In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his (...) overall theory is unacceptable, especially when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately, I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment, (b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim). (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...) unravel the phenomenological distinctions which, respectively, oppose phantasy to perception, on the one hand, and phantasy to other forms of the so-called “intuitive re-presentations”. Second, I introduce the difference between presentative and representative acts, arguing that this cannot help us to single out the defining feature of phantasy experiences. The third section draws again an important distinction between pure phantasy and neutrality modification, which allows me to finally determine an internal trait of phantasy experiences, which Husserl refers to as the “Ego-splitting”. In this way, I hope to contribute to a refined characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination. (shrink)

In a well-known course he gave in 1904-1905, Edmund Husserl developed a ‘threefold’ notion of image revolving around the notion of depiction [Abbildung]. More specifically, the phenomenological description allows a seeing-in to emerge as an essential characteristic of the image consciousness, in which an image object assumes the role of a representant [Repräsentant] in order to allow us to see the image subject in the image itself. Nevertheless, our paper – focusing particularly on what might be called the depictive art (...) par excellence, that is the portrait – aims to show that it would be erroneous to read the Husserlian notion of image exclusively on the basis of this earlier course: things seem to change significantly when Husserl develops a different notion of phantasy, and artistic images, in particular, are not to be thought of as resembling something else, but rather as expressive images producing their own model. (shrink)

Why are we deeply moved by the misfortune of Anna Karenina if we are fully aware that she is simply a fictional character who does not exist in our world?But what does it mean that fictional characters do not exist? The present article is concerned with the ontology of fictional characters. The author concludes thatsuccessful fictional characters become paramount examples of the ‘real’ human condition because they live in an incomplete world what we have cognitive access to but cannot influence (...) in any way and where no deeds can be undone. Unlike all the other semiotic objects, which are culturally subject to revisions, and perhaps only similar to mathematical entities, the fictual characters will never change and will remain the actors of what they did once and forever. (shrink)

Unser Beitrag versucht eine systematische Auslegung des Begriffs der „perzeptiven Phantasie , den Husserl in einigen Aufzeichnungen zum Bildbewusstsein anwendet. Dabei werden drei der wesentlichen Aspekte, die in der Husserl-Literatur das Thema Bild durchgehend bestimmen, einer gründlichen Analyse unterzogen: der Begriff des „Widerstreitbewusstseins , die Idee der „Neutralität und die Scheidung zwischen Impression und Reproduktion. Jedes dieser Themen spielt eine wesentliche Rolle in der husserlschen Auslegung des Bildbewusstseins. Dabei sind aber alle diese Themen, wie wir zeigen wollen, letztlich von einem (...) Einstellungsunterschied bestimmt, der im späteren Nachlass Husserls zwischen Erfahrung und Phantasie besteht. Ausgehend von Husserls Unterscheidung zweier Bedeutungsrichtungen des Begriffs „Phantasie – als „Reproduktion einerseits und als „Modus des Vollzugs andererseits – soll bewiesen werden, dass der Ausdruck „perzeptive Phantasie keineswegs den Beitrag von reproduktiven Akten zur Konstitution der Bildlichkeit betrifft, sondern eben die Tatsache, dass der Bildbetrachtung eine eigentümliche Einstellung, jene des „Als-ob , entspricht. (shrink)

Das ‚Paradoxon der Fiktion‘ steht im Kontext der Frage, warum Fiktionsrezipienten emotional auf Fiktionen reagieren. Das Paradoxon wurde in den Blütezeiten streng kognitivistischer Gefühlstheorien formuliert, denen zufolge Gefühle entweder in Überzeugungen gründen oder selbst eine Art Überzeugung sind. Im Rahmen dieses Paradigmas sind Gefühle, die sich auf Fiktionen beziehen, eine Herausforderung der Rationalität. Wenn auch die heutige Gefühlsforschung streng kognitivistische Gefühlstheorien (narrow cognitivism) zugunsten eines Kognitivismus im weiten Sinne (broad cognitivism) ablehnt, hat die im ‚Paradoxon der Fiktion‘ formulierte Frage ihre (...) Anziehungskraft nicht verloren und erweist sich als hoch produktiv. Die Fruchtbarkeit dieser Debatte zeigt sich, wenn es darum geht, die Rolle der Imagination bei unserer Beschäftigung mit Fiktionen zu erklären, oder darum, unsere emotionalen Reaktionen auf Fiktionen besser zu verstehen. Dieser Aufsatz gliedert sich in fünf Teile. Nach einer Formulierung des Paradoxons der Fiktion und seiner Prämissen (1) werden die wichtigsten Lösungsvorschläge im Rahmen jener streng kognitivistischen Gefühlsmodelle dargestellt, die in der Gefühlsforschung bis zur letzten Jahrhundertwende die Debatte dominiert haben (2). Daraus folgt eine Darstellung des Paradoxons im Kontext des heutigen Kognitivismus in weitem Sinne (3). Im vierten Abschnitt wird die Frage nach der praktischen Rationalität behandelt (4); schließlich wird die Frage nach der Zukunft des Paradoxons gestellt und auf den aktuellen Forschungsbedarf hingewiesen (5). (shrink)

In this paper I trace Husserl’s transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a (...) particular scientific paradigm for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves. (shrink)