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Why abortion is immoral

Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202 (1989)

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  1. Wittgenstein, ethics and basic moral certainty.Nigel Pleasants - 2008 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):241 – 267.
    Alice Crary claims that “the standard view of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics” is dominated by “inviolability interpretations”, which often underlie conservative readings of Wittgenstein. Crary says that such interpretations are “especially marked in connection with On Certainty”, where Wittgenstein is represented as holding that “our linguistic practices are immune to rational criticism, or inviolable”. Crary's own conception of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics, which I call the “intrinsically-ethical reading”, derives from the influential New Wittgenstein school (...)
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  • Introduction: Ethics and stem cell research.Laura Grabel & Lori Gruen - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (2-3):137–152.
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  • Welfare and the achievement of goals.Simon Keller - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):27-41.
    I defend the view that an individual''s welfareis in one respect enhanced by the achievementof her goals, even when her goals are crazy,self-destructive, irrational or immoral. This``Unrestricted View'''' departs from familiartheories which take welfare to involve only theachievement of rational aims, or of goals whoseobjects are genuinely valuable, or of goalsthat are not grounded in bad reasons. I beginwith a series of examples, intended to showthat some of our intuitive judgments aboutwelfare incorporate distinctions that only theUnrestricted View can support. Then, (...)
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  • “More on respect for embryos and potentiality: Does respect for embryos entail respect for in vitro embryos?”.Stephen S. Hanson - 2006 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (3):215-226.
    It is commonly assumed that persons who hold abortions to be generally impermissible must, for the same reasons, be opposed to embryonic stem cell research [ESR]. Yet a settled position against abortion does not necessarily direct one to reject that research. The difference in potentiality between the embryos used in ESR and embryos discussed in the abortion debate can make ESR acceptable even if one holds that abortion is impermissible. With regard to their potentiality, in vitro embryos are here argued (...)
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  • (1 other version)Abortion, killing, and maternal moral authority.Soran Reader - 2008 - Hypatia 23 (1):132-149.
    : A threat to women is obscured when we treat "abortion-as-evacuation" as equivalent to "abortion-as-killing." This holds only if evacuating a fetus kills it. As technology advances, the equivalence will fail. Any feminist account of abortion that relies on the equivalence leaves moral room for women to be required to give up their fetuses to others when it fails. So an account of the justification of abortion-as-killing is needed that does not depend on the equivalence.
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  • (1 other version)Bitak-od-rođenja.Suki Finn - 2023 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (1):7-32.
    Žene su nedovoljno zastupljene u filozofiji, a trudnoća je nedovoljno istražena u filozofiji. Može li se uspostaviti veza između ta dva fenomena? Tvrdit ću da, iako je kontrafaktična tvrdnja "da su žene bile povijesno bolje zastupljene u filozofiji, trudnoća bi bila također zastupljena" možda istinita, to ne znači nužno da sada, u sadašnjosti, možemo očekivati (ili poželjeti) da postoji korelacija. Kako bismo shvatili jaz između ovih dvaju područja nedovoljne zastupljenosti, dovoljno je usvojiti ne-esencijalističko shvaćanje žena kako bismo prepoznali da neke (...)
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  • Alternate nuclear transfer is no alternative for embryonic stem cell research.John A. Fennel - 2008 - Bioethics 22 (2):84–91.
    ABSTRACT Recent developments allow for the creation of human stem cells without the creation of human embryos, a process called alternate nuclear transfer (‘ANT’). Pursuing this method of stem cell research makes sense for pro‐lifers if arguments for the sanctity of the human embryo do not apply to ANT. However, the technology that makes ANT possible undermines the erstwhile technical barrier between human embryos and somatic cell DNA. These advances bring home the force of hypothetical arguments about the potential of (...)
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  • Ronald Dworkin, Reverence for Life, and the Limits of State Power.Eric Rakowski - 2001 - Utilitas 13 (1):33.
    Ronald Dworkin claims in Life's Dominion that our tradition of religious toleration shields decisions to abort a pregnancy and to end one's life with the assistance of others because they pivot on judgements about the value of human life that are essentially spiritual. He further maintains that the state may regulate these decisions to ensure that they honour appropriately life's sacred or intrinsic value. This article disputes the first of Dworkin's claims. Tolerating other people's religious practices does not entail acquiescing (...)
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  • (1 other version)Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2021 - Utilitas:1-13.
    A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...)
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  • (1 other version)Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (2):154-166.
    A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...)
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  • Abortion and the Epicurean challenge.Karl Ekendahl - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (4):273-274.
    In a recent article in this journal, Anna Christensen raises an ‘Epicurean challenge’ to Don Marquis’ much-discussed argument for the immorality of abortion. According to Marquis’ argument, abortion is pro tanto morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of ‘a future like ours’. Drawing on the Epicurean idea that death cannot harm its victim because there is no subject to be harmed, Christensen argues that neither fetuses nor anyone else can be deprived of a future like ours by dying. Thus, (...)
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  • The ontological and moral significance of persons.Jason T. Eberl - 2017 - Scientia et Fides 5 (2):217-236.
    Many debates in arenas such as bioethics turn on questions regarding the moral status of human beings at various stages of biological development or decline. It is often argued that a human being possesses a fundamental and inviolable moral status insofar as she is a “person”; yet, it is contested whether all or only human beings count as persons. Perhaps there are non-human person, and perhaps not every human being satisfies the definitional criteria for being a person. A further question, (...)
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  • Metaphysics, Reason, and Religion in Secular Clinical Ethics.Jason T. Eberl - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 21 (6):17-18.
    I support Abram Brummett’s contention that there is a need for secular clinical ethics to acknowledge that various positions typically advocated for by ethicists, concerning bedside decision-making and broader policy-making, rely upon metaphysical commitments that are not often explicit. I further note that calls for “neutrality” in debates concerning conscientious refusals to provide legal health care services—such as elective abortion or medical aid-in-dying—may exhibit biases against specific metaphysical claims regarding, for instance, the ontological and moral status of fetuses or the (...)
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  • Is it in the best interests of an intellectually disabled infant to die?D. Wilkinson - 2006 - Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (8):454-459.
    One of the most contentious ethical issues in the neonatal intensive care unit is the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from infants who may otherwise survive. In practice, one of the most important factors influencing this decision is the prediction that the infant will be severely intellectually disabled. Most professional guidelines suggest that decisions should be made on the basis of the best interests of the infant. It is, however, not clear how intellectual disability affects those interests. Why should intellectual disability (...)
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  • Abortion and Non-Fallacious Potentiality.Travis Dumsday - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):387-394.
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  • (1 other version)Abortion and the Beginning and End of Human Life.Don Marquis - 2006 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (1):16-25.
    The doctrine that it is wrong to end the existence of something because it is a human life I call “the standard view.” I argue that attempts by proponents of abortion choice to avoid the implications of the standard view by suggesting that we don't know when life begins or by suggesting that fetuses are only potential lives fail. Nevertheless, opponents of abortion choice should not base their arguments on the standard view, for the standard view is false. I propose (...)
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  • A defence of the potential future of value theory.Don Marquis - 2002 - Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (3):198-201.
    In this issue of the journal Mark Brown has offered a new argument against my potential future of value theory. I argue that even though the premises of this new argument are far more defensible than the premises of his old argument, the new argument does not show that the potential future of value theory of the wrongness of killing is false. If the considerations to which Brown appeals are used, not to show that the potential future of value theory (...)
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  • Deprivations, futures and the wrongness of killing.Don Marquis - 2001 - Journal of Medical Ethics 27 (6):363-369.
    In my essay, Why abortion is immoral, I criticised discussions of the morality of abortion in which the crucial issue is whether fetuses are human beings or whether fetuses are persons. Both argument strategies are inadequate because they rely on indefensible assumptions. Why should being a human being or being a person make a moral difference? I argued that the correct account of the morality of abortion should be based upon a defensible account of why killing children and adults is (...)
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  • Abortion and human nature.D. Marquis - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (6):422-426.
    According to the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion, the best explanation for the presumptive serious wrongness of killing innocent post-natal children and adults is that killing them deprives them of all of the goods of life that they would have experienced had they not been killed. These future goods can be called their “futures of value”. Fetuses have futures like ours. Therefore, given some assumptions, ending their lives is seriously presumptively wrong, or so the argument goes.1iThe (...)
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  • Fathers and Abortion.Ezio Di Nucci - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (4):444-458.
    I argue that it is possible for prospective mothers to wrong prospective fathers by bearing their child; and that lifting paternal liability for child support does not correct the wrong inflicted to fathers. It is therefore sometimes wrong for prospective mothers to bear a child, or so I argue here. I show that my argument for considering the legitimate interests of prospective fathers is not a unique exception to an obvious right to procreate. It is, rather, part of a growing (...)
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  • Broadening the future of value account of the wrongness of killing.Ezio Di Nucci - 2015 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 18 (4):587-590.
    On Don Marquis’s future of value account of the wrongness of killing, ‘what makes it wrong to kill those individuals we all believe it is wrong to kill, is that killing them deprives them of their future of value’. Marquis has recently argued for a narrow interpretation of his future of value account of the wrongness of killing and against the broad interpretation that I had put forward in response to Carson Strong. In this article I argue that the narrow (...)
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  • Abortion: Strong's counterexamples fail.Ezio Di Nucci - 2009 - Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (5):304-305.
    This paper shows that the counterexamples proposed by Strong in 2008 in the Journal of Medical Ethics to Marquis’s argument against abortion fail. Strong’s basic idea is that there are cases — for example, terminally ill patients — where killing an adult human being is prima facie seriously morally wrong even though that human being is not being deprived of a "valuable future". So Marquis would be wrong in thinking that what is essential about the wrongness of killing an adult (...)
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  • Where’s the Body?: Victimhood as the Wrongmaker in Abortion.Jacob Derin - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (3):1041-1057.
    Much of the work in moral philosophy and the political debate on abortion has focused on when in human development personhood begins. In this article, using a variant of Derek Parfit’s view on personal identity, I instead frame the question as one of victimhood. I argue for what I call the Victim Requirement for the wrongness of killing–killing is wrong only if there is an identifiable victim. An identifiable victim is, temporally speaking, in the midst of a chain of psychological (...)
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  • Abortion and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law.Lara Denis - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):547-579.
    The formula of universal law (FUL) is a natural starting point for philosophers interested in a Kantian perspective on the morality of abortion. I argue, however, that FUL does not yield much in the way of promising or substantive conclusions regarding the morality of abortion. I first reveal how two philosophers' (Hare's and Gensler's) attempts to use Kantian considerations of universality and prescriptivity fail to provide analyses of abortion that are either compelling or true to Kant=s understanding of FUL. I (...)
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  • Embryo Loss and Moral Status.James Delaney - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (3):252-264.
    There is a significant debate over the moral status of human embryos. This debate has important implications for practices like abortion and IVF. Some argue that embryos have the same moral status as infants, children, and adults. However, critics claim that the frequency of pregnancy loss/miscarriage/spontaneous abortion shows a moral inconsistency in this view. One line of criticism is that those who know the facts about pregnancy loss and nevertheless attempt to conceive children are willing to sacrifice embryos lost for (...)
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  • The harm of death, time-relative interests, and abortion.David Degrazia - 2007 - Philosophical Forum 38 (1):57–80.
    Regarding the sinking lifeboat scenario involving several human beings and a dog, nearly everyone agrees that it is right to sacrifice the dog. I suggest that the best explanation for this considered judgment, an explanation that appears to time-relative interests, contains a key insight about prudential value. This insight, I argue, also provides perhaps the most promising reply to the future-like-ours argument, which is widely regarded as the strongest moral argument against abortion. Providing a solution to a longstanding puzzle in (...)
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  • Identity, Killing, and the Boundaries of Our Existence.David Degrazia - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (4):413-442.
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  • Moral Status, Human Identity, and Early Embryos: A Critique of the President's Approach.David DeGrazia - 2006 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (1):49-57.
    Underlying President Bush's view regarding stemcell research and cloning are two assumptions: we originate at conception, and we have full moral status as soon as we originate. I will challenge both assumptions, argue that at least the second is mistaken, and conclude that the President's approach is unsustainable.
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  • Um Embrião não é um Indivíduo (An Embryo is not an Individual).Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2019 - Dissertatio 49:133-145.
    Um argumento recorrente contra a liberalização do aborto parte do pressuposto de que, desde o momento da fertilização, seres humanos são indivíduos (no sentido de serem algo que necessariamente ocorre em uma entidade apenas). Nesse artigo, argumento que esse não é um caso a partir da possibilidade de geminação monozigótica e do fato de identidades serem necessárias. Defendo as premissas do argumento e discuto as possíveis interpretações de sua conclusão. Argumento que a interpretação completa da conclusão desse argumento está em (...)
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  • Having a Future.Charles B. Daniels - 1992 - Dialogue 31 (4):661-.
    In a recent article, Don Marquis canvasses the arguments on both sides of the abortion controversy and then puts forward his own argument against abortion:A. To deprive someone of the value of his or her future is prima facie wrong.B. The future an adult has is included in the future of the fetus it developed from.C. Abortion deprives the fetus of the value of its future.D. Therefore, abortion is prima facie wrong.I wish to show that this reasoning in no way (...)
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  • Abortion and multifetal pregnancy reduction: An ethical comparison.Silje Langseth Dahl, Rebekka Hylland Vaksdal, Mathias Barra, Espen Gamlund & Carl Tollef Solberg - 2021 - Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 1:51-73.
    In recent years, multifetal pregnancy reduction has increasingly been a subject of debate in Norway. The intensity of this debate reached a tentative maximum when the Legislation Department delivered their interpretative statement, Section 2 - Interpretation of the Abortion Act, in 2016 in response to a request from the Ministry of Health that the Legislation Department consider whether the Abortion Act allows for MFPR of healthy fetuses in multiple pregnancies. The Legislation Department concluded that the current abortion legislation [as of (...)
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  • What justifies the United States ban on federal funding for nonreproductive cloning?Thomas V. Cunningham - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4):825-841.
    This paper explores how current United States policies for funding nonreproductive cloning are justified and argues against that justification. I show that a common conceptual framework underlies the national prohibition on the use of public funds for cloning research, which I call the simple argument. This argument rests on two premises: that research harming human embryos is unethical and that embryos produced via fertilization are identical to those produced via cloning. In response to the simple argument, I challenge the latter (...)
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  • Enforced pregnancy, rape, and the image of woman.Ann E. Cudd - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (1-2):47 - 59.
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  • Thomson 50 Years Later.Elliott R. Crozat - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):177-197.
    Approximately 50 years have passed since Judith Jarvis Thomson wrote A Defense of Abortion (1971). Her article has significantly shaped the philosophical literature on abortion. In this paper, I will summarize some of the interesting and important work done on the topic since Thomson's article. I will highlight Thomson as a defender of the claim that abortion is morally permissible and Don Marquis as an influential opponent of that claim. I will start by articulating Thomson's case, focusing on the violinist (...)
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  • Material Persons, Immaterial Souls and an Ethic of Life.Kevin Corcoran - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):218-228.
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  • Slippery Slopes, Moral Slides and Human Nature.Gary Colwell - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (1).
    Causal slippery slope arguments with moral conclusions are sometimes stronger than we think. Their strength may be missed either by overlooking the problems of human nature which support the arguments or, upon seeing the problems, by underestimating their influence upon human behaviour. This article aims to correct the oversight and the misjudgement by looking in some detail at four interrelated problems of human nature which have a direct bearing upon moral causal slope arguments.
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  • Spontaneous abortion and unexpected death: a critical discussion of Marquis on abortion.Mary Clayton Coleman - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):89-93.
    In his classic paper, ‘Why abortion is immoral’, Don Marquis argues that what makes killing an adult seriously immoral is that it deprives the victim of the valuable future he/she would have otherwise had. Moreover, Marquis contends, because abortion deprives a fetus of the very same thing, aborting a fetus is just as seriously wrong as killing an adult. Marquis’ argument has received a great deal of critical attention in the two decades since its publication. Nonetheless, there is a potential (...)
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  • Meeting the Epicurean challenge: a reply to ’Abortion and Deprivation'.Nick Colgrove - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (6):380-383.
    Anna Christensen argues that it is implausible to claim that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they deprive individuals of a future like ours. In this essay, I provide two responses to Christensen’s argument. First, I show that the premises upon which Christensen’s argument relies have implausible implications. Second, I provide a direct response to Christensen’s challenge, showing that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they do deprive individuals of an FLO. Doing so involves drawing a (...)
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  • Continuing conversations about abortion and deprivation.Anna Christensen - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (4):275-276.
    In ‘Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, I argued that Marquis’ argument about abortion encounters the Epicurean Challenge. In this essay, I continue the conversation begun there. I aim to motivate the Challenge further by examining Marquis’ argument on his own terms and responding to objections about whom death deprives, whether we should focus on the action of killing or the result of death, and how harms suffered before existence compare to harms suffered after death. Finally, I suggest that (...)
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  • Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis.Anna Christensen - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (1):22-25.
    In ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’, Don Marquis argues that abortion is wrong for the same reason that murder is wrong, namely, that it deprives a human being of an FLO, a ‘future like ours,’ which is a future full of value and the experience of life. Marquis’ argument rests on the assumption that the human being is somehow deprived by suffering an early death. I argue that Marquis’ argument faces the ‘Epicurean Challenge’. The concept of ‘deprivation’ requires that some discernible (...)
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  • The Moral Justification of Abortion.Chen Rongxia - 2007 - Contemporary Chinese Thought 39 (2):49-60.
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  • It’s Complicated: What Our Attitudes toward Pregnancy, Abortion, and Miscarriage Tell Us about the Moral Status of Early Fetuses.K. Lindsey Chambers - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (8):950-965.
    Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption: early fetuses can elicit feelings of joy, love, indifference, or distress. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses reflect a real difference in their moral status, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain that difference. (...)
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  • Political Conviction and Epistemic Injustice.Spencer Case - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):197-216.
    Epistemic injustice occurs when we fail to appropriately respect others as epistemic agents. Philosophers building on the work of Miranda Fricker, who introduced the concept, have focused on epistemic injustices involving certain social categories, particularly race and gender. Can there be epistemic injustice attached to political conviction and affiliation? I argue yes: politics can be a salient social category that draws epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustices might also be intersectional, based on the overlap of politics and some other identity category like (...)
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  • Two puzzles for Marquis's conservative view on abortion.Robert F. Card - 2006 - Bioethics 20 (5):264–277.
    ABSTRACT Don Marquis argues that abortion is morally wrong in most cases since it deprives the fetus of the value of its future. I criticize Marquis’s argument for the modified conservative view by adopting an argumentative strategy in which I work within his basic account: if it is granted that his fundamental idea is sound, what follows about the morality of abortion? I conclude that Marquis is faced with a dilemma: either his position must shift towards the extreme conservative view (...)
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  • Epicureanism and the Wrongness of Killing.Tim Burkhardt - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (2):177-192.
    This paper argues that Epicureanism about death is consistent with grounding the wrongness of killing in the interests of the victim. Both defenders and critics of Epicureanism should agree that, if we knew Epicureanism to be false, then we would have a moral reason not to kill people. We would have this reason because we would know that killing people harms them. And even Epicureans should agree that, given their evidence, Epicureanism could be false. Given that it could be false, (...)
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  • A Sperm and Ovum Separately! Contra Marquis on Abortion and Contraception.Tim Burkhardt - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):1-15.
    Don Marquis argues that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong because it deprives the foetus of a valuable future. This paper argues that there is no morally relevant difference between the relations that foetuses stand in to valuable futures and those that gametes stand in to such futures. Therefore, Marquis’ account implies that contraception is prima facie seriously wrong. My argument for this conclusion has a significant advantage over existing criticisms of Marquis based on controversial accounts of personal identity. It (...)
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  • Forgetting your scruples.Adam Bugeja - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2889-2911.
    It can sound absurd to report that you have forgotten a moral truth. Described cases in which people who have lost moral beliefs exhibit the behavioural and phenomenological symptoms of forgetting can seem similarly absurd. I examine these phenomena, and evaluate a range of hypotheses that might be offered to explain them. These include the following proposals: that it is hard to forget moral truths because they are believed on the basis of intuition; that moral forgetting seems puzzling for the (...)
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  • Situated Personhood: Insights from Caregivers of Minimally Communicative Individuals.Johnny Brennan, Molly Kelleher, Rossio Motta-Ochoa, Stefanie Blain-Moraes & Laura Specker Sullivan - 2023 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 16 (2):64-94.
    For caregivers of minimally communicative individuals, providing support in the absence of clearly meaningful responses is ethically fraught. We conducted a secondary analysis of qualitative data from caregivers of individuals who are minimally communicative, including persons with advanced dementia and individuals in disorders of consciousness. Our analysis led to two central claims: (1) Personhood is a threshold concept that is situated, relational, and dynamic and (2) in circumstances in which personhood is difficult to judge, caregivers can “fill the gap” to (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Morality of Killing Human Embryos.Bonnie Steinbock - 2006 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (1):26-34.
    The morality of embryonic stem cell research depends on the moral status of human embryos. I defend the interest view against some of Don Marquis's objections, and show that on his own Valuable Futures account, ESCR is morally permissible.
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  • The Impairment Argument and Future-Like-Ours: A Problematic Dependence.Christopher Bobier - 2023 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 20 (3):353-357.
    In response to criticism of the impairment argument for the immorality of abortion, Bruce Blackshaw and Perry Hendricks appeal to Don Marquis’s future-like-ours (FLO) account of the wrongness of killing to explain why knowingly causing fetal impairments is wrong. I argue that wedding the success of the impairment argument to FLO undermines all claims that the impairment argument for the immorality of abortion is novel. Moreover, I argue that relying on FLO when there are alternative explanations for the wrongness of (...)
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