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  1. Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance.Gaile Pohlhaus - 2012 - Hypatia 27 (4):715-735.
    I distinguish between two senses in which feminists have argued that the knower is social: 1. situated or socially positioned and 2. interdependent. I argue that these two aspects of the knower work in cooperation with each other in a way that can produce willful hermeneutical ignorance, a type of epistemic injustice absent from Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice. Analyzing the limitations of Fricker's analysis of the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird with attention to the (...)
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  • The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Tamar Gendler - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):55.
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  • Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature.Martha C. Nussbaum - 1990 - Philosophy 68 (266):564-566.
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  • Two Kinds of Unknowing.Rebecca Mason - 2011 - Hypatia 26 (2):294-307.
    Miranda Fricker claims that a “gap” in collective hermeneutical resources with respect to the social experiences of marginalized groups prevents members of those groups from understanding their own experiences (Fricker 2007). I argue that because Fricker misdescribes dominant hermeneutical resources as collective, she fails to locate the ethically bad epistemic practices that maintain gaps in dominant hermeneutical resources even while alternative interpretations are in fact offered by non-dominant discourses. Fricker's analysis of hermeneutical injustice does not account for the possibility that (...)
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  • The problem of speaking for others.Linda Alcoff - 1991 - Cultural Critique 20:5-32.
    This was published in Cultural Critique (Winter 1991-92), pp. 5-32; revised and reprinted in Who Can Speak? Authority and Critical Identity edited by Judith Roof and Robyn Wiegman, University of Illinois Press, 1996; and in Feminist Nightmares: Women at Odds edited by Susan Weisser and Jennifer Fleischner, (New York: New York University Press, 1994); and also in Racism and Sexism: Differences and Connections eds. David Blumenfeld and Linda Bell, Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.
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  • Scepticism and Implicit Bias.Jennifer Saul - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):243-263.
    Saul_Jennifer, Scepticism and Implicit Bias.
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  • Perspectives in imaginative engagement with fiction.Elisabeth Camp - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):73-102.
    I take up three puzzles about our emotional and evaluative responses to fiction. First, how can we even have emotional responses to characters and events that we know not to exist, if emotions are as intimately connected to belief and action as they seem to be? One solution to this puzzle claims that we merely imagine having such emotional responses. But this raises the puzzle of why we would ever refuse to follow an author’s instructions to imagine such responses, since (...)
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  • The Politics of Intellectual Self-trust.Karen Jones - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):237-251.
    Just as testimony is affected by unjust social relations, so too is intellectual self-trust. I defend an account of intellectual self-trust that explains both why it is properly thought of as trust and why it is directed at the self, and explore its relationship to social power. Intellectual self-trust is neither a matter of having dispositions to rely on one?s epistemic methods and mechanisms, nor having a set of beliefs about which ones are reliable. Instead, it is a stance that (...)
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  • The moral psychology of fiction.Gregory Currie - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (2):250 – 259.
    What can we learn from fiction? I argue that we can learn about the consequences of a certain course of action by projecting ourselves, in imagination, into the situation of the fiction's characters.
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  • Imaginative Blocks and Impossibility: An Essay in Modal Psychology.Shaun Nichols - 2006 - In The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
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  • Introduction.Shaun Nichols - 2006 - In The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
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  • Uncharted features and dynamics of reading: Voices, characters, and crossing of experiences.Ben Alderson-Day, Marco Bernini & Charles Fernyhough - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:98-109.
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