Switch to: Citations

References in:

Ramsey Equivalence

Erkenntnis 84 (1):77-99 (2019)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (3 other versions)Models and representation.Roman Frigg & James Nguyen - 2017 - In Lorenzo Magnani & Tommaso Bertolotti (eds.), Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science. Springer. pp. 49-102.
    Scientific discourse is rife with passages that appear to be ordinary descriptions of systems of interest in a particular discipline. Equally, the pages of textbooks and journals are filled with discussions of the properties and the behavior of those systems. Students of mechanics investigate at length the dynamical properties of a system consisting of two or three spinning spheres with homogenous mass distributions gravitationally interacting only with each other. Population biologists study the evolution of one species procreating at a constant (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1798 citations  
  • Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth.Stathis Psillos - 1999 - New York: Routledge.
    Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it. In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiricism, to instrumentalism and to modern sceptical empiricism. _Scientific Realism_ explains that the history (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   595 citations  
  • Glymour and Quine on Theoretical Equivalence.Thomas William Barrett & Hans Halvorson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (5):467-483.
    Glymour and Quine propose two different formal criteria for theoretical equivalence. In this paper we examine the relationships between these criteria.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Introduction to Logic.Roland Hall - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):287-288.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Scientific Realism.Anjann D. Chakravartty - 2013 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Debates about scientific realism are closely connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • Structural realism: The best of both worlds?John Worrall - 1989 - Dialectica 43 (1-2):99-124.
    The no-miracles argument for realism and the pessimistic meta-induction for anti-realism pull in opposite directions. Structural Realism---the position that the mathematical structure of mature science reflects reality---relieves this tension.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   621 citations  
  • Newman's objection.Peter M. Ainsworth - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):135-171.
    This paper is a review of work on Newman's objection to epistemic structural realism (ESR). In Section 2, a brief statement of ESR is provided. In Section 3, Newman's objection and its recent variants are outlined. In Section 4, two responses that argue that the objection can be evaded by abandoning the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR are considered. In Section 5, three responses that have been put forward specifically to rescue the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR from the modern versions of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Introduction to logic.Patrick Suppes - 1957 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.
    Coherent, well organized text familiarizes readers with complete theory of logical inference and its applications to math and the empirical sciences. Part I deals with formal principles of inference and definition; Part II explores elementary intuitive set theory, with separate chapters on sets, relations, and functions. Last section introduces numerous examples of axiomatically formulated theories in both discussion and exercises. Ideal for undergraduates; no background in math or philosophy required.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   217 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Introduction to Logic.J. Dopp - 1957 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 22 (4):353-354.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Empirical adequacy and ramsification.Jeffrey Ketland - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.
    Structural realism has been proposed as an epistemological position interpolating between realism and sceptical anti-realism about scientific theories. The structural realist who accepts a scientific theory thinks that is empirically correct, and furthermore is a realist about the ‘structural content’ of . But what exactly is ‘structural content’? One proposal is that the ‘structural content’ of a scientific theory may be associated with its Ramsey sentence (). However, Demopoulos and Friedman have argued, using ideas drawn from Newman's earlier criticism of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  • (1 other version)A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
    This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly 'naturalistic' forms of scientific (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   766 citations  
  • (1 other version)New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1582 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Debates about scientific realism are closely connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • Who's afraid of coordinate systems? An essay on representation of spacetime structure.David Wallace - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 67:125-136.
    Coordinate-based approaches to physical theories remain standard in mainstream physics but are largely eschewed in foundational discussion in favour of coordinate-free differential-geometric approaches. I defend the conceptual and mathematical legitimacy of the coordinate-based approach for foundational work. In doing so, I provide an account of the Kleinian conception of geometry as a theory of invariance under symmetry groups; I argue that this conception continues to play a very substantial role in contemporary mathematical physics and indeed that supposedly ``coordinate-free'' differential geometry (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Ramseyfication and structural realism.Elie G. Zahar - 2004 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (1):5-30.
    Structural Realism (SSR), as embodied in the Ramsey-sentence H* of a theory H, is defended against the view that H* reduces to a trivial statement about the cardinality of the domain of H, a view which arises from ignoring the central role of observation within science. Putnam’s theses are examined and shown to support rather than undermine SSR. Finally: in view of its synthetic character, applied mathematics must enter into the formulation of H* and hence be shown to be finitely (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask.Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
    Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • Theoretical Realism and Theoretical Equivalence.Clark Glymour - 1970 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1970:275 - 288.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/tenns.htm1. J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • (1 other version)Supervenience.Karen Bennett & Brian McLaughlin - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   163 citations  
  • Mr. Russell's causal theory of perception.M. H. A. Newman - 1928 - Mind 37 (146):26-43.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   147 citations  
  • (1 other version)New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1026 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2014 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.
    Debates about scientific realism are closely connected to almost everything else in the philosophy of science, for they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge. Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This epistemic attitude has important metaphysical and semantic dimensions, and these various commitments are contested by a number of rival epistemologies of science, known collectively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  • Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Wilfrid Hodges - 1997 - Studia Logica 64 (1):133-149.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  • Theoretical Equivalence as Interpretative Equivalence.Kevin Coffey - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):821-844.
    The problem of theoretical equivalence is traditionally understood as the problem of specifying when superficially dissimilar accounts of the world are reformulations of a single underlying theory. One important strategy for answering this question has been to appeal to formal relations between theoretical structures. This article presents two reasons to think that such an approach will be unsuccessful and suggests an alternative account of theoretical equivalence, based on the notion of interpretive equivalence, in which the problem is merely an instance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Extensions of first order logic.María Manzano - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Classical logic has proved inadequate in various areas of computer science, artificial intelligence, mathematics, philosopy and linguistics. This is an introduction to extensions of first-order logic, based on the principle that many-sorted logic (MSL) provides a unifying framework in which to place, for example, second-order logic, type theory, modal and dynamic logics and MSL itself. The aim is two fold: only one theorem-prover is needed; proofs of the metaproperties of the different existing calculi can be avoided by borrowing them from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • The epistemology of geometry.Clark Glymour - 1977 - Noûs 11 (3):227-251.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. J STOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non—commercial use.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Models and Representation: Why Structures Are Not Enough.Roman Frigg - manuscript
    Models occupy a central role in the scientific endeavour. Among the many purposes they serve, representation is of great importance. Many models are representations of something else; they stand for, depict, or imitate a selected part of the external world (often referred to as target system, parent system, original, or prototype). Well-known examples include the model of the solar system, the billiard ball model of a gas, the Bohr model of the atom, the Gaussian-chain model of a polymer, the MIT (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Ramseyfication and structural realism.Elie G. Zahar - 2010 - Theoria 19 (1):5-30.
    The Ramsey-sentence H* of any hypothesis H is shown to be a synthetic proposition containing mathematics as a finite component. Far from being quasi-tautological, H* proves to have as much physical content as H itself.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • (1 other version)Supervenience.Brian McLaughlin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Criteria of Empirical Significance: Foundations, Relations, Applications.Sebastian Lutz - 2012 - Dissertation, Utrecht University
    This dissertation consists of three parts. Part I is a defense of an artificial language methodology in philosophy and a historical and systematic defense of the logical empiricists' application of an artificial language methodology to scientific theories. These defenses provide a justification for the presumptions of a host of criteria of empirical significance, which I analyze, compare, and develop in part II. On the basis of this analysis, in part III I use a variety of criteria to evaluate the scientific (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • (1 other version)A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 2001 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 211.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   719 citations  
  • Ramseyfication and theoretical content.Joseph Melia & Juha Saatsi - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):561-585.
    Model theoretic considerations purportedly show that a certain version of structural realism, one which articulates the nvtion of structure via Ramsey sentences, is in fact trivially true. In this paper we argue that the structural realist is by no means forced to Ramseyfy in the manner assumed in the formal proof. However, the structural realist's reprise is short-lived. For, as we show, there are related versions of the model theoretic argument which cannot be so easily blocked by the structural realist. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Geometries in Collision: Einstein, Klein and Riemann.John D. Norton - 1982 - In John Norton (ed.).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Is structure not enough?Ioannis Votsis - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):879-890.
    This paper counters an objection raised against one of Bertrand Russell’s lesser-known epistemological views, viz. ‘‘structural realism’’ (SR). In short, SR holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e., physical) world. M. H. A. Newman’s allegedly fatal objection is that SR is either trivial or false. I argue that the accusation of triviality is itself empty since it fails to establish that SR knowledge claims are uninformative. Moreover, appealing to Quine’s notion of ontological relativity, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations