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  1. The Hallucinatory Epoché.Jean Naudin & Jean-Michel Azorin - 1997 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 28 (2):171-195.
    This paper focuses on the phenomenological significance of schizophrenics' auditory hallucinations and begins with the face-to-face relationship in order to describe the schizophrenic experience. Following European psychiatrists like Blackenburg and Tatossian, the authors compare the bracketing of reality in the Husserlian phenomenological reduction with that of the hallucinatory experience. "Hallucinatory epoché" is used to refer to the schizophrenic way to experiencing auditory hallucinations. The problem of intentionality is then discussed, in addition to that of dialogue, internal time, living body, and (...)
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  • Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold.Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):81-86.
    Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency.
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  • Egocentrism, allocentrism, and Asperger syndrome.Uta Frith & Frederique de Vignemont - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):719-738.
    In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric (‘‘you'') or an allocentric (‘‘he/ she/they'') stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person (...)
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  • The “minimal self” in psychopathology: Re-examining the self-disorders in the schizophrenia spectrum☆.Michel Cermolacce, Jean Naudin & Josef Parnas - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):703-714.
    The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the ‘mineness’ of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Delusions and double book-keeping.Louis A. Sass - 2013 - In Thomas Fuchs, Thiemo Breyer & Christoph Mundt (eds.), Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy and Psychopathology. New York: Springer. pp. 125–147.
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  • General Psychopathology.Karl Jaspers - 1913 - Johns Hopkins University Press.
    In 1910, Karl Jaspers wrote a seminal essay on morbid jealousy in which he laid the foundation for the psychopathological phenomenology that through his work and the work of Hans Gruhle and Kurt Schneider, among others, would become the ...
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  • Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.John Campbell - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):89-100.
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  • Gibson's affordances.James G. Greeno - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (2):336-342.
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  • Delusional realities.Shaun Gallagher - 2009 - In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 245–268.
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  • First Steps Toward a Psychopathology of "Common Sense".Wolfgang Blankenburg & Aaron L. Mishara - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (4):303-315.
    In addition to discussing some philosophical accounts of common sense, this article considers several ways in which common sense can be altered or disturbed in psychopathology. Common sense can be defined as practical understanding, capacity to see and take things in their right light, sound judgment, or ordinary mental capacity. The philosopher Vico described it as the ability to distinguish the probable from the improbable. Goethe understood common sense as an "organ" that is formed in communication for the purpose of (...)
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  • Phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on delusions: A critical overview.L. Sass & G. Byrom - 2015 - World Psychiatry 14 (2):164–73.
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  • Nous n'avons jamais été modernes: essai d'anthropologie symétrique.Bruno Latour - 1991
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  • The phenomenology of abnormal belief: A philosophical and psychiatric inquiry.Edgar Jones - 1999 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (1):1-16.
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  • (1 other version)The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions.Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.
    After reviewing factors implicated in the generation of delusional beliefs, we conclude that whilst a perceptual aberration coupled with a particular type of attri‐butional bias may be necessary to explain the specific thematic content of a bizarre delusion, neither of these factors, whether in isolation or in combination, is sufficient to explain the presence of delusional beliefs. In contrast to bias models (theories which explain delusion formation in terms of extremes of normal reasoning biases), we advocate a deficit model of (...)
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