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  1. Why abortion is immoral.Don Marquis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.
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  • Animal welfare and animal rights.L. W. Sumner - 1988 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13 (2):159-175.
    Animal liberationists tend to divide into two mutually antagonistic camps: animal welfarists, who share a utilitarian moral outlook, and animal rightists, who presuppose a structure of basic rights. However, the gap between these groups tends to be exaggerated by their allegiance to oversimplified versions of their favored moral frameworks. For their part, animal rightists should acknowledge that rights, however basic, are also defeasible by appeals to consequences. Contrariwise, animal welfarists should recognize that rights, however derivative, are capable of constraining appeals (...)
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  • On the moral and legal status of abortion.Mary Anne Warren - 1973 - The Monist 57 (1):43-61.
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  • A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
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  • Preference and urgency.T. M. Scanlon - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):655-669.
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  • When did you first begin to feel it?John A. Burgess & S. A. Tawia - 1996 - Locating the Beginnings of Human Consciousness? Bioethics 10 (1):1-26.
    In this paper we attempt to sharpen and to provide an answer to the question of when human beings first become conscious. Since it is relatively uncontentious that a capacity for raw sensation precedes and underpins all more sophisticated mental capacities, our question is tantamount to asking when human beings first have experiences with sensational content. Two interconnected features of our argument are crucial. First, we argue that experiences with sensational content are supervenient on facts about electrical activity in the (...)
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  • When Did You First Begin to Feel It? — Locating the Beginning of Human Consciousness.S. A. Tawia J. A. Burgess - 2007 - Bioethics 10 (1):1-26.
    ABSTRACT In this paper we attempt to sharpen and to provide an answer to the question of when human beings first become conscious. Since it is relatively uncontentious that a capacity for raw sensation precedes and underpins all more sophisticated mental capacities, our question is tantamount to asking when human beings first have experiences with sensational content. Two interconnected features of our argument are crucial. First, we argue that experiences with sensational content are supervenient on facts about electrical activity in (...)
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  • When did you first begin to feel it? — Locating the beginning of human consciousness.J. A. Burgess & S. A. Tawia - 1996 - Bioethics 10 (1):1-26.
    In this paper we attempt to sharpen and to provide an answer to the question of when human beings first become conscious. Since it is relatively uncontentious that a capacity for raw sensation precedes and underpins all more sophisticated mental capacities, our question is tantamount to asking when human beings first have experiences with sensational content. Two interconnected features of our argument are crucial. First, we argue that experiences with sensational content are supervenient on facts about electrical activity in the (...)
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  • The human embryo: A scientist's point of view.Mary J. Seller - 1993 - Bioethics 7 (2-3):135-140.
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