In this new book, Michael Friedman argues that Kant's continuing efforts to find a metaphysics that could provide a foundation for the sciences is of the utmost ...

Hans Reichenbach, a philosopher of science who was one of five students in Einstein's first seminar on the general theory of relativity, became Einstein's bulldog, defending the theory against criticism from philosophers, physicists, and popular commentators. This book chronicles the development of Reichenbach's reconstruction of Einstein's theory in a way that clearly sets out all of its philosophical commitments and its physical predictions as well as the battles that Reichenbach fought on its behalf, in both the academic and popular press. (...) The essays include reviews and responses to philosophical colleagues, such as Moritz Schlick and Hugo Dingler; polemical discussions with physicists Max Born and D. C. Miller; as well as popular articles meant to clarify aspects of Einstein's theories and set out their philosophical ramifications for the layperson. At a time when physics and philosophy were both undergoing revolutionary changes in content and method, this book is a window into the development of scientific philosophy and the role of the philosopher. (shrink)

The student of philosophy usually is not irritated by obscure formulations. On the contrary, reading the quoted passage he would presumably be convinced ...

A respected Harvard logician and philosopher gathers together twenty-nine writings dealing with the foundations of mathematics, Rudolf Carnap, lin-guistics, ...

In recent years, Reichenbach's 1920 conception of the principles of coordination has attracted increased attention after Michael Friedman's attempt to revive Reichenbach's idea of a "relativized a priori". This paper follows the origin and development of this idea in the framework of Reichenbach's distinction between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connection. It suggests a further differentiation among the coordinating axioms and accordingly proposes a different account of Reichenbach's "relativized a priori".

überall einen richtigen Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft giebt, in welchem Fall es auch einen Canon derselben geben muß, so wird dieser nicht den speculativen, sondernden pr.ntischen Vernunftgebrauch betreffen, den wir also iezt ...

In this insightful study of the common origins of analytic and continental philosophy, Friedman looks at how social and political events intertwined and influenced philosophy during the early twentieth century, ultimately giving rise to the two very different schools of thought. He shows how these two approaches, now practiced largely in isolation from one another, were once opposing tendencies within a common discussion. Already polarized by their philosophical disagreements, these approaches were further split apart by the rise of Naziism and (...) the resulting emigration of all influential German-speaking philosophers except for Heidegger. Although the book gives a general overview of the philosophical issues of the period, the author pays special attention to the relationships among three key twentieth-century philosophers: Rudolf Carnap, Ernst Cassirer, and Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

Unter den Philosophen war Cassirer einer der ersten, der die philosophischen Probleme erkannte und aufgenommen hat, die durch Fortschritte der modernen Physik aufgeworfen wurden. In seinem Vorwort zu der in diesem Band enthaltenen Schrift "Zur Einsteinschen Relativtätstheorie" erklärt er es zum Ziel seiner Studie, in den aus dieser Theorie folgenden erkenntnistheoretischen Fragen, über welche das Urteil der Philosophen und der Physiker damals noch weit auseinandergingen, eine wechselseitige Verständigung zwischen beiden anzubahnen. Inhalt: Maßbegriffe und Dingbegriffe, Die empirischen und begrifflichen Grundlagen der (...) Relativitätstheorie, Der philosophische Wahrheitsbegriff und die Relativitätstheorie, Materie – Äther – Raum, Der Raum- und Zeitbegriff des kritischen Idealismus und die Relativitätstheorie, Euklidische und Nicht-Euklidische Geometrie, Die Relativitätstheorie und das Problem der Realität. (shrink)

Kants Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft von 1786 stehen ihrem Anspruch nach zwischen einer transzendentalen Kritik der Vernunft - Kant bereitete zur selben Zeit die in wesentlichen Stücken umgearbeitete zweite Auflage der KrV vor - und der Physik als empirischer Wissenschaft. Die Notwendigkeit einer Reflexion über die Naturwissenschaft verhilft dieser Schrift heute wieder zu systematischer Relevanz, nachdem sie lange Zeit nur aus dem Blickwinkel ihrer Bedeutsamkeit für die empirische Naturwissenschaft betrachtet und infolgedessen allenfalls aus wissenschaftshistorischem Interesse rezipiert wurde.

Excerpt from Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen Uber die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik Die erste Anregung zu den Untersuchungen, die dieser Band enthalt, ist mir aus Studien zur Philosophie der Mathe matik erwachsen. Indem ich versuchte, von Seiten der Logik aus einen Zugang zu den Grundbegriffen der Mathematik zu gewinnen, erwies es sich vor allem als notwendig, die B e g r i f f s f u n k t i 0 n e'lhsimaher zu zergliedern und auf ihre Voraussetzungen zuruckzufuhren. Hier (...) aber machte sich alsbald eine eigentumliche Schwierigkeit geltend: die her kommliche logische Lehre vom Begriff zeigte sich in ihren bekannten Hauptzugen als unzureichend, die Probleme, zu denen die Prinzipienlehre der Mathematik hinfuhrt, auch nur vollstandig z u b e z e i c h n e n. Die exakte Wissenschaft war hier, wie sich mir immer deutlicher zu ergeben schien, zu Fragen gelangt, fur welche die Formensprache der tradi tionellen Logik kein genaues Correlat besitzt. Der sachliche Gehalt der mathematischen Erkenntnisse wies auf eine Grund form des Begriffs zuruck, die in der Logik selbst nicht zu klarer Bezeichnung und Anerkennung gekommen war. Ins besondere waren es Untersuchungen jiber den Reihenbegriff und den Grenzbegriff (deren spezielles Ergebnis in die allgemeineren Erorterungen dieses Buches nich? 3iffge nommen werden konnte), die diese Uberzeugung in mir be festigten und damit zu einer erneuten Analyse der Prinzipien der Begriffsbildung selbsfhindrangten. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Kein Geringerer als Arthur Schopenhauer beurteilte Kants Prolegomena als die "schönste und faßlichste aller Kantischen Hauptschriften, welche viel zu wenig gelesen wird, da sie doch das Studium seiner Philosophie außerordentlich erleichtert". Die Prolegomena von 1783 sind eine Kurzfassung der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft", deren Plan und Ergebnisse sie übersichtlich darstellen sollen. In Umkehrung der Methode der Kritik - statt der synthetischen Lehrart wird nun die analytische befolgt - nimmt Kant unter der Leitfrage "Wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich?" eine (...) Inhalts-, Umfangs- und Grenzbestimmung reiner Erkenntnis vor. Orientiert am Ideal der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaft soll der Metaphysik hinsichtlich der Gewißheit ihrer Prinzipien die Nobilitierung einer Wissenschaft zuteil werden, die ihr vor der Kritik versagt war. Damit sind die Prolegomena nicht nur eine Einführung in den Transzendentalen Idealismus Kants, sondern dokumentieren bereits die Weiterführung dieser Kritischen Philosophie, welche sich über die "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" (1785) sowie die "Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft" (1786) bis zur zweiten Auflage der Kritik (1787) und über diese hinaus fortsetzt. (shrink)

The book is an analysis of Kant’s uses and definitions of the three concepts ‘transcendental philosophy’, ‘ontology’ and ‘logic’. It first focuses on Kant’s definitions of ‘transcendental’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, where the term is used for the very first time with a programmatic meaning, as the qualification of Kant’s specific philosophical standpoint. Secondly, it reconstructs Kant’s position towards metaphysics and ontology in his pre-critical and critical writings, as well as its premises in the Leibnizian and Wolffian metaphysics. (...) It last examines the meaning of the concept of logic in Kant's philosophy. All this shows that a new conception of metaphysics emerges from Kant’s critique and within the critical period. (shrink)

Universally recognized as bringing about a revolutionary transformation of the notions of space, time, and motion in physics, Einstein's theory of gravitation, known as "general relativity," was also a defining event for 20th century philosophy of science. During the decisive first ten years of the theory's existence, two main tendencies dominated its philosophical reception. This book is an extended argument that the path actually taken, which became logical empiricist philosophy of science, greatly contributed to the current impasse over realism, whereas (...) new possibilities are opened in revisiting and reviving the spirit of the more sophisticated tendency, a cluster of viewpoints broadly termed transcendental idealism, and furthering its articulation. It also emerges that Einstein, while paying lip service to the emerging philosophy of logical empiricism, ended up siding de facto with the latter tendency. Ryckman's work speaks to several groups, among them philosophers of science and historians of relativity. Equations are displayed as necessary, but Ryckman gives the non-mathematical reader enough background to understand their occurrence in the context of his wider philosophical project. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the history of analytic philosophy in general and of logical positivism in particular. It provides the first detailed and comprehensive study of Rudolf Carnap, one of the most influential figures in twentieth-century philosophy. The focus of the book is Carnap's first major work: Der logische Aufbau der Welt. It reveals tensions within the context of German epistemology and philosophy of science in the early twentieth century. Alan Richardson argues that Carnap's move to philosophy (...) of science in the 1930s was largely an attempt to dissolve the tension in his early epistemology. This book fills a significant gap in the literature on the history of twentieth-century philosophy. It will be of particular importance to historians of analytic philosophy, philosophers of science, and historians of science. (shrink)

In this collection of essays one of the preeminent philosophers of science writing offers a reinterpretation of the enduring significance of logical positivism, the revolutionary philosophical movement centered around the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and 30s. Michael Friedman argues that the logical positivists were radicals not by presenting a new version of empiricism but rather by offering a new conception of a priori knowledge and its role in empirical knowledge. This collection will be mandatory reading for any philosopher or (...) historian of science interested in the history of logical positivism in particular or the evolution of modern philosophy in general. (shrink)

This book introduces a new approach to the issue of radical scientific revolutions, or "paradigm-shifts," given prominence in the work of Thomas Kuhn. The book articulates a dynamical and historicized version of the conception of scientific a priori principles first developed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. This approach defends the Enlightenment ideal of scientific objectivity and universality while simultaneously doing justice to the revolutionary changes within the sciences that have since undermined Kant's original defense of this ideal. Through a modified (...) Kantian approach to epistemology and philosophy of science, this book opposes both Quinean naturalistic holism and the post-Kuhnian conceptual relativism that has dominated recent literature in science studies. Focussing on the development of "scientific philosophy" from Kant to Rudolf Carnap, along with the parallel developments taking place in the sciences during the same period, the author articulates a new dynamical conception of relativized a priori principles. This idea applied within the physical sciences aims to show that rational intersubjective consensus is intricately preserved across radical scientific revolutions or "paradigm-shifts and how this is achieved. (shrink)

This major publication is a history of the semantic tradition in philosophy from the early nineteenth century through its incarnation in the work of the Vienna Circle, the group of logical positivists that emerged in the years 1925-1935 in Vienna who were characterised by a strong commitment to empiricism, a high regard for science, and a conviction that modern logic is the primary tool of analytic philosophy. In the first part of the book, Alberto Coffa traces the roots of logical (...) positivism in a semantic tradition that arose in opposition to Kant's theory that a priori knowledge is based on pure intuition and the constitutive powers of the mind. In Part II, Coffa chronicles the development of this tradition by members and associates of the Vienna Circle. Much of Coffa's analysis draws on the unpublished notes and correspondence of many philosophers. The book, however, is not merely a history of the semantic tradition from Kant 'to the Vienna Station'. Coffa also critically reassesses the role of semantic notions in understanding the ground of a priori knowledge and its relation to empirical knowledge and questions the turn the tradition has taken since Vienna. (shrink)

This book introduces a new approach to the issue of radical scientific revolutions, or "paradigm-shifts," given prominence in the work of Thomas Kuhn. The book articulates a dynamical and historicized version of the conception of scientific a priori principles first developed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant. This approach defends the Enlightenment ideal of scientific objectivity and universality while simultaneously doing justice to the revolutionary changes within the sciences that have since undermined Kant's original defense of this ideal. Through a modified (...) Kantian approach to epistemology and philosophy of science, this book opposes both Quinean naturalistic holism and the post-Kuhnian conceptual relativism that has dominated recent literature in science studies. Focussing on the development of "scientific philosophy" from Kant to Rudolf Carnap, along with the parallel developments taking place in the sciences during the same period, the author articulates a new dynamical conception of relativized a priori principles. This idea applied within the physical sciences aims to show that rational intersubjective consensus is intricately preserved across radical scientific revolutions or "paradigm-shifts and how this is achieved. (shrink)