This paper forms part of a wider campaign: to deny pointillisme, the doctrine that a physical theory's fundamental quantities are defined at points of space or of spacetime, and represent intrinsic properties of such points or point-sized objects located there; so that properties of spatial or spatiotemporal regions and their material contents are determined by the point-by-point facts. More specifically, this paper argues against pointillisme about the concept of velocity in classical mechanics; especially against proposals by Tooley, Robinson and Lewis. (...) A companion paper argues against pointillisme about -geometry, as proposed by Bricker. To avoid technicalities, I conduct the argument almost entirely in the context of "Newtonian" ideas about space and time, and the classical mechanics of point-particles, i.e. extensionless particles moving in a void. But both the debate and my arguments carry over to relativistic physics. Introduction The wider campaign 2.1 Connecting physics and metaphysics 2.1.1 Avoiding controversy about the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction 2.1.2 Distinction from three mathematical distinctions 2.2 Classical mechanics is not pointilliste, and can be perdurantist 2.2.1 Two versions of pointillisme 2.2.2 Two common claims 2.2.3 My contrary claims 2.3 In more detail... 2.3.1 Four violations of pointillisme 2.3.2 For perdurantism Velocity as intrinsic? 3.1 Can properties represented by vectors be intrinsic to a point? 3.2 Orthodox velocity is extrinsic but local 3.2.1 A question and a debate 3.2.2 The verdict 3.3 Against intrinsic velocity 3.3.1 A common view—and a common problem 3.3.2 Tooley's proposal and his arguments 3.3.3 Tooley's further discussion "Shadow velocities": Lewis and Robinson 4.1 The proposal 4.2 Criticism: the vector field remains unspecified 4.3 Avoiding the presupposition of persistence, using Hilbert's symbol 4.4 Comparison with Robinson and Lewis. (shrink)

In this paper we show that the three main equations used by Bohm in his approach to quantum mechanics are already contained in the earlier paper by Moyal which forms the basis for what is known as the Wigner-Moyal approach. This shows, contrary to the usual perception, that there is a deep relation between the two approaches. We suggest the relevance of this result to the more general problem of constructing a quantum geometry.

We show that the strong form of Heisenberg’s inequalities due to Robertson and Schrödinger can be formally derived using only classical considerations. This is achieved using a statistical tool known as the “minimum volume ellipsoid” together with the notion of symplectic capacity, which we view as a topological measure of uncertainty invariant under Hamiltonian dynamics. This invariant provides a right measurement tool to define what “quantum scale” is. We take the opportunity to discuss the principle of the symplectic camel, which (...) is at the origin of the definition of symplectic capacities, and which provides an interesting link between classical and quantum physics. (shrink)