- Our Knowledge of the Internal World.Robert Stalnaker - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays, Volume 2.Tyler Burge - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Cognitive Phenomenology.Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Anti-externalism.Joseph Mendola - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge.Susana Nuccetelli (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Thought and reference.Kent Bach - 1987 - New York: Clarendon Press.details
|
|
Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. Edited by Frank Jackson.details
|
|
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press. pp. 55-140.details
|
|
There is no viable notion of narrow content.Sarah Sawyer - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 20-34.details
|
|
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
|
|
Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content.Brian Loar - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 229--258.details
|
|
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
|
|
The components of content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.details
|
|
A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.details
|
|
Reduction of mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.details
|
|
The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism.Bryan Frances - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138.details
|
|
Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Narrow content.Robert Stalnaker - 1990 - In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: Csli.details
|
|
Phenomenal intentionalities.William Lycan - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):233 - 252.details
|
|
Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.details
|
|
Externalism and Self-Knowledge.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 2002 - Filosoficky Casopis 50:528-530.details
|
|
Phenomenality and reference: Reply to Loar.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.details
|
|