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Previous efforts to bring the Hegelian dialectic closer to a clarification give reason for skepticism. The question: "What is dialectic", according to Dieter Henrich, "has remained without an answer so far". Hegel's objective-idealistic program is, however, so much linked to the possibility of a dialectical logic that it is an urgent desideratum to gain clarity about the stringency of dialectical argumentation. But this is only possible on the basis of a theory of dialectic. Hegel's own reflection on methods cannot be (...) |
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The study ties in with former considerations concerning the problem of phenomenal perception of higher animals. Accordingly the phenomenal character results from the adjustment of perceptions to (species-specific) behavioral dispositions under the principle of self-preservation: an emergence phenomenon provided by the constitutive system unity of perception, valuation and behavior, here named as perc-val-act-system. Thereby the subject of the behavior can be emergentistly explained as an emergent instance of the – systems-theoretically highest rank – perc-val-act-level. In terms of the principle of (...) |
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What corresponds to the present-day ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel’s fundamental intuition is that of a ‘backward going grounding’ obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby ‘wrapping itself into a circle’ – the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple ‘logics’ which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic (...) |
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Hegel's Science of Logic makes the just not low claim to be an absolute, ultimate-grounded knowledge. This project, which could not be more ambitious, has no good press in our post-metaphysical age. However: That absolute knowledge absolutely cannot exist, cannot be claimed without self-contradiction. On the other hand, there can be no doubt about the fundamental finiteness of knowledge. But can absolute knowledge be finite knowledge? This leads to the problem of a self-explication of logic (in the sense of Hegel) (...) |
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The study ties in with former considerations concerning the problem of phenomenal perception of higher animals. Accordingly the phenomenal character, qualia included, results from the adjustment of perceptions to (typal) behavioral dispositions under the principle of self-preservation: an emergence phenomenon provided by the constitutive system unity of perception and behavior, here characterized as percept-act-system. Thereby the subject of behavior can be explained as an emergent instance of the – system-theoretically highest rank – percept-act-level. In terms of the principle of self-preservation (...) |
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RésuméCet article étudie lafaçon dont Hegel élabore sa conception des rapports entre la pensée et la nature dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit. L'examen montre que 1) Hegel étend le concept de raison pour y inclure i'indépendance de la nature à l'endroit de la pensée rationnelle, 2) cette indépendance se révèle dans le donné contingent de l'empiricité, 3) le concept étendu de raison détermine et justifie les présuppositions de la logique hégélienne, et 4) ce même concept limite le rôle de la (...) |
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