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  1. What is the unity of consciousness?Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing (...)
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  • Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):191-194.
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  • Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.
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  • Introduction.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2009 - In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.
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  • The reality of appearances.Michael G. F. Martin - 1997 - In M. Sainsbury (ed.), Thought and Ontology. Franco Angeli.
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  • The shallows of the mind.Michael G. F. Martin - 1997 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society:80--98.
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  • Perceptual Experience.T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne - 2009 - Critica 41 (122):124-132.
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  • On active Attention.F. H. Bradley - 1902 - Philosophical Review 11:194.
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  • Perceptual intentionality, attention and consciousness.Naomi M. Eilan - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 181-202.
    of presence cannot be explained by appeal to the notion of non-representational of experience. world see John Campbell, 'The Role of Physical Objects in Thinking', in Representation: Problems Perceptual Intentionality, and.
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  • Sense and Content: Experience, Thought & Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1985 - Mind 94 (375):480-487.
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