While twentieth-century medical ethics has focused on the duty of physicians to benefit their patients, the next century will see that duty challenged in three ways. First, we will increasingly recognize that it is unrealistic to expect physicians to be able to determine what will benefit their patients. Either they limit their attention to medical well-being when total well-being is the proper end of the patient or they strive for total well-being, which takes them beyond their expertise. Even within the (...) medical sphere, they have no basis for choosing among the proper medical goals for medicine. Also, there are many plausible strategies for relating predicted benefits to harms, and physicians cannot be expert in picking among these strategies. Second, increasingly plausible ethical systems recognize that in some cases, patient benefit must be sacrificed to protect patient rights including the right to the truth, to have promises kept, to have autonomy respected, and to not be killed. Third, ethics of the next century will increasingly recognize that some patient benefits must be sacrificed to fulfill duties to others - either the duty to serve the interests of others or other duties such as keeping promises, telling the truth, and, particularly, promoting justice. Physicians in the twenty-first century will be seen as having a new, more limited duty to assist the patient in pursuing the patient's understanding of the patient's interest within the constraints of deontological ethical principles and externally imposed duties to promote justice. The result will be a duty to be loyal to the consumer of health care with the recognition that often this will mean that the physician is not permitted to pursue the physician's understanding of the patient's well-being. (shrink)

Health care institutions have paid increasing attention to preventing nosocomial transmission of influenza through vaccination of health care personnel. While multifaceted voluntary interventions have increased vaccination rates, proponents of mandatory programs contend the rates remain unacceptably low. Conventional bioethical analyses of mandatory programs are inadequate; they fail to account for the obligations of nonprofessional personnel or to justify the weights assigned to different ethical principles. Using an ethics framework for public health permits a fuller analysis. The framework's focus on fairness (...) accentuates the potential differences between the risk of transmitting infection and employment status, and the need to equitably evaluate exemptions. The framework's emphasis on balancing benefits and burdens highlights the need to justify a specific goal and questions the need to exclude all nonmedical exemptions. While mandatory vaccination programs are justifiable, greater attention should be paid to their implementation. (shrink)

Health care institutions have paid increasing attention to preventing nosocomial transmission of influenza through vaccination of health care personnel. While multifaceted voluntary interventions have increased vaccination rates, proponents of mandatory programs contend the rates remain unacceptably low. Conventional bioethical analyses of mandatory programs are inadequate; they fail to account for the obligations of nonprofessional personnel or to justify the weights assigned to different ethical principles. Using an ethics framework for public health permits a fuller analysis. The framework's focus on fairness (...) accentuates the potential differences between the risk of transmitting infection and employment status, and the need to equitably evaluate exemptions. The framework's emphasis on balancing benefits and burdens highlights the need to justify a specific goal and questions the need to exclude all nonmedical exemptions. While mandatory vaccination programs are justifiable, greater attention should be paid to their implementation. (shrink)

Proponents of evidence-based medicine and some philosophers of science seem to agree that knowledge of mechanisms can help solve the problem of applying results of controlled studies to target populations (‘the problem of extrapolation’). We describe the problem of extrapolation, characterize mechanisms, and outline how mechanistic knowledge might be used to solve the problem. Our main thesis is that there are four often overlooked problems with using mechanistic knowledge to solve the problem of extrapolation. First, our understanding of mechanisms is (...) often (and arguably, likely to remain) incomplete. Secondly, knowledge of mechanisms is not always applicable outside the tightly controlled laboratory conditions in which it is gained. Thirdly, mechanisms can behave paradoxically. Fourthly, as Daniel Steel points out, using mechanistic knowledge faces the problem of the ‘extrapolator’s circle’. At the same time, when the problems with mechanistic knowledge have been addressed, such knowledge can and should be used to mitigate (nothing can entirely solve) the problem of extrapolation. (shrink)

This paper will consider the right not to know in the context of psychiatric disorders. It will outline the arguments for and against acquiring knowledge about the results of genetic testing for conditions such as breast cancer and Huntington’s disease, and examine whether similar considerations apply to disclosing to clients the results of genetic testing for psychiatric disorders such as depression and Alzheimer’s disease. The right not to know will also be examined in the context of the diagnosis of psychiatric (...) disorders that are associated with stigma or for which there is no effective treatment. (shrink)