Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Malfunction and Mental Illness.Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):658-670.
    For years a debate has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are social constructions that reflect cultural values. While the majority position among philosophers has been normativist, i.e., that the conception of a mental disorder is value-laden, a vocal and cogent minority have argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that is objective and scientific. Scientists and clinicians have tended to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Towards an understanding of delusions of misidentification: Four case studies.Nora Breen, Diana Caine, Max Coltheart, Julie Hendy & Corrine Roberts - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):74–110.
    Four detailed cases of delusions of misidentification (DM) are presented: two cases of misidentification of the reflected self, one of reverse intermetamorphosis, and one of reduplicative paramnesia. The cases are discussed in the context of three levels of interpretation: neurological, cognitive and phenomenological. The findings are compared to previous work with DM patients, particularly the work of Ellis and Young (1990; Young, 1998) who found that loss of the normal affective response to familiar faces was a contributing factor in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions.Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.
    After reviewing factors implicated in the generation of delusional beliefs, we conclude that whilst a perceptual aberration coupled with a particular type of attri‐butional bias may be necessary to explain the specific thematic content of a bizarre delusion, neither of these factors, whether in isolation or in combination, is sufficient to explain the presence of delusional beliefs. In contrast to bias models (theories which explain delusion formation in terms of extremes of normal reasoning biases), we advocate a deficit model of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • Delusional Beliefs.T. F. Oltmanns & B. A. Maher (eds.) - 1988 - John Wiley.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
    We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   152 citations  
  • Pathologies of belief.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):1-46.
    In this book, psychologists and philosophers describe and discuss a range of case studies of delusional beliefs, drawing out general lessons both for the cognitive architecture of the mind and for the notion of rationality, and exploring connections between the delusional beliefs that occur in schizophrenia and the flawed understanding of beliefs that is characteristic of autism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Belief and awareness: Reflections on a case of persistent anosognosia.Annalena Venneri & Michael F. Shanks - 2004 - Neuropsychologia 42 (2):230-238.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Unawareness of deficits after right hemisphere stroke: Double-dissociations of anosognosias.M. Jehkonen, J. Ahonen, P. Dastidar & J. Vilkki - 2000 - Acta Neurologica Scandinavica 102:378-384.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations