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  1. William Whewell on the Consilience of Inductions.Larry Laudan - 1971 - The Monist 55 (3):368-391.
    Most contributions to Whewell scholarship have tended to stress the idealistic, antiempirical temper of Whewell’s philosophy. Thus, the only two monograph-length studies on Whewell, Blanché’s Le Rationalisme de Whewell and Marcucci’s L’ ‘Idealismo’ Scientifico di William Whewell, are, as their titles suggest, concerned primarily with Whewell’s departures from classical British empiricism. Particularly in his famous dispute with Mill, it has proved tempting to parody Whewell’s position in the debate by treating it as a straightforward encounter between an arch-empiricist and an (...)
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  • William Whewell's Theory of Scientific Method.Robert Butts - 1970 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):311-312.
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  • The Methodological Heritage of Newton.Robert E. Butts & John Whitney Davis (eds.) - 1970 - University of Toronto Press.
    The essays included in this volume are concerned with assessing Newton's contribution to the thought of others. They explore all aspects of the conceptual background-historical, philosophical, and narrowly methodological-and examine questions that developed in the wake of Newton's science.
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  • Whewell’s Cosilience of Inductions and Predictions.Mary Hesse - 1971 - The Monist 55 (3):520-524.
    In his paper “William Whewell on the Consilience of Inductions” Professor Laudan has suggested that Whewell’s use of “consilience of inductions” is not the same as mine in my paper of that title. Suppose we have a theory T which entails three empirical laws L1, L2, L3. L1 is supposed already confirmed by direct evidence of its instances, but we have as yet no direct evidence for L2 or for L3. Then Laudan distinguishes two problems: Whewell’s problem: T is suggested (...)
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  • Necessary Truth in Whewell's Theory of Science.Robert E. Butts - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (3):161 - 181.
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  • Whewell’s Cosilience of Inductions and Predictions.Mary Hesse - 1971 - The Monist 55 (3):520-524.
    In his paper “William Whewell on the Consilience of Inductions” Professor Laudan has suggested that Whewell’s use of “consilience of inductions” is not the same as mine in my paper of that title. Suppose we have a theory T which entails three empirical laws L1, L2, L3. L1 is supposed already confirmed by direct evidence of its instances, but we have as yet no direct evidence for L2 or for L3. Then Laudan distinguishes two problems: Whewell’s problem: T is suggested (...)
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  • Reply to Mary Hesse.Larry Laudan - 1971 - The Monist 55 (3):525-525.
    I am happy to see Dr. Hesse’s clarification of her earlier discussion of consilience. I shall not comment here on her interesting, if controversial, thesis that a confirmed theory confers no likelihood on its untested entailments, except insofar as the latter are analogous to previously confirmed entailments of that theory. It would be premature to comment on the thesis until Hesse has spelled out in more detail her account of analogy.
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  • Butts on Whewell's view of true causes.David B. Wilson - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (1):121-124.
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  • On Walsh's reading of Whewell's view of necessity.Robert E. Butts - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (2):175-181.
    In a recent paper,[3], Harold T. Walsh has argued that Whewell's commentators have in the past misunderstood his use of “necessary,” that Whewell's theory of necessary truth developed only gradually through thirty years of scholarly activity, finally finding a “mature” expression in Philosophy of Discovery, published in 1860, and that a proper understanding of Whewell's “mature” theory of necessary truth leads to a fundamental re-interpretation of the nature of the Ideas and of their role in scientific systems—that the meaning of (...)
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