- Introduction to Part Three: Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2020 - In Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 48-67.details
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Why It Does Not Matter What Matters: Relation R, Personal Identity, and Moral Theory.Bastian Steuwer - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):178-198.details
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Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World.Sam Baron, Kristie Miller & Jonathan Tallant - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):281-301.details
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A new argument for the phenomenal approach to personal persistence.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2031-2049.details
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Leaving gift-giving behind: the ethical status of the human body and transplant medicine.Paweł Łuków - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (2):221-230.details
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Non-branching personal persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.details
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Boltzmannian Immortality.Christian Loew - 2016 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):761-776.details
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(1 other version)Points of Concern.Simon Beck - 2000 - Theoria 47:121-130.details
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(1 other version)Was I Ever a Fetus?Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.details
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Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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Metaphysics and the Future-Like-Ours Argument Against Abortion.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):419-434.details
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The unity of consciousness, within subjects and between subjects.Luke Roelofs - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3199-3221.details
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Qualia Ain't in the Head Review of Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind by Michael Tye. [REVIEW]David M. Armstrong - 1995 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2:31--4.details
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Divided we fall.Jacob Ross - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):222-262.details
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Uploading and Branching Identity.Michael A. Cerullo - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (1):17-36.details
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Animal Interrupted, or Why Accepting Pascal's Wager Might Be the Last Thing You Ever Do.Sam Baron & Christina Dyke - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):109-133.details
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Does Division Multiply Desert?Theron Pummer - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):43-77.details
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(1 other version)Animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Utility Monsters for the Fission Age.Ray Briggs & Daniel Nolan - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):392-407.details
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The self and its brain.Stan Klein - 2012 - Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.details
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Early Abortion and Personal Ontology.Eugene Mills - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (1):19-30.details
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Prichard's Heresy.Sandy Berkovski - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (4):503-524.details
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The Identity of Living Beings, Epigenetics, and the Modesty of Philosophy.Giovanni Boniolo & Giuseppe Testa - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):279-298.details
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Self: Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2009 - In William P. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier. pp. 301-312.details
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(1 other version)The Survival of the Sentient.Peter Unger - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:325-348.details
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Personal Identity and Ethics.David Shoemaker - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)What Matters in Survival: Self-determination and The Continuity of Life Trajectories.Heidi Savage - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (1):37-56.details
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Did My Brain Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Action and Mental Competence.Laura Klaming & Pim Haselager - 2010 - Neuroethics 6 (3):527-539.details
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Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (4):507-529.details
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"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknowndetails
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Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study.Shaun Nichols & Michael Bruno - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):293-312.details
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Killing and the Time-relative Interest Account.Nils Holtug - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):169-189.details
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Love and history.Christopher Grau - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):246-271.details
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(1 other version)The singularity: A philosophical analysis.David J. Chalmers - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):9 - 10.details
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Parfit on fission.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):21 - 35.details
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Harming as causing harm.Elizabeth Harman - 2009 - In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. Springer. pp. 137--154.details
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Identity over time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Temporal phase pluralism.David Braddon-Mitchell & Caroline West - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):59–83.details
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The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind.David Barnett - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):308 - 335.details
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Personal identity and practical concerns.David W. Shoemaker - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):317-357.details
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Totipotency, twinning, and ensoulment at fertilization.Rose Koch-Hershenov - 2006 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 31 (2):139 – 164.details
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You are simple.David Barnett - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 161--174.details
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Fission rejuvenation.Raymond Martin - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (1):17-40.details
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Functionalism and personal identity.Nicholas Agar - 2003 - Noûs 37 (1):52-70.details
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(1 other version)Why there are still no people.Jim Stone - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-192.details
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Why there still are no people.Jim Stone - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.details
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Consciousness as a guide to personal persistence.Barry Dainton & Tim Bayne - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.details
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These bizarre fictions: Thought-experiments, our psychology and our selves.Simon Beck - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54.details
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Are Functional Properties Causally Potent?Peter Alward - 2006 - Sorites 17:49-55.details
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Can Views on Personal Identity Be Neutral about Ethics?Marek Gurba - manuscriptdetails
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