This paper approaches the problem of the relation between Deleuze and Derrida by focusing on their respective readings of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's eternal return. It argues that the difference between Deleuze and Derrida cannot be measured in terms of their explicit statements about Heidegger, but in terms of how they relate their own readings of Nietzsche to Heidegger's positioning of him as the last metaphysician. The paper focuses on Deleuze's brief analyses of Heidegger in Difference and Repetition and Derrida's (...) numerous references to the eternal return throughout his oeuvre, particularly in the essay Différance. I argue that Deleuze and Derrida articulate two different relations to the simulacrum through the way in which they position their own work in relation to Heidegger's understanding of Nietzsche. (shrink)

In the present paper, I shall argue that the book which Deleuze terms rhizomatic is a type of “open work”, namely a work that comprises its recipient's intervention as an encoder. It is distinguished, however, from Eco's and Ingarden's poetics – as well as from Gadamer's hermeneutics – in that the recipient actually inscribes. He inscribes in the sense that the book is “hybrid”, consisting of both semiotic text and the actual body and actions of an empirical – rather then (...) an implied – reader. I will introduce an example of a hybrid work in the form of Jewish scripture. Developing the book's unique mise en abyme and the interrelated trait of “transcoding” which Deleuze ascribes to it, I shall finally argue that rather than a “heterocosm”, the diegetic level of the hybrid work is empirical reality itself, although at a level which Deleuze terms “diagrammatical”. (shrink)

Repetition plays a significant, productive role in the work of both Derrida and Deleuze. But the difference between these two philosophers couldn''t be greater: it is the difference between negation and affirmation, between Yes and No. In Derrida, the productive energy of repetition derives from negation, from the necessary impossibility of supplementing an absence. Deleuze recognizes the kind of repetition which concerns Derrida, but insists that there is another, primary form of repetition which is fully positive and affirmative. I will (...) argue that there is nothing in Derrida''s philosophy to match the affirmative, primary form of repetition articulated by Deleuze. Moreover, it is precisely this difference that accounts for the most exciting features of Deleuze''s work: the possibility of breaking through to the other side of representation, beyond authenticity and inauthenticity, becoming-becoming. (shrink)