Can the neo-Aristotelian uphold a pluralist substance ontology while taking seriously the recent arguments in favour of monism based on quantum holism and other arguments from quantum mechanics? In this article, Jonathan Schaffer’s priority monism will be the main target. It will be argued that the case from quantum mechanics in favour of priority monism does face some challenges. Moreover, if the neo-Aristotelian is willing to consider alternative ways to understand ‘substance’, there may yet be hope for a pluralist substance (...) ontology. A speculative case for such an ontology will be constructed based on primitive incompatibility. (shrink)

We show that the Bohmian approach in terms of persisting particles that move on continuous trajectories following a deterministic law can be literally applied to quantum field theory. By means of the Dirac sea model—exemplified in the electron sector of the standard model neglecting radiation—we explain how starting from persisting particles, one is led to standard QFT employing creation and annihilation operators when tracking the dynamics with respect to a reference state, the so-called vacuum. Since on the level of wave (...) functions, both formalisms are mathematically equivalent, this proposal provides for an ontology of QFT that includes a dynamics of individual processes, solves the measurement problem, and explains the appearance of creation and annihilation events. 1Bohmian Mechanics from Quantum Mechanics to Quantum Field Theory2The Dirac Sea Model3Equilibrium States and the Vacuum4Excitations of the Vacuum and the Fock Space Formalism5The Appearance of Particle Creations and Annihilations6The Merits of the Bohmian Approach. (shrink)

Prerequisite to memory is a past distinct from present. Because wave evolution is both continuous and time-reversible, the undisturbed quantum system lacks a distinct past and therefore the possibility of memory. With the quantum transition, a reversibly evolving superposition of values yields to an irreversible emergence of definite values in a distinct and transient moment of time. The succession of such moments generates an irretrievable past and thus the possibility of memory. Bohm’s notion of implicate and explicate order provides a (...) conceptual basis for memory as a general feature of nature akin to gravity and electromagnetism. I propose that natural memory is an outcome of the continuity of implicate time in the context of discontinuous explicate time. Among the ramifications of natural memory are that laws of nature can propagate through time much like habits and that personal memory does not require neural information storage. (shrink)

Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical (...) relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete. (shrink)

A persistent question about the deBroglie–Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics concerns the understanding of Born’s rule in the theory. Where do the quantum mechanical probabilities come from? How are they to be interpreted? These are the problems of emergence and interpretation. In more than 50 years no consensus regarding the answers has been achieved. Indeed, mirroring the foundational disputes in statistical mechanics, the answers to each question are surprisingly diverse. This paper is an opinionated survey of this literature. While acknowledging (...) the pros and cons of various positions, it defends particular answers to how the probabilities emerge from Bohmian mechanics and how they ought to be interpreted. (shrink)

Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful argument in its favor comes from quantum mechanics. Extant discussions of quantum monism are framed independently of any interpretation of the quantum theory. In contrast, this paper argues that matters of interpretation play a crucial role when assessing the viability of monism in the quantum realm. I consider four different interpretations: modal interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, many worlds interpretations, and wavefunction realism. In particular, I (...) extensively argue for the following claim: several interpretations of QM do not support monism at a more serious scrutiny, or do so only with further problematic assumptions, or even support different versions of it. (shrink)

I consider to what extent the phenomenon of interference precludes the possibility of attributing simultaneously determinate values to noncommuting observables, and I show that, while all observables can in principle be taken as simultaneously determinate, it suffices to take a suitable privileged observable as determinate to solve the measurement problem.

Experimental situations in which we observe quantum effects that deviate from the intuitive expectations of the classical world call for an interdisciplinary discussion, and one fundamental issue to be considered is the compatibility between the description of phenomena and the assumption of an objective reality. This paper discusses the ontological interpretation of Bohmian quantum mechanics, focusing on the use of the term “trajectory” and the difficulties associated with its connection to a “real” (objective) trajectory. My conclusion is that the intended (...) realistic interpretation of Bohmian trajectories is highly questionable.Los contextos experimentales que permiten la observación de efectos cuánticos contrarios a los esperables según la intuición clásica son especialmente adecuados para una discusión multidisciplinar, en particular sobre la compatibilidad entre la descripción fenomenológica y una pretendida realidad subyacente. Este artículo discute la interpretación ontológica de la mecánica cuántica en la interpretación de Bohm, centrándose principalmente en su uso del término “trayectoria” y las dificultades inherentes a su conexión con un concepto “real” (objetivo) de la misma. La conclusión es que la pretendida interpretación realista de las trayectorias bohmianas es muy cuestionable. (shrink)

The history and philosophy of science are destined to play a fundamental role in an epoch marked by a major scientific revolution. This ongoing revolution, principally affecting mathematics and physics, entails a profound upheaval of our conception of space, space–time, and, consequently, of natural laws themselves. Briefly, this revolution can be summarized by the following two trends: by the search for a unified theory of the four fundamental forces of nature, which are known, as of now, as gravity, electromagnetism, and (...) strong and weak nuclear forces; by the search for new mathematical concepts capable of elucidating and therefore explaining such a relationship. In fact, the first search is essentially dependent on the second; that is to say, that in order for a new theory of physics to come to light, the development of a deeper geometric theory capable of explaining the structure of space–time on a quantum scale appears to be necessary. On careful consideration, we notice that both of these developments converge in the direction of a unitary and fundamental tendency of modern science—which is the geometrization of theoretical physics and of natural sciences. This new emergent situation carries within it a profound conceptual change, affecting the way in which relations are conceived of, first and foremost, between mathematics and physics. This new paradigm can be summed up by the intimately interdependent points: the immense variety of physical phenomena and of natural forms follows from the equally infinite variety of geometric and topological objects that can be made out in space and from which space is made up; the second point, which ensues from the former one and which is of great historical and epistemological significance, is that mathematics is involved in rather than applied to phenomena. In other words, phenomena are effects that emerge from the geometrical structure of space–time. There is no doubt that this new conception of the relationship between the universe of mathematical ideas and objects and the world of natural phenomena is the true scientific revolution of our century, of great conceptual importance, and consequently, capable of changing our view of science and of nature at one and the same time. It is all at once of a scientific, philosophical and aesthetic order. (shrink)

Greenberger. Horne. Shimony, and Zeilinger gave a new version of the Bell theorem without using inequalities (probabilities). Mermin summarized it concisely; but Bohm and Hiley criticized Mermin's proof from contextualists' point of view. Using the branching space-time language, in this paper a proof will be given that is free of these difficulties. At the same time we will also clarify the limits of the validity of the theorem when it is taken as a proof that quantum mechanics is not compatible (...) with a deterministic world nor with a world that permits correlated space-related events without a common cause. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss how Bohm's interpretation models spin measurements and how the two ways in which spin is a contextual property pertains to the Kochen-Specker theorem. I then present locality principles from which a Bell Inequality can be derived, and I identify which of the locality principles Bohm's interpretation violates at which times. I also present reasons why the spin vector should not be attributed to the Bohmian particles.

The aim of this paper is to give a systematic account of the so-called “measurement problem” in the frame of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is argued that there is not one but five distinct formulations of this problem. Each of them depends on what is assumed to be a “satisfactory” description of the measurement process in the frame of the standard interpretation. Moreover, the paper points out that each of these formulations refers not to a unique problem, (...) but to a set of sub-problems. (shrink)

If the universe and God are identical, as pantheism holds, how can we reconcile the supposed unity of God with the apparent dis-unity of the universe’s elements? I argue that a powers ontology, which generates a form of pantheism under plausible assumptions, is apt to solve the problem of unity. There is reason to think that the directedness of powers is equivalent to the directedness, or intentionality, of mental states. This implies that intentionality is a feature of the physical world (...) at large, not just the mind. As Pfeifer argues, this physical intentionality represents a mild form of panpsychism that is interpretable as a brand of pantheism. I argue that the theory of powers holism explains the unity of the universe’s elements and thus the unity of a pantheistic God, and that powers holism is strengthened by fully recognizing the role of physical intentionality. (shrink)

On Bohm''s formulation of quantum mechanics particles always have determinate positions and follow continuous trajectories. Bohm''s theory, however, requires a postulate that says that particles are initially distributed in a special way: particles are randomly distributed so that the probability of their positions being represented by a point in any regionR in configuration space is equal to the square of the wave-function integrated overR. If the distribution postulate were false, then the theory would generally fail to make the right statistical (...) predictions. Further, if it were false, then there would at least in principle be situations where a particle would approach an eigenstate of having one position but in fact always be somewhere very different. Indeed, we will see how this might happen even if the distribution postulate were true. This will help to show how loose the connection is between the wave-function and the positions of particles in Bohm''s theory and what the precise role of the distribution postulate is. Finally, we will briefly consider two attempts to formulate a version of Bohm''s theory without the distribution postulate. (shrink)

This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from (...) this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger. (shrink)

The dual-aspect monist conjecture launched by Pauli and Jung in the mid-20th century will be couched in somewhat formal terms to characterize it more concisely than by verbal description alone. After some background material situating the Pauli–Jung conjecture among other conceptual approaches to the mind–matter problem, the main body of this paper outlines its general framework of a basic psychophysically neutral reality with its derivative mental and physical aspects and the nature of the correlations that connect these aspects. Some related (...) approaches are discussed to identify key similarities to and deviations from the Pauli–Jung framework that may be useful for cross-fertilization. (shrink)

EXPANDED EDITION (eBook): -/- Infinity Is Not What It Seems...Infinity is commonly assumed to be a logical concept, reliable for conducting mathematics, describing the Universe, and understanding the divine. Most of us are educated to take for granted that there exist infinite sets of numbers, that lines contain an infinite number of points, that space is infinite in expanse, that time has an infinite succession of events, that possibilities are infinite in quantity, and over half of the world’s population believes (...) in a divine Creator infinite in knowledge, power, and benevolence. -/- According to this treatise, such assumptions are mistaken. In reality, to be is to be finite. The implications of this assessment are profound: the Universe and even God must necessarily be finite. -/- The author makes a compelling case against infinity, refuting its most prominent advocates. Any defense of the infinite will find it challenging to answer the arguments laid out in this book. But regardless of the reader’s position, FOREVER FINITE offers plenty of thought-provoking material for anyone interested in the subject of infinity from the perspectives of philosophy, mathematics, science, and theology. -/- This electronic edition of FOREVER FINITE is offered free online for all and is expanded with content that does not appear in the published edition due to print production page limitations. From the Introduction to the Conclusion, Chapters 1–27 are identical to the published print edition, including the page numbering for the chapters. This electronic edition adds an appendix and associated content—specifically, updates to the book’s back matter (68 new endnotes, 17 new bibliographic references, 3 new figure credits, 14 new glossary terms) and front matter (an updated table of contents and this preface note). (shrink)

This is a textbook on quantum mechanics. It is addressed to graduates and advanced undergraduates. The book presents quantum theory as a logically coherent system, placing stronger emphasis on the theory' s probabilistic structure and on the role of symmetries. It makes students aware of foundational problems from the very beginning, but at the same time, it urges them to adopt a pragmatic attitude towards the quantum formalism. The book consists of five parts. Part I is a review of classical (...) physics, including probability theory, and a historical introduction to quantum theory. Part II presents quantum theory in terms of six fundamental principles. The principles are presented together with the necessary mathematical background and with applications to simple systems. Part III analyses the properties of quantum particles. It starts with the description of symmetries, continues to non-relativistic particles, the introduction of spin, and particle statistics. It concludes with a symmetries-based introduction to relativistic quantum systems and with the first steps towards relativistic quantum field theory. Part IV presents techniques adapted to specific problems: the structure and spectra of composite systems, decays and transitions, particle scattering, and open quantum systems. Finally, Part V revisits quantum foundations: quantum measurement theory, the major interpretations of quantum theory, and the frontiers of quantum theory in contemporary research. (shrink)

The paper first sketches out a reply to the underdetermination challenge and the incommensurability challenge that rebuts the sceptical conclusions of these challenges and that is sufficient to lay the ground for the project of a metaphysics of nature. That metaphysics is as hypothetical as are our scientific theories. The paper then explains how can one can argue for certain views in the metaphysics of nature based on our current fundamental physical theories, namely the commitments to a tenseless theory of (...) time and existence instead of a tensed one, to events instead of substances, and to relations instead of intrinsic properties. Finally, the paper mentions the themes of causation, laws and dispositions. (shrink)

The claim of the freedom of the will (understood as an individual who is transcendent to Nature) in the name of XXth century scientific knowledge, against the perspective of XVIIIth-XIXth century scientific materialism, is analysed and refuted in the present paper. The hypothesis of reductionism finds no obstacle within contemporary natural sciences. Determinism in classical physics is irrefutable, unless classical physics is itself refuted. From quantum mechanics, some authors argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism (...) in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, here I defend the opposite thesis because indeterminism does not imply free will, and because the considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against neuroscience or evolutionary theories about human beings. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms. (shrink)

What happens to the inner light of consciousness with the death of the individual body and brain? Reductive materialism assumes it simply fades to black. Others think of consciousness as indicating a continuation of self, a transformation, an awakening or even alternatives based on the quality of life experience. In this issue, speculation drawn from theoretic research are presented. -/- Table of Contents Epigraph: From “The Immortal”, Jorge Luis Borges iii Editor’s Introduction: I Killed a Squirrel the Other Day, Gregory (...) M. Nixon iv-xi Research Essays The Tilde Fallacy and Reincarnation: Variations on a "Skeptical" Argument Teed Rockwell 862-881 Death, Consciousness, and Phenomenology, Steve Bindeman 882-899 The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death, Bernardo Kastrup 900-909 Consciousness, a Cosmic Phenomenon—A Hypothesis, Eva Déli 910-930 The Theory of a Natural Afterlife: A Newfound, Real Possibility for What Awaits Us at Death, Bryon K. Ehlmann 931-950 Near-Death Cases Desegregating Non-Locality/Disembodiment via Quantum Mediated Consciousness: An Extended Version of the Cell-Soul Pathway, Contzen Pereira & J Shashi Kiran Reddy 951-968 On the Possible Existence of Quantum Consciousness After Brain Death, Massimo Pregnolato & Alfredo Pereira Jr. 969-991 Science and Postmortem Survival, Edward F. Kelly 992-1011 Explorations ISS Theory: Cosmic Consciousness, Self, and Life Beyond Death in a Hyperdimensional Physics, Chris H. Hardy 1012-1035 Does the Consciousness End, Remain Awake, or Transform After Death? Radivoj Stankovich (with Micho Durdevich) 1036-1050 Big Bang Spirituality, Life, and Death, Ken Bausch 1051-1063 Death, Consciousness and the Quantum Paradigm, Ronald Peter Glasberg 1064-1077 Living With Limits: The Continuum of Consciousness, Donald Brackett 1078-1098 Mysticism, Consciousness, Death, Mike Sosteric 1099-1118 What Dies? Eternalism and the Afterlife in William James, Jonathan Bricklin 1119-1140 Theories of Consciousness and Death: Does Consciousness End, Continue, Awaken, or Transform When the Body Dies? Roger Cook 1141-1153 It’s the Other Way Around: Matter is a Form of Consciousness and Death is the End of the Illusion of Life in the World, James P. Kowall & Pradeep B. Deshpande 1154-1208 Statements A Feminine Vision for the World Consciousness, & a New Outrageous Ontology, Lorna Green 1209-1217 The Mask of Eternity: The Quest for Immortality and the Afterlife, Iona Miller 1218-1228 Are We Really “such stuff as dreams are made on”? Chris Nunn 1229-1225 Is the Afterlife a Non-Question? (Let's Hope Not), Deepak Chopra 1226-1230 Life After Death? An Improbable Essay, Stuart Kauffman 1231-1236. (shrink)

The quantum theory of de Broglie and Bohm solves the measurement problem, but the hypothetical corpuscles play no role in the argument. The solution finds a more natural home in the Everett interpretation.

It is a frequent assumption that—via superluminal information transfers—superluminal signals capable of enabling communication are necessarily exchanged in any quantum theory that posits hidden superluminal influences. However, does the presence of hidden superluminal influences automatically imply superluminal signalling and communication? The non-signalling theorem mediates the apparent conflict between quantum mechanics and the theory of special relativity. However, as a ‘no-go’ theorem there exist two opposing interpretations of the non-signalling constraint: foundational and operational. Concerning Bell’s theorem, we argue that Bell employed (...) both interpretations, and that he finally adopted the operational position which is associated often with ontological quantum theory, e.g., de Broglie–Bohm theory. This position we refer to as “effective non-signalling”. By contrast, associated with orthodox quantum mechanics is the foundational position referred to here as “axiomatic non-signalling”. In search of a decisive communication-theoretic criterion for differentiating between “axiomatic” and “effective” non-signalling, we employ the operational framework offered by Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication, whereby we distinguish between Shannon signals and non-Shannon signals. We find that an effective non-signalling theorem represents two sub-theorems: Non-transfer-control theorem, and Non-signification-control theorem. Employing NTC and NSC theorems, we report that effective, instead of axiomatic, non-signalling is entirely sufficient for prohibiting nonlocal communication. Effective non-signalling prevents the instantaneous, i.e., superluminal, transfer of message-encoded information through the controlled use—by a sender-receiver pair —of informationally-correlated detection events, e.g., in EPR-type experiments. An effective non-signalling theorem allows for nonlocal quantum information transfer yet—at the same time—effectively denies superluminal signalling and communication. (shrink)

Psychological empirical research has shown that human choice behavior often violates the assumptions of classical rational choice models. In the last few decades a new research field has emerged which aims to account for the observed choice behavior by resorting to the concepts and mathematical techniques developed in the realm of quantum physics, such as the “mental state vector” defined in a Hilbert space and the interference of quantum probability. This article is a short introduction to the quantum-like approach to (...) the description of cognitive processes. I argue that the mathematical apparatus of quantum physics can account for the observed violations of classical logic and can help develop effective models of psychological and cognitive phenomena. This is illustrated through the so-called conjunction and disjunction fallacies by providing an alternative interpretation of the results of Linda test and Hawaii test. No-fallacy configurations are made possible in the quantum-like approach by sequential modeling of mental states transitions. (shrink)

This paper suggests an epistemic interpretation of Belnap’s branching space-times theory based on Everett’s relative state formulation of the measurement operation in quantum mechanics. The informational branching models of the universe are evolving structures defined from a partial ordering relation on the set of memory states of the impersonal observer. The totally ordered set of their information contents defines a linear “time” scale to which the decoherent alternative histories of the informational universe can be referred—which is quite necessary for assigning (...) them a probability distribution. The “historical” state of a physical system is represented in an appropriate extended Hilbert space and an algebra of multi-branch operators is developed. An age operator computes the informational depth of historical states and its standard deviation can be used to provide a universal information/energy uncertainty relation. An information operator computes the encoding complexity of historical states, the rate of change of its average value accounting for the process of correlation destruction inherent to the branching dynamics. In the informational branching models of the universe, the asymmetry of phenomena in nature appears as a mere consequence of the subject’s activity of measuring, which defines the flow of time-information. (shrink)

Whilst a straightforward consequence of the formalism of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, the phenomenon of quantum teleportation has given rise to considerable puzzlement. In this paper, the teleportation protocol is reviewed and these puzzles dispelled. It is suggested that they arise from two primary sources: (1) the familiar error of hypostatizing an abstract noun (in this case, ‘information’) and (2) failure to differentiate interpretation dependent from interpretation independent features of quantum mechanics. A subsidiary source of error, the simulation fallacy, is also (...) identified. The resolution presented of the puzzles of teleportation illustrates the benefits of paying due attention to the logical status of ‘information’ as an abstract noun. Introduction The quantum teleportation protocol 2.1 Some information-theoretic aspects of teleportation 2.1.1 Preamble 2.1.2Application to teleportation The puzzles of teleportation Resolving (dissolving) the problem 4.1 The simulation fallacy The teleportation process under different interpretations 5.1 Collapse interpretations:Dirac/von Neumann, GRW 5.2 No collapse and no extra values: Everett 5.3 No collapse, but extra values: Bohm 5.3.1 A note on active information 5.4 Ensemble and statistical viewpoints Concluding remarks. (shrink)

This article offers a review of the relationship of methodological positivism and post-World War II U.S. sociology, especially its transformations in the last three decades of the twentieth century. With this as context, sociological methodology is rethought in terms of what cultural critics refer to as infra-empiricism that allows for a rethinking of bodies, matter and life through new encounters with visceral perception and pre-conscious affect. Thinking infra-empiricism as a new empiricism at this time means rethinking methodology in relationship to (...) the changing configuration of economy, governance disciplinarity and control in the early twenty-first century. (shrink)

Consider a circle and a pair of its semicircles. Which is prior, the whole or its parts? Are the semicircles dependent abstractions from their whole, or is the circle a derivative construction from its parts? Now in place of the circle consider the entire cosmos (the ultimate concrete whole), and in place of the pair of semicircles consider the myriad particles (the ultimate concrete parts). Which if either is ultimately prior, the one ultimate whole or its many ultimate parts?

Quantum mechanics is certainly a strange place to start an investigation into the nature of the relationship between science and society. However, this article begins by integrating its history and proceeds through current conceptions of it by some physicists to examine quantum mechanics as an intersection of both science and knowledge. A famous thought experiment by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen pointed to an area that few physicists still research–a paradigm gone awry. Yet the vast majority of physiciststoday do not agonize (...) over this uncertainty. Physics today presses forward with indominable speed and precision. But by questioning a small sample of physicists doing physics about their practice, this study aims at an everyday physicist’s understanding of the matter; a paradox that lies between the results of experiment and their interpretation or place as knowledge in society. For Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, the paradox was that we can only determine the spin of an entangled particle–it only becomes real–after measuring the spin of its partner particle. For a few contemporary physicists, the problem is how to understand the fact that a measured particle “teleports” its state instantaniously to another point in space. Practicing physicist resolve this, to put it simply, by just using it. Quantum mechanics, as with physics, is incredibly accurate–accepting it as truth yields results that physicists and society can use. By interrogating this process in its historicity and current formulation, this article sheds some light on the way physics works as knowledge. It provides a possibility for turning the scientific eye toward the very meaning of science. (shrink)

The deBroglie–Bohm quantum potential is the potential energy function of the wave field. The quantum potential facilitates the transference of energy from wave field to particle and back again which accounts for energy conservation in isolated quantum systems. Factors affecting energy exchanges and the form of the quantum potential are discussed together with the related issues of the absence of a source term for the wave field and the lack of a classical back reaction.

I present a thought experiment in quantum mechanics and tease out some of its implications for the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence”, which, following Shimony, I take to be the proposition that quantum mechanics does not force us to revise or abandon the relativistic picture of causality. I criticize the standard arguments in favour of peaceful coexistence on the grounds that they are question-begging, and suggest that the breakdown of Lorentz-invariant relativity as a principle theory would be a natural development, given (...) the general trend of physics in this century. (shrink)

(2002). Bub and the barriers to quantum ontology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 285-289. doi: 10.1080/0269859022000013346.

Many attempts have been made to provide Quantum Field Theory with conceptually clear and mathematically rigorous foundations; remarkable examples are the Bohmian and the algebraic perspectives respectively. In this essay we introduce the dissipative approach to QFT, a new alternative formulation of the theory explaining the phenomena of particle creation and annihilation starting from nonequilibrium thermodynamics. It is shown that DQFT presents a rigorous mathematical structure, and a clear particle ontology, taking the best from the mentioned perspectives. Finally, after the (...) discussion of its principal implications and consequences, we compare it with the main Bohmian QFTs implementing a particle ontology. (shrink)

In this essay I examine various aspects of the nearcentury-long debate concerning the conceptualfoundations of quantum mechanics and the problems ithas posed for physicists and philosophers fromEinstein to the present. Most crucial here is theissue of realism and the question whether quantumtheory is compatible with any kind of realist orcausal-explanatory account which goes beyond theempirical-predictive data. This was Einstein's chiefconcern in the famous series of exchanges with NielsBohr when he refused to accept the truth orcompleteness of a doctrine (orthodox QM) (...) which ruledsuch questions to be strictly inadmissible. I discussthe later history of quantum-theoretical debate withparticular reference to the issue of nonlocality,i.e., the phenomenon of superluminal(faster-than-light) interaction betweenwidely-separated particles. Then I show how thestandard `Copenhagen' interpretation of QM hasinfluenced current anti-realist orontological-relativist approaches to philosophy ofscience. Indeed, there are clear signs that somephilosophers have retreated from a realist positionvery largely in response to just these problems. So itis important to ask exactly why – on what scientificor philosophical grounds – any preferred alternative(causal-realist) construal should have been ruled outas a matter of orthodox QM wisdom. Moreconstructively, my paper presents various arguments infavour of one such alternative, the `hidden-variables'theory developed since the early 1950s by David Bohmand consistently marginalised by proponents of theCopenhagen doctrine. (shrink)

In this essay, I offer a critical evaluation of Hilary Putnam's writings on epistemology and philosophy of science, in particular his engagement with interpretative problems in quantum mechanics. I trace the development of his thinking from the late 1960s when he adopted a strong causal-realist position on issues of meaning, reference, and truth, via the "internal realist" approach of his middle-period writings, to the various forms of pragmatist, naturalized, or "commonsense" epistemology proposed in his latest books. My contention is that (...) Putnam's retreat from a full-fledged realist outlook has been prompted in large part by his belief that it cannot possibly be reconciled with the implications of quantum mechanics for our understanding of processes and events in the subatomic domain. However, I suggest, this response should be seen as premature given the range of as-yet unresolved problems with quantum mechanics on the orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretation and also the existence of an alternative account - David Bohm's hidden-variables theory - which perfectly matches the established predictive-observational results while providing a credible realist ontology. I also examine Putnam's case for adopting a nonstandard (three-valued) "quantum logic" in relation to the thinking of other philosophers - Michael Dummett among them - who have espoused a more global or doctrinaire version of anti-realism. I conclude that Putnam's early (causal-realist) position is by no means untenable in light of the various arguments that he now takes as counting decisively against it. (shrink)

Recent literature on Bohm's alternative to mainstream quantum mechanics may create the misleading impression that, except for perfunctory dismissals, the theory was ignored by the physics community in the years immediately following its proposal. As a matter of fact, Einstein, Pauli, and Heisenberg all published criticisms of Bohm's theory, explaining their reasons for not accepting the theory. These criticisms will be discussed and evaluated in this article.

In this article I deal with the notion of observation, from a phenomenologically motivated point of view, and its representation mainly by means of the formal language of quantum mechanics. In doing so, I have taken the notion of observation in two diverse contexts. In one context as a notion related with objects of a logical-mathematical theory taken as registered facts of phenomenological perception ( Wahrnehmung ) inasmuch as this phenomenological idea can also be linked with a process of measurement (...) on the quantum-mechanical level. In another context I have taken it as connected with a notion of temporal constitution basically as it is described in E. Husserl’s texts on the phenomenology of temporal consciousness. Given that mathematical objects as formal-ontological objects can be thought of as abstractions of perceptual objects by means of categorial intuition, the question is whether and under what theoretical assumptions we can, in principle, include quantum objects in abstraction in the class of formal-ontological objects and thus inquire on the limits of their description within a formal-axiomatical theory. On the one hand, I derive an irreducibility on the level of individuals taken in formal representation as syntactical atoms-substrates without any further content and on the other hand a transcendental subjectivity of consciousness objectified as a self-constituted temporal unity upon which it is ultimately grounded the possibility of generation of an abstract predicative universe of discourse. (shrink)

Because intelligent agents employ physically embodied cognitive systems to reason about the world, their cognitive abilities are constrained by the laws of physics. Scientists have used digital computers to develop and validate theories of physically embodied cognition. Computational theories of intelligence have advanced our understanding of the nature of intelligence and have yielded practically useful systems exhibiting some degree of intelligence. However, the view of cognition as algorithms running on digital computers rests on implicit assumptions about the physical world that (...) are incorrect. Recently, the view is emerging of computing systems as goal-directed agents, evolving during problem solving toward improved world models and better task performance. A full realization of this vision requires a new logic for computing that incorporates learning from experience as an intrinsic part of the logic, and that permits full exploitation of the quantum nature of the physical world. This paper proposes a theory of physically embodied cognitive agents founded upon first-order logic, Bayesian decision theory, and quantum physics. An abstract architecture for a physically embodied cognitive agent is presented. The cognitive aspect is represented as a Bayesian decision theoretic agent; the physical aspect is represented as a quantum process; and these aspects are related through von Neumann’s principle of psycho-physical parallelism. Alternative metaphysical positions regarding the meaning of quantum probabilities and the role of efficacious choices by agents are discussed in relation to the abstract agent architecture. The concepts are illustrated with an extended example from the domain of science fiction. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom has it that chaotic behavior is either strongly suppressed or absent in quantum models. Indeed, some researchers have concluded that these considerations serve to undermine the correspondence principle, thereby raising serious doubts about the adequacy of quantum mechanics. Thus, the quantum chaos question is a prime subject for philosophical analysis. The most significant reasons given for the absence or suppression of chaotic behavior in quantum models are the linearity of Schrödinger’s equation and the unitarity of the time-evolution described (...) by that equation. Both are shown in this essay to be irrelevant by demonstrating that the crucial feature for chaos is the nonseparability of the Hamiltonian. That demonstration indicates that quantum chaos is likely to be exhibited in models of open quantum systems. A measure for probing such models for chaotic behavior is developed, and then used to show that quantum mechanics has chaotic models for systems having a continuous energy spectrum. The prospects of this result for vindicating the correspondence principle (or the motivation behind it, at least) are then briefly examined. (shrink)

Eighty years after de Broglie’s, and a little more than half a century after Bohm’s seminal papers, the de Broglie–Bohm theory (a.k.a. Bohmian mechanics), which is presumably the simplest theory which explains the orthodox quantum mechanics formalism, has reached an exemplary state of conceptual clarity and mathematical integrity. No other theory of quantum mechanics comes even close. Yet anyone curious enough to walk this road to quantum mechanics is soon being confused by many misleading signposts that have been put up, (...) and not just by its detractors, but unfortunately enough also by some of its proponents. This paper outlines a road map to help navigate ones way. (shrink)

Standard quantum mechanics undeniably violates the notion of separability that classical physics accustomed us to consider as valid. By relating the phenomenon of quantum nonseparability to the all-important concept of potentiality, we effectively provide a coherent picture of the puzzling entangled correlations among spatially separated systems. We further argue that the generalized phenomenon of quantum nonseparability implies contextuality for the production of well-defined events in the quantum domain, whereas contextuality entails in turn a structural-relational conception of quantal objects, viewed as (...) carriers of dispositional properties. It is finally suggested that contextuality, if considered as a conditionalization preparation procedure of the object to be measured, naturally leads to a separable concept of reality whose elements are experienced as distinct, well-localized objects having determinate properties. In this connection, we find it necessary to distinguish the meaning of the term reality from the criterion of reality for us. The implications of the latter considerations for the notion of objectivity in quantum mechanics are also discussed. (shrink)

Under certain conditions private information can be a source of trade. Arbitrage for instance can occur as a result of the existence of private information. In this paper we want to explicitly model information. To do so we define an ‘information function’. This information function is a mathematical object, also known as a so called ‘wave function’. We use the definition of wave function as it is used in quantum mechanics and we attempt to show the usefulness of this wave (...) function in an economic context. We attempt to answer the following questions. How does the information function relate to private information? How can we use the information function to define the ‘quantity’ of information? How can we use the information function in arbitrage-based option pricing? How can the information function be used in the formulation of a so called Universal Brownian motion? (shrink)