- Expanding the Active Mind.Jan Slaby - 2021 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 53 (2):193-209.details
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Can morally ignorant agents care enough?Daniel J. Miller - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):155-173.details
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On Defining “Reliance” and “Trust”: Purposes, Conditions of Adequacy, and New Definitions.Karl de Fine Licht & Bengt Brülde - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):1981-2001.details
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Attributionist Theories of Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 50-70.details
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Liturgical Philosophy of Religion: An Untimely Manifesto on Sincerity, Acceptance, and Hope.Andrew Chignell - 2021 - In M. David Eckel, Allen Speight & Troy DuJardin (eds.), The Future of the Philosophy of Religion. Springer. pp. 73-94.details
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Compensation and Moral Luck.Nora Heinzelmann - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):251-264.details
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IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (2):203-235.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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What do we epistemically owe to each other? A reply to Basu.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):1005-1022.details
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(1 other version)A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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Entkräftung und Widerruf: Fügsame Überzeugungen im Zeitverlauf.Benjamin McMyler - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (6):992-1007.details
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Blameworthiness and constitutive control.Rachel Achs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3695-3715.details
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Doxastic Responsibility is Owed to Others.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:63-77.details
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Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 125-145.details
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Shared Epistemic Responsibility.Boyd Millar - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):493-506.details
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Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.details
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A classification of Newcomb problems and decision theories.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6415-6434.details
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Hurt Feelings.David Shoemaker - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (3):125-148.details
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Emotions, Attitudes, and Reasons.Kelly Epley - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):256-282.details
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Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Nobody’s Perfect: Moral Responsibility in Negligence.Ori Herstein - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 31 (1):109-125.details
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Doxastic responsibility, guidance control, and ownership of belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):82-98.details
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(1 other version)Responsibilism within Reason.Kurt Sylvan - 2020 - In Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.details
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What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.details
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Responsibility for Reason-Giving: The Case of Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption.Emanuela Ceva & Lubomira Radoilska - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):789-809.details
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Don’t Step on the Foul Line: On the (Ir)rationality of Superstition in Baseball.Amber Griffioen - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 56 (223):319-32.details
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Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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Beliefs That Wrong.Rima Basu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Southern Californiadetails
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The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.details
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Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
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The eye's mind: Perceptual process and epistemic norms.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):317-347.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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(1 other version)Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Responsibility for forgetting.Samuel Murray, Elise D. Murray, Gregory Stewart, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1177-1201.details
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Owning Our Implicit Attitudes: Responsibility, Resentment, and the Whole Self.Whitaker Wesley - unknowndetails
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A Spinozist Aesthetics of Affect and Its Political Implications.Christopher Davidson - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press. pp. 185-206.details
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The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy.Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.) - 2017 - Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press.details
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Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press. pp. 38-58.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):318-341.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Responding to Skepticism About Doxastic Agency.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):627-645.details
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Ignorance, Humility and Vice.Fabre Cecile - 2016 - Journal of Practical Ethics 4 (2):25-30.details
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In Defense of Moral Evidentialism.Sharon Ryan - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens.Sebastian Schmidt - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):571-582.details
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Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):174-185.details
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