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  1. The Subject and Power.Michel Foucault - 1982 - Critical Inquiry 8 (4):777-795.
    I would like to suggest another way to go further toward a new economy of power relations, a way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies more relations between theory and practice. It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point. To use another metaphor, t consists of using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, (...)
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  • Game theory: A practitioner's approach.Thomas C. Schelling - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):27-46.
    To a practitioner in the social sciences, game theory primarily helps to identify situations in which interdependent decisions are somehow problematic; solutions often require venturing into the social sciences. Game theory is usually about anticipating each other's choices; it can also cope with influencing other's choices. To a social scientist the great contribution of game theory is probably the payoff matrix, an accounting device comparable to the equals sign in algebra.
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  • Toward a Social Ontology of the Firm: Reconstitution, Organizing Entity, Institution, Social Emergence and Power.Virgile Chassagnon - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 124 (2):197-208.
    In the past half century, the theory of the firm has become a specific and prolific research field. However, the social ontology of this central institution of capitalism has never truly been the subject of investigation. I consider this negligence harmful for organizational economics and management and, more broadly, for the social sciences, notably because the first and central question raised by the theory of the firm relates to its nature: What is a firm? For this reason, I propose some (...)
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  • Capitalists rule ok? Some puzzles about power.Brian Barry - 2002 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (2):155-184.
    Even if we do not observe those who own or manage capital doing anything, are there nevertheless good reasons for saying that they have power over government? My thesis is that, on any analysis of `power over others' that enables us to say that voters have power over those elected and that consumers have power over producers, we also have to say that those who own or control capital have power over government. Conversely, the reasons that can be given (and (...)
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  • From covariation to causation: A causal power theory.Patricia W. Cheng - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):367-405.
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  • A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise.Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):75.
    We consider two reasons why firms should be owned and run democratically by their workers. The first concerns accountability : Because the employment relationship involves the exercise of power, its governance should on democratic grounds be accountable to those most directly affected. The second concerns efficiency : The democratic firm uses a lower level of inputs per unit of output than the analogous capitalist firm.
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  • Power and causality.Albert Hofstadter - 1935 - Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):5-19.
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