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Reasons and the Good

Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press (2006)

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  1. Inference and insight. [REVIEW]Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):633–640.
    All of us are disposed to reason according to the rule of inference modus ponens : from.
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  • Recent Debates about the A Priori.Hartry Field - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.
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  • Introduction.A. R. Peacocke - 1976 - Zygon 11 (4):306-306.
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  • Welfarism in moral theory.Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):598 – 613.
    We take welfarism in moral theory to be the claim that the well-being of individuals matters and is the only consideration that fundamentally matters, from a moral point of view. We argue that criticisms of welfarism due to G.E. Moore, Donald Regan, Charles Taylor and Amartya Sen all fail. The final section of our paper is a critical survey of the problems which remain for welfarists in moral theory.
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  • Hedonic pluralism.Irwin Goldstein - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):49 - 55.
    Hedonic pluralism is the thesis that 'pleasure' cannot be given a single, all-embracing definition. In this paper I criticize the reasoning people use to support this thesis and suggest some plausible all-encompassing analyses that easily avoid the kinds of objections people raise to all-encompassing analyses.
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  • Moral Cognitivism and Motivation.Sigrun Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.
    The impact moral judgments have on our deliberations and actions seems to vary a great deal. Moral judgments play a large part in the lives of some people, who are apt not only to make them, but also to be guided by them in the sense that they tend to pursue what they judge to be of moral value, and shun what they judge to be of moral disvalue. But it seems unrealistic to claim that moral judgments play a pervasive (...)
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