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  1. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
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  • Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
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  • A revised paranormal belief scale.Jerome J. Tobacyk - 2004 - International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 23 (23):94-98.
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  • Many reasons or just one: How response mode affects reasoning in the conjunction problem.Ralph Hertwig Valerie M. Chase - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (4):319 – 352.
    Forty years of experimentation on class inclusion and its probabilistic relatives have led to inconsistent results and conclusions about human reasoning. Recent research on the conjunction "fallacy" recapitulates this history. In contrast to previous results, we found that a majority of participants adhere to class inclusion in the classic Linda problem. We outline a theoretical framework that attributes the contradictory results to differences in statistical sophistication and to differences in response mode-whether participants are asked for probability estimates or ranks-and propose (...)
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  • Common Paranormal Belief Dimensions.Neil Dagnall, Andrew Parker, Gary Munley & Kenneth Drinkwater - 2010 - Journal of Scientific Exploration 24 (3).
    Several measures of paranormal belief have been developed and employed by researchers of published work. Despite this, there is considerable debate about the nature and structure of paranormal belief. Particularly, authors remain uncertain about which belief subsets should be included within paranormal scales. The current study extended existing research by exploring shared variance across different paranormal measures. An extensive literature review was undertaken in order to identify measures of paranormal belief. The independent scale items were then combined to produce a (...)
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  • Associative processing and paranormal belief.Lorena R. R. Gianotti, Christine Mohr, Diego Pizzagalli, Dietrich Lehmann & Peter Brugger - 2001 - Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 55 (6):595-603.
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  • A revised paranormal belief scale.Jerome J. Tobacyk - 1988 - Unpublished Manuscript, Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, La.
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  • ESP: extrasensory perception or effect of subjective probability?Peter Brugger & Kirsten I. Taylor - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (6-7):6-7.
    This paper consists of two parts. In the first, we discuss the neuropsychological correlates of belief in a 'paranormal' or magical causation of coincidences. In particular, we review experimental evidence demonstrating that believers in ESP and kindred forms of paranormal phenomena differ from disbelievers with respect to indices of sequential response production and semantic-associative processing. Not only do believers judge artificial coincidences as more 'meaningful' than disbelievers, they also more strongly suppress coincidental productions (i.e. repetitions) in their generation of random (...)
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