, and Utilitarianism.Diane Jeske - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):541-575.
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  • Dividing Without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity.Eugene O. Mills - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):37-51.
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  • Goods and Lives.Michael Slote - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Oup Usa. pp. 311.
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