The idea that the language we speak influences the way we think has evoked perennial fascination and intense controversy. According to the strong version of this hypothesis, called the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis after the American linguists who propounded it, languages vary in their semantic partitioning of the world, and the structure of one’s language influences how one understands the world. Thus speakers of different languages perceive the world differently. Although the last two decades have been marked by extreme skepticism concerning the (...) possible effects of language on thought, recent theoretical and methodological advances in cognitive science have given the question new life. Research in linguistics and linguistic anthropology has revealed striking differences in cross-linguistic semantic patterns, and cognitive psychology has developed subtle techniques for studying how people represent and remember experience. It is now possible to test predictions about how a given language influences the thinking of its speakers. Language in Mind includes contributions from both skeptics and believers and from a range of fields. It contains work in cognitive psychology, cognitive development, linguistics, anthropology, and animal cognition. The topics discussed include space, number, motion, gender, theory of mind, thematic roles, and the ontological distinction between objects and substances. I Introduction 1 Whither Whorf 3 Dedre Gentner and Susan Goldin-Meadow II Position Statements 15 1 Languages and Representations 17 Eve V. Clark 2 Language and Mind: Let’s Get the Issues Straight! 25 Stephen C. Levinson 3 The Key Is Social Cognition 47 Michael Tomasello III Language as Lens: Does the Language We Acquire Influence How We See the World? 59 4 Sex, Syntax, and Semantics 61 Lera Boroditsky, Lauren A. Schmidt, and Webb Phillips 5 Speaking versus Thinking about Objects and Actions 81 Barbara C. Malt, Steven A. Sloman, and Silvia P. Gennari 6 The Effects of Spatial Language on Spatial Representation: Setting Some Boundaries 113 Edward Munnich and Barbara Landau 7 Language and Thought Online: Cognitive Consequences of Linguistic Relativity 157 Dan I. Slobin IV Language as Tool Kit: Does the Language We Acquire Augment Our Capacity for Higher-Order Representation and Reasoning? 193 8 Why We’re So Smart 195 Dedre Gentner 9 Does Language Help Animals Think? 237 Stan A. Kuczaj, II, and Jennifer L. Hendry 10 What Makes Us Smart? Core Knowledge and Natural Language 277 Elizabeth S. Spelke 11 Conceptual and Linguistic Factors in Inductive Projection: How Do Young Children Recognize Commonalities between Animals and Plants? 313 Kayoko Inagaki and Giyoo Hatano 12 Language for Thought: Coming to Understand False Beliefs 335 Jill G. de Villiers and Peter A. de Villiers V Language as Category Maker: Does the Language We Acquire Influence Where We Make Our Category Distinctions? 385 13 Space under Construction: Language-Specific Spatial Categorization in First Language Acquisition 387 Melissa Bowerman and Soonja Choi 14 Reevaluating Linguistic Relativity: Language-Specific Categories and the Role of Universal Ontological Knowledge in the Construal of Individuation 429 Mutsumi Imai and Reiko Mazuka 15 Interaction of Language Type and Referent Type in the Development of Nonverbal Classification Preferences 465 John A. Lucy and Suzanne Gaskins 16 Thought before Language: Do We Think Ergative? 493 Susan Goldin-Meadow. (shrink)

Only human beings have a rich conceptual repertoire with concepts like tort, entropy, Abelian group, mannerism, icon and deconstruction. How have humans constructed these concepts? And once they have been constructed by adults, how do children acquire them? While primarily focusing on the second question, in The Origin of Concepts , Susan Carey shows that the answers to both overlap substantially. Carey begins by characterizing the innate starting point for conceptual development, namely systems of core cognition. Representations of core cognition (...) are the output of dedicated input analyzers, as with perceptual representations, but these core representations differ from perceptual representations in having more abstract contents and richer functional roles. Carey argues that the key to understanding cognitive development lies in recognizing conceptual discontinuities in which new representational systems emerge that have more expressive power than core cognition and are also incommensurate with core cognition and other earlier representational systems. Finally, Carey fleshes out Quinian bootstrapping, a learning mechanism that has been repeatedly sketched in the literature on the history and philosophy of science. She demonstrates that Quinian bootstrapping is a major mechanism in the construction of new representational resources over the course of childrens cognitive development. Carey shows how developmental cognitive science resolves aspects of long-standing philosophical debates about the existence, nature, content, and format of innate knowledge. She also shows that understanding the processes of conceptual development in children illuminates the historical process by which concepts are constructed, and transforms the way we think about philosophical problems about the nature of concepts and the relations between language and thought. (shrink)