With recent advancements in systems engineering and artificial intelligence, autonomous agents are increasingly being called upon to execute tasks that have normative relevance. These are tasks that directly—and potentially adversely—affect human well-being and demand of the agent a degree of normative-sensitivity and -compliance. Such norms and normative principles are typically of a social, legal, ethical, empathetic, or cultural nature. Whereas norms of this type are often framed in the abstract, or as high-level principles, addressing normative concerns in concrete applications of (...) autonomous agents requires the refinement of normative principles into explicitly formulated practical rules. This paper develops a process for deriving specification rules from a set of high-level norms, thereby bridging the gap between normative principles and operational practice. This enables autonomous agents to select and execute the most normatively favourable action in the intended context premised on a range of underlying relevant normative principles. In the translation and reduction of normative principles to SLEEC rules, we present an iterative process that uncovers normative principles, addresses SLEEC concerns, identifies and resolves SLEEC conflicts, and generates both preliminary and complex normatively-relevant rules, thereby guiding the development of autonomous agents and better positioning them as normatively SLEEC-sensitive or SLEEC-compliant. (shrink)

Communication campaigns often highlight environmental progress to encourage further pro-environmental behaviour. Consequently, the drop in carbon emissions caused by the COVID-19 restrictions has been framed as a positive environmental outcome of the pandemic. We conducted an experimental study with a US-representative sample (N = 500) to show that raising awareness of emissions reduction has the contrary effect: an increase in moral self-concept facilitated a negative spillover, namely, it reduced climate-friendly behavioural intentions. Normative influence was able to prevent this negative spillover (...) because activating environmental norms inhibited compensatory feelings. Besides, awareness of recent emissions reduction was less likely to increase the moral self-concept of participants with a strong environmental self-identity. Our findings demonstrate that environmental progress increases moral self-concept which, in turn, could cause a negative spillover (i.e., reduce climate-friendly low-carbon behaviour and increase climate-harmful high-carbon behaviour). Normative influences and environmental self-identity can inhibit this negative spillover. (shrink)

Many have begun to despair that climate justice will prevail even in a minimal form. The affective dimensions of such despair, we suggest, threaten to make climate action appear too demanding. Thus, despair constitutes a moral challenge to individual climate action that has not yet received adequate attention. In response, we defend a duty to act in hope for a more just (climate) future. However, as we see it, this duty falls differentially upon the shoulders of more and less advantaged (...) agents in society. From arguments by Black thinkers like Derrick Bell, we draw a set of distinctions between two types of hope: one for ideal justice, and one for more modest change; and between two types of hopeful actions, those undertaken through formal political channels and those we call 'extra-political' actions; and between two sites of differential moral burdens, those of the privileged and those of the oppressed. Ours is a case for facing even bleak realities, demanding otherwise, and acting in hope to achieve a better future. (shrink)

In the context of understanding Nature's Contribution to People, this article explores the Mapuche value system and its contributions to living well by conserving nature. Through the context-specific approach, the findings shows that the Mapuche Az-Mapu is important for bio-cultural conservation in Chile. Deepening understanding of the distinct Mapuche value system shows the importance of rights and sovereignty for other coastal stateless nations who are enhancing bio-cultural conservation around the world. The article explores the importance of maintaining Mapuche values in (...) the context of Indigenous Marine Areas in Chile and linking to land-based rights. This research makes use of semi structured interviews and intercultural dialogue among the authors, to understand how traditional Mapuche concepts under the framework of Az-Mapu, are continued today in local marine conservation and other ecosystems. In this context, we ask how well these eudemonic relational values resonate with Mapuche values of nature. This article shows that rights for the marine environment can be expanded to additionally allow indigenous communities safeguard wetlands, lakes and forests which are indivisible under Az-Mapu. Greater recognition of this different form of valuation can better account for the dynamic relations between individuals, cultures, and ecosystems, as well as showing the importance in allowing indigenous communities to take back control of conservation under their own terms. (shrink)

The ecosystem services argument is a highly publicised instrumental argument for protecting biodiversity. I develop a new objection to this argument based on the lack of a causal connection from global species losses to local ecosystem changes. I survey some alternative formulations of services arguments, including ones incorporating option value or a precautionary principle, and show that they do not fare much better than the standard version. I conclude that environmental thinkers should rely less on ecosystem services as a means (...) to defend biodiversity, and that attention should be focused on additional types of value which might be attributed to global biodiversity. (shrink)

The control of various introduced species brings to the fore questions around how species are categorised as ‘native’ or ‘invasive’, belonging or not belonging. In far north Queensland, Australia, the Cape York region is a complex mixture of land tenures, including pastoral leases, National Parks and Aboriginal land, and overlapping management agreements. Weed control comprises much of the work that land managers in Cape York do. However, different land managers target different introduced species for control, and the ways in which (...) certain species are understood as more or less problematic indicate how land managers understand and seek to order landscapes. Through investigating the various positions that introduced species occupy, I will explore how Cape York emerges as a ‘hybrid landscape’ that is produced in contested, overlapping and ambiguous ways, and is rife with ‘feral dynamics’. (shrink)

As incoming Editor and Deputy Editor we describe our impression of the current situation that those committed to understanding and upholding environmental values find themselves in. We consider some of the factors that make enviornmental concern difficult to maintain, including conditions that affect us as academics, publishers, global citizens and activists. We describe some of the emerging trends that have appeared in Environmental Values in recent years, in philosophy, ecological economics, critical social science and widening interdisciplinarity in the environmental humanities. (...) We highlight the journal's commitment to engaged, plural and open investigation of environmental values and consider what we might expect and hope for in the coming years. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of African worldviews in biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. African worldviews recognise the interdependence and interconnectedness of human beings, animals, plants and the natural world. Although it is not always the case that what one does depends on what one thinks and believes, indigenous African people's ideas and beliefs about the human-nature relationship have influenced what they have done in and to nature. In African worldviews, the present generation has moral obligations to the ancestors and (...) future generations. It ought to preserve the environment, which is rich in biodiversity, for posterity. This paper insists that it is extremely urgent that every effort be made to document the knowledge of peasant farmers and indigenous people in general. This paper further stresses that indigenous environmental knowledge makes a big difference to sustaining diverse environments, and it is imperative to preserve such knowledge before it dies out. (shrink)

Each year, over 200 million people are infected with the malaria parasite, nearly half a million of whom succumb to the disease. Emerging genetic technologies could, in theory, eliminate the burden of malaria throughout the world by intentionally eradicating the mosquitoes that transmit the disease. In this paper, we offer an ethical examination of the intentional eradication of Anopheles gambiae, the main malaria vector of sub-Saharan Africa. In our evaluation, we focus on two main considerations: the benefit of alleviating the (...) malaria burden, and the loss of value that would accompany the eradication of the species. We outline a typology of the different ways in which species are valued or could be valuable, then use that typology to appraise the value of the species in question. We argue that Anopheles gambiae has minor (and redundant) instrumental value, little final subjective value and no objective final value. (shrink)

This article argues that holistic ecocentrism unnecessarily introduces elements to explain why we ought to halt biodiversity loss. I suggest that atomistic accounts can justify the same conclusion by utilising fewer elements. Hence, why we ought to preserve biodiversity can be made reasonable without adding elements such as intrinsic values of ecosystems or moral obligations to conserve collectives of organisms. Between two equally good explanations of the same phenomenon, the explanation utilising fewer elements, which speaks in favour of atomistic accounts, (...) will be the better one. (shrink)

Abstract:In her 2002 essay, "Anthropocentrism, Artificial Intelligence, and Moral Network Theory: An Ecofeminist Perspective," Victoria Davion points out, utilizing Val Plumwood's ecofeminist analysis, the faulty anthropocentric, logocentric assumptions made both within the artificial intelligence (AI) community, generating serious problems in the effort to build "intelligent" machines, and in moral philosophy, its "rule-based picture of moral reasoning" (169) coming under fire from the emerging field of neural net research. Davion demonstrates prescience regarding the direction in which both disciplines eventually move, as (...) they learn important "lessons from nature": that intelligence and moral reasoning are widely distributed throughout the Biosphere and are not based upon what has been taken as paradigmatic—the reductive, linear logic, abstracted from all context, characteristic of only one possible way of approaching the world. I present updates regarding artificial intelligence, neuropsychology, and the philosophical analysis of anthropocentrism, affirming that directing open, respectful attention toward the Other in the real, living world will eventually provide us with the ontological foundation for a nonanthropocentric ethics capable of sustaining truly intelligent and moral ways of living. (shrink)

Industrial production imposes geographical, economic and cultural distances between producers and consumers. The concept of constituting 'missing objects' can help shrink these distances by enabling actors to engage in discourses and practices about contexts beyond what is materially present. Since the mid-1990s, food miles have emerged as an example of missing objects, representing the distance that agricultural products travel from the farm to the dining table, and the environmental effects of transportation. I analyse how consumers, farmers, activists, industry and policy-makers (...) in the United States and Europe are building agency in making and using food miles. (shrink)