Ethical reasoning of all types is anthropocentric, in that it is addressed to agents, but anthropocentric starting points vary in the preference they accord the human species. Realist claims about environmental values, utilitarian reasoning and rights-based reasoning all have difficulties in according ethical concern to certain all aspects of natural world. Obligation-based reasoning can provide quite strong if incomplete reasons to protect the natural world, including individual non-human animals. Although it cannot establish all the conclusions to which anti-speciesists aspire, it (...) may establish many of them with some clarity. (shrink)

Bryan Norton 's convergence hypothesis, which predicts that nonanthropocentric and human-based philosophical positions will actually converge on long-sighted, multi-value environmental policy, has drawn a number of criticisms from within environmental philosophy. In particular, nonanthropocentric theorists like J. Baird Callicott and Laura Westra have rejected the accuracy of Norton 's thesis, refusing to believe that his model's contextual appeals to a plurality of human and environmental values will be able adequately to provide for the protection of ecological integrity. These theoretical criticisms (...) of convergence, however, have made no real attempt to engage the empirical validity of the hypothesis, the dimension that Norton clearly takes to be the centerpiece of his project. Accordingly, the present paper attempts to provide an empirical analysis of the convergence argument, by means of a study of the Vermont public's environmental commitments and their attitudes toward national forest policy. Our findings support a generalized version of Norton 's thesis, and lead us to suggest that environmental philosophers should try to be more inclusive and empirically minded in their discussions about public moral claims regarding nature. (shrink)

Land use planning decisions are recognised as being value judgements, yet the questions of what values and whose values are rarely addressed. Values may be absolute or relative, intrinsic or extrinsic, passionately emotional or coolly reasoned, and ‘measured’ in a multitude of ways: by rarity, economics, social or aesthetic interpretations. Using examples of land use planning in Western Australia, I examine some of the complex values brought into play. I conclude that we need to explore, rather than reject, the plurality (...) of values we incorporate into planning decisions. Rather than imposing an artificial order on value confusion, we need to learn how to negotiate our decisions in a world of value complexity and diversity. (shrink)

Concern about the slow progress of liberal representative democracies on questions of sustainable development has encouraged research into alternative forms of democracy which might better inform environmental decision‐making. Forms of deliberative, strong or ‘participatory’ democracy which emphasise greater public involvement in decision‐making have particular appeal for many environmentalists. However, there has been surprisingly little critical evaluation of these theories in an environmental context. This contribution evaluates theories of participatory democracy in the context of environmental management in New Zealand where major (...) restructuring has created new opportunities for experimentation. This opportunity to ‘green’ theories of democracy should force theorists to consider ecological rationality, community diversity, the needs of future generations, claims of intrinsic value, and the political sovereignty of indigenous peoples. (shrink)