In arguing for government withdrawal from funding and regulating schooling, James Tooley claims that equality of opportunity in education implies only that all deserve an adequate minimum education. However, he concedes the 'abstract egalitarian thesis' that all should be treated with equal concern and respect. I show that this thesis indeed implies educational equality, and that Tooley's arguments against educational equality rest on a misunderstanding of the foundations of egalitarianism.

Defends a theory of social justice for education from within an egalitarian version of liberalism. The theory involves a strong commitment to educational equality, and to the idea that children's rights include a right to personal autonomy. The book argues that school reform must always be evaluated from the perspective of social justice and applies the theory, in particular, to school choice proposals. It looks at the parental choice schemes in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and in England and Wales, and argues that (...) they fall short of the requirements of justice, but that not all such schemes must do so. It elaborates an abstract voucher scheme that would combine choice with justice, and offers ways by which actual choice‐based reform can be modified to meet the requirements of justice. (shrink)

Professor Harry Brighouse has written extensively against ‘educational choice’ reforms in England and Wales and in the USA, and has challenged the status quo of private school provision in England and Wales. This paper explores the extent to which his arguments are applicable to the more radical, but prima facie linked, concept of the ‘privatisation of education’, that is, where funding, provision or regulation of education are progressively moved away from the state to the private sector. The arguments address in (...) particular the issues of autonomy-facilitating education and educational equality, suggesting that Brighouse's arguments that use these concepts are not powerful objections to the case for choice or privatisation. Indeed, it is suggested that there are several arguments in Brighouse's writings, concerning the virtues of efficiency, diversity and innovation, and the power of the ‘mimicking effect’ of parents who are not skilled choosers, that contain the kernel for an argument advanced elsewhere that defends, rather than opposes, the privatisation of education. (shrink)

Professor Harry Brighouse has written extensively against ‘educational choice’ reforms in England and Wales and in the USA, and has challenged the status quo of private school provision in England and Wales. This paper explores the extent to which his arguments are applicable to the more radical, but prima facie linked, concept of the ‘privatisation of education’, that is, where funding, provision or regulation of education are progressively moved away from the state to the private sector. The arguments address in (...) particular the issues of autonomy-facilitating education and educational equality, suggesting that Brighouse’s arguments that use these concepts are not powerful objections to the case for choice or privatisation. Indeed, it is suggested that there are several arguments in Brighouse’s writings, concerning the virtues of efficiency, diversity and innovation, and the power of the ‘mimicking effect’ of parents who are not skilled choosers, that contain the kernel for an argument advanced elsewhere that defends, rather than opposes, the privatisation of education. (shrink)

The author discusses Rawls’s conception of socioeconomic justice, Democratic Equality. He contrasts Rawls’s account, which includes the difference principle constrained by the principle of fair equality of opportunity, with Natural Aristocracy, which constrains the difference principle only by the principle of careers open to talents. According to the author, many of Rawls’s own arguments support NaturalAristocracy over Democratic Equality. In particular, Natural Aristocracy appears well placed to avoid a challenge that naturally arises in consideration of Democratic Equality, with respect to (...) which formal distributive principle should deal with social and natural causes of inequality. The challenge is to cite a morally relevant distinction which supports the appropriateness of dealing with natural causes of inequality differently to those generated by social causes. In support of his proposal, the author also appeals to certain arguments in Rawls’s Political Liberalism. (shrink)

William Galston is a distinguished political philosopher whose work is informed by the experience of having also served from 1993–5 as President Clinton's Deputy Assistant for Domestic Policy. He is thus able to speak with an authority unique amongst political theorists about the implications of advancing certain moral and political values in practice. The foundational argument of this 2002 book is that liberalism is compatible with the value pluralism first espoused by Isaiah Berlin. William Galston defends a version of value (...) pluralism - liberal pluralism - and argues, against the contentions of John Gray and others, that it undergirds a kind of liberal politics that gives weight to the ability of individuals and groups to live their lives in accordance with their deepest beliefs about what gives meaning and purpose to life. (shrink)