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  1. The Design Argument.Elliott Sober - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.
    This Element analyzes the various forms that design arguments for the existence of God can take, but the main focus is on two such arguments. The first concerns the complex adaptive features that organisms have. Creationists who advance this argument contend that evolution by natural selection cannot be the right explanation. The second design argument - the argument from fine-tuning - begins with the fact that life could not exist in our universe if the constants found in the laws of (...)
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  • Subjective and objective confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
    Confirmation is commonly identified with positive relevance, E being said to confirm H if and only if E increases the probability of H. Today, analyses of this general kind are usually Bayesian ones that take the relevant probabilities to be subjective. I argue that these subjective Bayesian analyses are irremediably flawed. In their place I propose a relevance analysis that makes confirmation objective and which, I show, avoids the flaws of the subjective analyses. What I am proposing is in some (...)
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  • (1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
    The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. (...)
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  • Probabilistic arguments for multiple universes.Kai Draper, Paul Draper & Joel Pust - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):288–307.
    In this paper, we discuss three probabilistic arguments for the existence of multiple universes. First, we provide an analysis of total evidence and use that analysis to defend Roger White's "this universe" objection to a standard fine-tuning argument for multiple universes. Second, we explain why Rodney Holder's recent cosmological argument for multiple universes is unconvincing. Third, we develop a "Cartesian argument" for multiple universes. While this argument is not open to the objections previously noted, we show that, given certain highly (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The design argument.Elliott Sober - 2004 - In William Mann (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 117–147.
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  • The doomsday argument and the number of possible observers.Ken D. Olum - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):164-184.
    If the human race comes to an end relatively shortly, then we have been born at a fairly typical time in the history of humanity; if trillions of people eventually exist, then we have been born in the first surprisingly tiny fraction of all people. According to the 'doomsday argument' of Carter, Leslie, Gott and Nielsen, this means that the chance of a disaster which would obliterate humanity is much larger than usually thought. But treating possible observers in the same (...)
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  • Fine‐Tuning, Multiple Universes and Theism.Rodney D. Holder - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):295–312.
    The universe appears fine-tuned for life. Bayesian confirmation theory is utilized to examine two competing explanations for this fine-tuning, namely design (theism) and the existence of many universes, in comparison with the ’null’ hypothesis that just one universe exists as a brute fact. Some authors have invoked the so-called ’inverse gambler’s fallacy’ to argue that the many-universes hypothesis does not explain the fine-tuning of ’this’ universe, but flaws in this argument are exposed. Nevertheless, the hypothesis of design, being simpler, is (...)
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  • Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization.Marc Lange - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):294-324.
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  • Doomsday--or: The dangers of statistics.Dennis Dieks - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):78-84.
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  • Carnap’s Theory of Probability and Induction.John G. Kemeny - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill.,: Open Court. pp. 711--738.
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  • Inductive Logic and Rational Decisions.Rudolf Carnap - 1971 - In Rudolf Carnap & Richard C. Jeffrey (eds.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press. pp. 5 -- 31.
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