In his excellent recent book, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other, Robert Williams argues that, contrary to what many commentators claim, Hegel’s philosophy does not seek to swallow up individuality and difference in an all-embracing and all-consuming absolute, but rather takes individuality and differentiation seriously as essential features of the society and the world in which we live. Williams defends this interpretation by arguing that Hegel understands all forms of genuine human community and interaction - including not just civil (...) society and the state, but also family relations and forgiveness - as modes of reciprocal recognition between individuals. (shrink)

The view that Hegel’s logic is a metaphysical logic has come under criticism in recent years from a number of commentators. Richard Winfield, for example, states unequivocally in Reason and Justice that Hegel’s “foundation-free theory of determinacy … turns out to be a theory of self-determined determinacy with no immediate ontological or epistemological application … It is no more an ontological theory demonstrating that the fundamental structure of reality is something self-determined, than it is an epistemological doctrine ordaining the manner (...) in which reason can arrive at each and every truth”. The view that Hegel’s is a non-foundational, presuppositionless logic is one that I accept. It is clear that Hegel’s logic does not constitute a traditional metaphysics of the kind put forward by, say, Leibniz or Spinoza. Hegel is not offering us metaphysical propositions about presupposed metaphysical entities. He is not therefore presupposing that there is an absolute and then enquiring into what it is. (shrink)

The question of the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics is a continuing one. In the last few decades the idea that Hegel even has a metaphysics has been challenged. Recently Stephen Houlgate has responded to this latter idea and tried to show not only that Hegel has a metaphysics, but of what sort it is. In my view Houlgate is right about Hegel having a metaphysics and also right generally about what sort of metaphysics it is. However, it seems to me (...) that he has made too weak a case for the metaphysics in his presentation of what he takes to be Hegel’s arguments, and as a consequence cannot escape a charge that Hegel might still be either a Kantian or some sort of subjective idealist. What I mean by this is that, to the extent that we are simply limited in our metaphysics to what we can think being to be, there may still be an absolute other which we simply cannot know. Houlgate has made things very clear concerning the conclusion to which we should come about the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics, but has not, in my view, made his argument leading to his conclusions quite strong enough. (shrink)

At the conclusion of TBKH, I expressed the hope that what I had written would provoke others to pursue further the issues raised by the paper. It will be evident from what follows that there is much in “Hegel’s Metaphysics”, Joseph Flay’s response to my paper, with which I do not agree. However, Flay has provided just the kind of thoughtful analysis of the issues that I was hoping for, and for that I am very grateful.

From Kierkegaard’s famous polemic against Hegel’s system, and Marx’s rejection of the “mysticism” of reason, to Heidegger’s claim that Hegel completes the tradition of western metaphysics, and contemporary critics’ identification of Hegel as the authoritative spokesman — the “Master” — for the principles of unity and identity, a standard view has governed interpretations and evaluations of Hegel’s philosophy. Though familiarity with the positions just cited reveals considerable disparity, one does not need an especially discerning eye to recognize the common features (...) of the figures drawn. Hegel is, in all of them, the philosopher of the Absolute, the proponent of metaphysics without equal in the modern world. (shrink)

In his excellent recent book, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other, Robert Williams argues that, contrary to what many commentators claim, Hegel’s philosophy does not seek to swallow up individuality and difference in an all-embracing and all-consuming absolute, but rather takes individuality and differentiation seriously as essential features of the society and the world in which we live. Williams defends this interpretation by arguing that Hegel understands all forms of genuine human community and interaction - including not just civil (...) society and the state, but also family relations and forgiveness - as modes of reciprocal recognition between individuals. (shrink)

The question of the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics is a continuing one. In the last few decades the idea that Hegel even has a metaphysics has been challenged. Recently Stephen Houlgate has responded to this latter idea and tried to show not only that Hegel has a metaphysics, but of what sort it is. In my view Houlgate is right about Hegel having a metaphysics and also right generally about what sort of metaphysics it is. However, it seems to me (...) that he has made too weak a case for the metaphysics in his presentation of what he takes to be Hegel’s arguments, and as a consequence cannot escape a charge that Hegel might still be either a Kantian or some sort of subjective idealist. What I mean by this is that, to the extent that we are simply limited in our metaphysics to what we can think being to be, there may still be an absolute other which we simply cannot know. Houlgate has made things very clear concerning the conclusion to which we should come about the nature of Hegel’s metaphysics, but has not, in my view, made his argument leading to his conclusions quite strong enough. (shrink)