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On not having a theory of mind

Cognition 27 (3):285-290 (1987)

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  1. Propositional attitudes.Jerry Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):501-23.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
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  • (1 other version)Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology.Daniel Dennett - 1975 - In Richard Healey (ed.), Reduction, Time and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Cambridge University Press.
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  • Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”?Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith - 1985 - Cognition 21 (1):37–46.
    We use a new model of metarepresentational development to predict a cognitive deficit which could explain a crucial component of the social impairment in childhood autism. One of the manifestations of a basic metarepresentational capacity is a ‘ theory of mind ’. We have reason to believe that autistic children lack such a ‘ theory ’. If this were so, then they would be unable to impute beliefs to others and to predict their behaviour. This hypothesis was tested using Wimmer (...)
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  • Gavagai!: Or, the Future History of the Animal Language Controversy.David Premack - 1986 - MIT Press.
    In this witty and fascinating book, Premack examines arguments over whether humans are unique because we can talk.
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  • Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
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  • Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & Guy Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):515-526.
    An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others. As to the mental states the chimpanzee may infer, consider those inferred by our own species, for example, purpose or intention, as well as knowledge, belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, (...)
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  • Intentional communication in the chimpanzee: The development of deception.Guy Woodruff & David Premack - 1979 - Cognition 7 (4):333-362.
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  • (1 other version)“Gavagai!” or the future history of the animal language controversy.David Premack - 1985 - Cognition 19 (3):207-296.
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