Complementing recent studies by Keown, Whitehill, and Hallisey that associate Buddhist ethics with the virtue tradition, the author proposes that Buddhist virtue requires both overcoming attachment to self and compassionate regard for others. Within a broader framework of comparative religious ethics, such a claim is not extraordinary; overcoming prudentialist self-interest, cultivating sympathy, and acting on others' behalf are ethical values highly praised by most religious traditions, including Buddhism. Nevertheless, this proposal runs counter to those who hold Theravāda Buddhism to be (...) dominated by the world-renouncing values of the monk antithetical to a social ethic. It also differs from the view that monastic and lay ethics, while not in opposition, are merely complementary. The author contends that the moral value of voluntary poverty, ordinarily labeled a monastic virtue, can be seen as the foundation for other-regarding virtues such as compassion and benevolence. (shrink)