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  1. (1 other version)New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
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  • Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
    A number of philosophers have recently become receptive to the idea that, in addition to scientific or causal explanation, there may be a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans and explanandum are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through some constitutive form of determination. I myself have long been sympathetic to this idea of constitutive determination or ‘ontological ground’; and it is the aim of the present paper to help put the idea on a firmer (...)
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  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
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  • Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):394-397.
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  • Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
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  • Resemblance nominalism: a solution to the problem of universals.Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra - 2002 - New York: Clarendon Press.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.
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  • (1 other version)The Structure of Appearance.Nelson Goodman - 1956 - Studia Logica 4:255-261.
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  • Parts of Classes.Michael Potter - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (172):362-366.
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  • Universals: An Opinionated Introduction.Jerrold Levinson & D. M. Armstrong - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):654.
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  • Science without Numbers.Michael D. Resnik - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):514-519.
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  • Vagueness.Loretta Torrago - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):637.
    Consider an object or property a and the predicate F. Then a is vague if there are questions of the form: Is a F? that have no yes-or-no answers. In brief, vague properties and kinds have borderline instances and composite objects have borderline constituents. I'll use the expression "borderline cases" as a covering term for both. ;Having borderline cases is compatible with precision so long as every case is either borderline F, determinately F or determinately not F. Thus, in addition (...)
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  • (1 other version)”Ostrich Nominalism’ or ”Mirage Realism’?Michael Devitt - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):433-439.
    In "nominalism and realism" armstrong carefully demolishes various nominalist responses to plato's "one over many" problem but simply dismissed the quinean response as "ostrich nominalism". The paper argues that plato's problem is pseudo. So to ignore it is not to behave like an ostrich. Rather to adopt realism because of this problem that isn't there is to be a "mirage realist." there are some good reasons that lead armstrong to realism but he is largely a mirage realist. Quine does not (...)
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  • Ways a World Might Be.Robert Stalnaker - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):439-441.
    Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a necessary proposition is true in all possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would (...)
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  • Truthmaking without truthmakers.Joseph Melia - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 67.
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  • The Logical Structure of the World. Pseudoproblems in Philosophy.Rudolf Carnap & Rolf A. George - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (3):551-552.
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  • (2 other versions)Ontological Nihilism.Jason Turner - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6:3-54.
    Ontological nihilism is the radical-sounding thesis that there is nothing at all. This chapter first discusses how the most plausible forms of this thesis aim to be slightly less radical than they sound and what they will have to do in order to succeed in their less radical ambitions. In particular, they will have to paraphrase sentences of best science into ontologically innocent counterparts. The chapter then points out the defects in two less plausible strategies, before going on to argue (...)
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  • (1 other version)Against Ostrich Nominalism: a Reply to Michael Devitt.David Armstrong - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):440-449.
    In my reply to michael devitt, It is argued, First, That quine fails to appreciate the force of plato's "one over many" argument for universals. It is argued, Second, That quine's failure springs in part at least from his doctrine of ontological commitment: from the view that predicates need not be treated with ontological seriousness. Finally, An attempt is made to blunt the force of devitt's contention that realists cannot give a coherent explanation of the way that universals stand to (...)
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  • Things qua truthmakers.David K. Lewis - 2002 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, With His Replies. New York: Routledge. pp. 25-38.
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  • There is no 'truthmaker' argument against nominalism.Josh Parsons - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):325 – 334.
    In his two recent books on ontology, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction, and A World of States of Affairs, David Armstrong gives a new argument against nominalism. That argument seems, on the face of it, to be similar to another argument that he used much earlier against Rylean behaviourism: the Truthmaker Argument, stemming from a certain plausible premise, the Truthmaker Principle. Other authors have traced the history of the truthmaker principle, its appearance in the work of Aristotle [10], Bradley [16], and (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Ontological Nihilism.Jason Turner - 2011 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 6. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)The Structure of Appearance.N. Goodman & Geoffrey Hellman - 1966 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 42 (4):828-829.
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  • (1 other version)Truthmakers and Predication.Daniel Nolan - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 4:171-192.
    To what extent do true predications correspond to truthmakers in virtue of which those predications are true? One sort of predicate which is often thought to not be susceptible to an ontological treatment is a predicate for instantiation, or some corresponding predication (trope-similarity or set-membership, for example). This paper discusses this question, and argues that an "ontological" approach is possible here too: where this ontological approach goes beyond merely finding a truthmaker for claims about instantiation. Along the way a version (...)
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  • Humean Supervenience, Vectorial Fields, and the Spinning Sphere.Ralf Busse - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (4):449-489.
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  • Postscript to Why Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - In E. Jonathan Lowe & Adolf Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-Making. Montreal: Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).
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  • Class Nominalism, Wolterstorff's Objection, and Combinatorial Worlds.Ralf Busse - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):680-700.
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  • (1 other version)Truthmakers and Predication.Daniel Nolan - 2008 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press UK.
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  • Introduction.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2007 - In Robert Stalnaker (ed.), Ways a World Might Be. Oxford University Press Uk.
    This introductory chapter presents an overview of the papers included in this book. The author begins with a discussion on what metaphysics is. He observes recurring themes in his papers that echo the philosophies of W.V. Quine and David Lewis, and cites a mix of agreements and disagreements between Lewis and himself on both substantive and methological issues.
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  • Review of Resemblance Nominalism by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. [REVIEW]Cian Dorr - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):457-461.
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