Nineteenth-century American political thinkers like Emerson, Thoreau, and Whitman advocated for and sought to exemplify a life of self-direction and critical self-reflection, or personal autonomy, as a means of contesting entrenched routines of democratic-capitalist normalization and as a way of resisting a host of institutional disciplinary pressures. Today, the ideal of personal autonomy within a diverse liberal society is branded by many as a form of “comprehensive” disciplinary normalization in its own right. In this essay I offer a reconsideration of (...) this reversal in the appraisal of the value of autonomy within pluralistic democratic societies and argue that the abandonment of autonomy is a symptom of a mistaken understanding of the personal-ethical qualities upon which a democratic culture depends and a maladaptive concession to neoliberal norms. To confront these challenges, I draw upon a range of Emerson’s writings to offer some ideas about how a reconstructed ideal of aspirational autonomy might inform contemporary politics without unduly constraining moral pluralism or undermining toleration. (shrink)

Ralph Waldo Emerson famously warned his readers against the dangers of conformity and consistency. In this paper, I argue that this warning informs his engagement with and opposition to a Kantian view of rational agency. The interpretation I provide of some of Emerson's central essays outlines a unique conception of agency, a conception which gives substance to Emerson's exhortations of self-trust. While Kantian in spirit, Emerson's view challenges the requirement that autonomy requires acting from a conception of the law. The (...) key to understanding Emerson's opposition to Kant rests in showing how obeying the law requires spontaneity on the part of the agent herself. Emerson's concerns about conformity and consistency further enrich the view of agency, argued for by Richard Moran, according to which we take responsibility for our minds by taking up a first-person deliberative perspective on our minds. Conformity and consistency in one's thinking and acting permits society and one's own past to dictate when deliberation may come to an end, thereby undermining a crucial sense in which an agent, in taking up the deliberative perspective, has taken responsibility for her mind. (shrink)

This book follows hard upon Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity. Both present the author's influential version of a Kantian theory of normative ethics and metaethics. Whereas The Sources of Normativity was a systematic investigation of "normativity" written as a single unit, the present volume is a collection of previously published papers, some of them already well known and much discussed, dating between 1983 and 1993. By the nature of the case, one might expect less thematic unity in this book than (...) in the other one, but the present book is a deeper and more wide ranging presentation of the author's views. Korsgaard's historical focus in The Sources of Normativity is less on Kant and more on the British moralists. Creating the Kingdom of Ends deals quite explicitly with the interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. The papers in this book contain, in my judgment, the heart of Korsgaard's work: a variety of fresh and illuminating insights into Kant's moral theory and its relation to contemporary ethical theory which have helped to reshape the image of Kant's ethics and to refocus the issues dealt with in current moral philosophy. Or to make claims less grand but of more immediate relevance to this review, there is no question that some of the papers in this book have helped to reshape both the present writer's image of Kant's ethics and his conception of the way questions of ethical theory should be addressed. I hope below to say something both about where I think Korsgaard has gotten these matters right, and where I find her position either unclear or dubious. (shrink)

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...) that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. (shrink)

This book assesses the tempestuous impact and reception history of the Book of Mormon, produced by Joseph Smith in 1830, and the primary scripture of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐day Saints. Givens describes the book's role as a divine testament of the Last Days and as a sacred sign of Joseph Smith's status as a modern‐day prophet. He reviews its claims to be a history of the pre‐Columbian peopling of the Western Hemisphere, first by a small Old World (...) group in the era of Babel, and later by Israelites from Jerusalem in the age of Jeremiah. Givens explores how the Book of Mormon has been defined as a cultural product of early nineteenth‐century America, and also investigates its status as a new American Bible or Fifth Gospel, displacing, supporting, or—in some views—perverting the canonical Word of God. Givens also probes the Book's shifting relationship to Mormon doctrine and its changing reputation among theologians and scholars. Finally, in exploring the Book of Mormon's “revelatory appeal,” Givens finds the key to the Book's role as the engine behind what may become the next world religion. The Book of Mormon describes and enacts a model of revelation that Givens calls “dialogic.” Ultimately, Givens argues, the Book of Mormon has exerted its influence primarily by virtue of what it points to, represents, and claims to be, rather than by virtue of any particular content. (shrink)

Kant's Formula of Humanity famously forbids treating others merely as a means. It is unclear, however, what exactly treating someone merely as a means comes to. This essay argues against an interpretation of this idea advanced by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O'Neill. The essay then develops a new interpretation that suggests an important connection between the Formula of Humanity and Kant's political philosophy: the content of many of our moral duties depends on the results of political philosophy and, indeed, on (...) the results of actual political decision making. (shrink)

There is a strong moral presumption against the use of coercion, and those who are coerced seem to be less responsible for the actions they were coerced to perform. Both these considerations seem to reflect the effect of coercion on the victim’s choice. This paper examines three ways of understanding this effect. First, I argue against understanding victims as unable to engage in genuine action. Next, I consider the suggestion that victims are unable to consent to participate in the coercer’s (...) plan. Although this suggestion is promising, I argue that the inability to consent reflects a more basic problem. Victims are unable to exercise what I call ‘normative authority’: they are unable to make discretionary changes in the permissions and obligations that they and others have. This final account yields a compelling understanding of why coercion is impermissible when it is and reveals a unique way in which impermissible coercion affects the responsibility of victims. (shrink)