the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood (...) or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks. (shrink)

Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...) that most of us will find very disturbing. (shrink)

The key to understanding self-identity is identifying the transcendental structures that make a temporally extended, continuous, and unified experiential life possible. Self-identity is rooted in the formal, temporalizing structure of intentional experience that underlies psychological continuity. Personal identity, by contrast, is rooted in the content of the particular flow of experience, in particular and primarily, in the convictions adopted passively or actively in reflection by a self-identical subject in the light of her social and traditional inheritances. Secondarily, a person’s identity (...) is rooted in others’ characterizations of that person in the light of the social conventions and constructs of the cultures and traditions that have shaped the personal identity of the ones who make the attributions. Personal identity, on this view, is fundamentally rooted in beliefs, traits—especially character traits—sentiments, and moods, that is, in the subject’s convictions about the true, the good, and the right—and in the commitments to the pursuit of (apparently) worthwhile goods and to the practical identities rooted in those convictions. (shrink)

This paper introduces phenomenology as a distinctive form of transcendental philosophy by exploring a problem that arises with the phenomenological concept of “constitution,” namely, the “paradox of human subjectivity” – the idea that under the transcendental reduction the human subject is both a entity in the world and the ground of all such constitution. Focusing on the question of what conditions must obtain for something to be the bearer of normatively structured intentional content, the paper argues that the appearance of (...) paradox here rests upon a certain naturalistic assumption – namely, that the aspect of subjectivity responsible for transcendental constitution is consciousness conceived as the kind of phenomenal experience we share with other animals. In a final section I try to suggest how transcendentalism and a certain naturalism might nevertheless be reconciled on phenomenological grounds. (shrink)

Locke claims that a person’s identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article draws on (...) phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one’s own body, but also possibly as “other” or “strange.” Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the “mineness” of the body and its “alterity” are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one’s own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person. (shrink)

Die Lebenswelt als personale Welt der Praxis und Welt der endlichen Erkenntnisinteressen. 7. Die Welt als Erwerb.

Steven Crowell has been for many years a leading voice in debates on twentieth-century European philosophy. This volume presents thirteen recent essays that together provide a systematic account of the relation between meaningful experience and responsiveness to norms. They argue for a new understanding of the philosophical importance of phenomenology, taking the work of Husserl and Heidegger as exemplary, and introducing a conception of phenomenology broad enough to encompass the practices of both philosophers. Crowell discusses Husserl's analyses of first-person authority, (...) the semantics of conscious experience, the structure of perceptual content, and the embodied subject, and shows how Heidegger's interpretation of the self addresses problems in Husserl's approach to the normative structure of meaning. His volume will be valuable for upper-level students and scholars interested in phenomenological approaches to philosophical questions in both the European and the analytic traditions. (shrink)

A profound, original, and accessible book that argues that a faith not in God or eternal life, but in the finite, temporal life we lead here on earth is one that gives that life far greater depth of meaning. A manifesto for a truly secular faith that speaks eloquently to both believers and agnostics alike. The philosopher and critic Martin Hägglund believes that we need a new way of thinking about faith. In contrast to the traditional religious faith in eternity, (...) he proposes a secular faith in the value of living in time. He argues that the concept of an eternal heaven actually renders our mortal life meaningless since it assumes that our ultimate aims should be to escape it. Engaging writers and thinkers as diverse as C. S. Lewis, Kierkegaard, St. Augustine, Nietzsche, Martin Luther, and even Karl Ove Knausgaard, Hägglund provides not only a critique of religious ideals, but also a positive, alternative understanding of the beliefs and values that can motivate us to live lives of meaning in the here and now. (shrink)

As is made plain in the critical apparatus and editorial matter appended to the original German publication of Hussed's Ideas II, I this is a text with a history. It underwent revision after revision, spanning almost 20 years in one of the most fertile periods of the philosopher's life. The book owes its form to the work of many hands, and its unity is one that has been imposed on it. Yet there is nothing here that cannot be traced back (...) to Hussed himself. Indeed, the final" clean copy" for publication, prepared by an assistant, was completely reviewed by the master three times and emended by him in detail on each occasion. Nevertheless, in the end the work was in fact not submitted for publication, and after Hussed's pen last touched the manuscript in 1928 it was set aside until posthumously edited and published by the Hussed-Archives in 1952. The story of the composition of Ideas II begins with the "pencil manuscript" of 1912. This is the ultimate textual source for both Ideas II and Ideas III. 2 It has been preserved as a folio of 84 sheets in very dense shorthand of the Gabelsberger system, written mostly with a pencil. It was composed by Hussed "in one stroke" immediately after the completion of I Edmund Husser!: Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phiinomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. Edited by Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus NijhofT, 1952 (Husserliana IV). (shrink)

In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism.

Die beiden in dieser Studienausgabe veroffentlichten Haupt­ texte wurden von Husserl vom Oktober bis Dezember 1910 ge­ schrieben. Sie wurden zum erst en Mal 1973 im Band XIII der H usserliana, Edmund H usserl, Gesammelte Werke, veroffent­ licht.! Beim ersten Text (S. 1ft) handelt es sich urn eine person­ liche Vorbereitung fur die Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" vom Wintersemester 1910/11, beim zweiten Text (S. 15ft) urn Husserls Manuskript dieser Vorlesungen. Dieses hier abgedruckte Manuskript gibt nicht die ganzen wahrend eines Semesters (...) in zwei W ochenstunden gehaltenen Vorlesungen wie­ der, sondern nur ihren erst en Teil, wohl bis Weihnachten 1910. N ach Husserls eigenen Angaben knupften sich an dies en Teil Dis­ kussionen, in denen er ohne Manuskript frei sprach.2 Diese Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" wa­ ren fur Husserl von entscheidender Bedeutung. In zwei von ihm selbst publizierten Schriften, in Formale und transzendentale Lo­ gik (1929) (Husserliana XVII, S. 250, Anm. 1) und im Nachwort zu meinen Ideen (1930) (Husserliana V, S. 150, Anm.), weist Husserl auf diese Vorlesungen, und auch in seinem Nachlass wird 1 Und zwar als Texte Nr. 5 und Nr. 6. Diese Nummerierung sowie auch diejenige der zugehorigen Beilagen wurde in dieser Studienausgabe beibehalten. Die urspriing­ lichen Seitenzahlen der Husserliana-Ausgabe werden in eckigen Klammern wieder­ gegeben. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band enthält Husserls Versuche, einen Beweis für seine These zu entwickeln, dass die Existenz realer transzendenter Objekte ohne Bezug auf ein aktuelles Bewusstsein undenkbar und also unmöglich sei. Die frühesten Texte, die Begründungen für diese These des transzendentalen oder transzendental-phänomenologischen Idealismus enthalten, stammen aus dem Jahr 1908. In ihnen erarbeitet Husserl einerseits die für den Beweisgang wesentlichen Elemente, wie insbesondere die Unterscheidung zwischen realen und idealen Möglichkeiten; andererseits versucht er seine These indirekt dadurch zu stützen, dass er den (...) Phänomenalismus und die realistische Schlusstheorie der äußeren Wahrnehmung, wonach diese in einem Schluss von unmittelbar gegebenen Sinnesdaten auf eine "an sich" bestehende reale Außenwelt bestehe, als unhaltbar zurückweist. Genauer und ausführlicher als in diesen Forschungsmanuskripten von 1908 argumentiert Husserl in den hier veröffentlichten Stücken zweier Vorlesungen, der Vorlesungen "Natur und Geist" (SS 1913) und "Ausgewählte phänomenologische Probleme" (SS 1915), für seinen transzendentalen Idealismus. Gleichwohl bleibt die Argumentation in diesen Texten abstrakt und in wesentlichen Hinsichten ergänzungsbedürftig. In Texten der Folgejahre bemüht sich Husserl, diesen "formal allgemeinen" Beweis, den er einer solipsistischen "Unterstufe" des transzendentalen Idealismus zuweist, zu vervollständigen. Es sind vor allem die von ihm bisher vernachlässigten Aspekte der Leiblichkeit und der Intersubjektivität, die Husserl in hier veröffentlichten Forschungsmanuskripten aus den Jahren 1914/1915 bis 1921 in seine Argumentationen mit einbezieht, indem er zeigt, dass das aktuelle Bewusstsein, auf das alle transzendenten objektiven Realitäten ihrem Sinne nach zurückbezogen sind, ein leibliches Bewusstsein sein muss, das für anderes leibliches Bewusstsein da ist und mit ihm auf dieselbe Realitätenwelt bezogen ist. (shrink)

Burt C. Hopkins presents the first in-depth study of the work of Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein on the philosophical foundations of the logic of modern symbolic mathematics. Accounts of the philosophical origins of formalized concepts—especially mathematical concepts and the process of mathematical abstraction that generates them—have been paramount to the development of phenomenology. Both Husserl and Klein independently concluded that it is impossible to separate the historical origin of the thought that generates the basic concepts of mathematics from their (...) philosophical meanings. Hopkins explores how Husserl and Klein arrived at their conclusion and its philosophical implications for the modern project of formalizing all knowledge. (shrink)

Part 1. Husserl: the outlines of the transcendental-phenomenological system -- 1. Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the natural attitude -- 2. Husserl's theory of the phenomenological reduction: between lifeworld and Cartesianism -- 3. Some methodological problems arising in Husserl's late reflections on the phenomenological reduction -- 4. Facticity and historicity as constituents of the lifeworld in Husserl's late philosophy -- 5. Husserl's concept of the "transcendental person": another look at the Husserl-Heidegger relationship -- 6. Dialectics of the absolute: the systematics of (...) the phenomenological system in Husserl's last period -- Part 2. Husserl, Kant, and neo-Kantianism: from subjectivity to lifeworld as a world of culture -- 7. From being to givenness and back: some remarks on the meaning of transcendental idealism in Kant and Husserl -- 8. Reconstruction and reduction: Natorp and Husserl on method and the question of subjectivity -- 9. A hermeneutic phenomenology of subjective and objective spirit: Husserl, Natorp, and Cassirer -- 10. Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms: between reason and relativism: a critical appraisal -- Part 3. Toward a Husserlian hermeneutics -- 11. The subjectivity of effective history and the suppressed husserlian elements in Gadamer's hermeneutics -- 12. Husserl's "hermeneutical phenomenology" as a philosophy of culture. (shrink)

The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...

Paul Ricoeur has been hailed as one of the most important thinkers of the century. Oneself as Another, the clearest account of his "philosophical ethics," substantiates this position and lays the groundwork for a metaphysics of morals.

Winner of 2002 Edward Goodwin Ballard Prize In a penetrating and lucid discussion of the enigmatic relationship between the work of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Steven Galt Crowell proposes that the distinguishing feature of twentieth-century philosophy is not so much its emphasis on language as its concern with meaning. Arguing that transcendental phenomenology is indispensable to the philosophical explanation of the space of meaning, Crowell shows how a proper understanding of both Husserl and Heidegger reveals the distinctive contributions of (...) each to that ongoing phenomenological project. (shrink)

In this article, I develop how the phenomenological understanding of the intentionality of consciousness allows us to formulate a theory of personal identity that can at least account for the continuity of consciousness through time, provide an account of a certain aspect of what it means to be a person, namely to be able to appropriate one’s past as one’s own, and give an original answer to the question of personal identity and state in what the identity of a person (...) through time consists. After having developed the outlines for such a phenomenological theory of personal identity, I conclude that the provided account of the person is the correlate of the phenomenological concept of world. (shrink)