First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

An analysis of Hegel's chapter on teleology in the Science of Logic. Hegel argues that the 'intentional model' of teleology assumed by Kant actually presupposes a natural or organic teleology more like along Aristotelian lines.

Kant contrasts dynamical and mechanistic approaches to physics, and rejects the latter. This paper attempts to connect this rejection to Kant’s views about a fundamental shift in the conception of matter’s basic properties, and in the explanatory projects in which they figure. It argues that for Kant, the mechanistic conception of impenetrability involves an attempt to characterize matter through its inner properties. In this way, Kant’s rejection of the mechanistic conception is tied to considerations from the first Critique, namely, the (...) critical doctrine that we cannot know things as they are in themselves. (shrink)