- Agreement and Updating For Self-Locating Belief.Michael Caie - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):513-547.details
|
|
A Problem for Credal Consequentialism.Michael Caie - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
|
|
Academic superstars: competent or lucky?Remco Heesen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4499-4518.details
|
|
Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
|
|
Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of ‘the will to believe’.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):253-268.details
|
|
Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Explosion and the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):385-419.details
|
|
Probabilistic consistency norms and quantificational credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
|
|
Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):15-48.details
|
|
Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
|
|
On the preference for more specific reference classes.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2025-2051.details
|
|
Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments.Don Fallis - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):215-246.details
|
|
Don’t stop believing.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):744-766.details
|
|
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
|
|
A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.details
|
|
The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-47.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Do bets reveal beliefs?Jean Baccelli - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3393-3419.details
|
|
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.details
|
|
Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity.Thomas Icard - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):863-903.details
|
|
Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.details
|
|
Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):362-377.details
|
|
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.details
|
|
Process reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Ben Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.details
|
|
Normativität und Bayesianismus.Stephan Hartmann & Ludwig Fahrbach - 2004 - In Bernward Gesang (ed.), Deskriptive oder normative Wissenschaftstheorie. ontos-Verlag. pp. 177-204.details
|
|
(1 other version)Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief.Martin Smith Philip A. Ebert - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.details
|
|
Nonclassical Minds and Indeterminate Survival.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):379-428.details
|
|
The puzzle of the changing past.L. Barlassina & F. Del Prete - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):59-67.details
|
|
Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-conformists.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):239-247.details
|
|
Reliability Theories of Justified Credence.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):63-94.details
|
|
X - Phi and Carnapian Explication.Joshua Shepherd & James Justus - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):381-402.details
|
|
Accuracy and Evidence.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):579-596.details
|
|
Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
|
|
New foundations for counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.details
|
|
(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
|
|
(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
|
|
Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulford - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).details
|
|
Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
|
|
Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.details
|
|
Confirmation.Franz Huber - 2011 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.details
|
|
Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.details
|
|
Options and Diachronic Tragedy.Brian Hedden - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451.details
|
|
You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
|
|
More trouble for regular probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012details
|
|
Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
|
|
Difference‐Making in Epistemology.Juan Comesaña & Carolina Sartorio - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):368-387.details
|
|
What Language Dependence Problem? A Reply for Joyce to Fitelson on Joyce.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Clark Glymour - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):561-574.details
|
|