To most interpreters, the case seems to be clear: Plotinus identifies matter and evil, as he bluntly states in Enn. 1.8[51] that 'last matter' is 'evil', and even 'evil itself'. In this paper, I challenge this view: how and why should Plotinus have thought of matter, the sense-making ἔσχατον of his derivational ontology from the One and Good, evil? A rational reconstruction of Plotinus's tenets should neither accept the paradox that evil comes from Good, nor shirk the arduous task of (...) interpreting Plotinus's texts on evil as a fitting part of his philosophy on the whole. Therefore, I suggest a reading of evil in Plotinus as the outcome of an incongruent interaction of matter and soul, maintaining simultaneously that neither soul nor matter are to be considered as bad or evil. When Plotinus calls matter evil, he does so metonymically denoting matter's totally passive potentiality as perceived by the toiling soul trying to act upon it as a form-bringer. As so often, Plotinus is speaking quoad nos here rather than referring to 'matter per se' (for Plotinus, somewhat of an oxymoron) which, as mere potentiality (and nothing else) is not nor can be evil. In short: matter is no more evil than the melancholy evening sky is melancholy -- not in itself (for it isn't), but as to its impression on us who contemplate it. As I buttress this view, it will also become clear that matter cannot tritely be considered to be the αὐτὸ κακόν as a prima facie-reading of Enn. 1.8[51] might powerfully suggest, but that the αὐτὸ κακόν, far from being a principle of its own, has to be interpreted within the dynamics of Plotinus's philosophical thinking as a unique, though numerously applicable flaw-pattern for all the single κακά (hence the Platonic αὐτό). To conclude, I shall offer a short outlook on the consistency of this interpretation with Plotinus's teaching on the soul and with the further Neoplatonic development of the doctrine of evil. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine whether and, if so, how far, the Augustinian notion of pulchrum is related to Plotinus’ concept of beauty, as it appears in Ennead I. 6. The Augustinian notion of beauty will be analyzed by focusing on the De natura boni, considering plurality and unity in Augustine’s identification of bonum with esse, both in their ontological and axiological dimensions. Topics selected for special consideration will be, first, beauty as outcome of modus, species and (...) ordo naturalis, and, secondly, corruptio as cause of deformitas. The first part of the paper will attempt to explain the Augustinian identification of esse with bonum and pulchrum.The second part will analyze Plotinus’ notion of beauty, as spelled out in Ennead I. 6, considering the Plotinian identity of to kalon and to agathon. Topics selected for analysis will be, first, the concept of form as cause of beauty, and secondly, the notion of to aischron as partial or absolute lack of form. The second part of the paper will attempt to explain Plotinus’ concept of good as yielding the nature of beauty through an analysis of Plotinus’ reflections on being and unity. The third part of this paper will consider the differences between Plotinus’ and Augustine’s identity of ugliness and non-being, as related to the notion of matter. Topics selected for analysis will be, firstly, Plotinus’ identity of matter and to aischron, and, secondly, Augustine’s concept of matter as capacitas formarum. The conclusion will prove how Plotinus’ concept of matter as coinciding with ugliness shows a wide theoretical difference between Augustine’s and Plotinus’ ontological-axiological patterns. (shrink)

The status of beauty in Plotinus' metaphysics is unclear: is it a Form in Intellect, the Intelligible Principle itself, or the One? Basing themselves on a number of well-known passages in the "Enneads," and assuming that Plotinus' Forms are similar in function and status to Plato's, many scholars hold that Plotinus theorized beauty as a determinate entity in Intellect. Such assumptions, it is here argued, lead to difficulties over self-predication, the interpretation of Plotinus's rich and varied aesthetic terminology and, most (...) of all, the puzzling dearth of references, in the whole of the "Enneads," to a Form of Beauty. A detailed reading of VI.7.32 and 33 reveals that, in these two crucial passages at least, Plotinus adopts an aesthetic approach to the One and that, far from confining Beauty to Intellect, he equates the One, the Good and the Beautiful. This reading is here supported not only by an analysis of the text but also by a consideration of the semantic differences between μορφή and ε[unrepresentable symbol]δος, the inter-relatedness, in Plotinus' philosophy, of the concepts of love and value, and the exclusion of beauty from the πρ[unrepresentable symbol]τα γένη. In turn, the exegesis of VI.7.32 and 33 raises the issue of the significance for aesthetics understood in the narrow sense of the word, of Plotinus's ontology of beauty. It is here claimed that in so far as sensible beauty, both artistic and natural, can be nothing else than an effect of the shaping action of the Forms and a reflection of their radiance, singular or global, it should not be held that Plotinus had an aesthetics in the modern sense of this term. (shrink)

As befits a volume devoted to the topic of pluralism the contributing pieces collected here are varied. Their concern is with very different kinds of difference, and their conclusions range from an insistence that pluralism is both inevitable and desirable to a belief that it is unsustainable and perhaps remediable. The starting point for any discussion of pluralism is a recognition that we inhabit a world of differences. These differences are exhibited in moral outlooks, cultural identities, ways of life, religious (...) beliefs, and even modes of philosophy. The mere fact of such differences is salient but unremarkable. What preoccupies philosophers is the question of the conclusions that are to be drawn from a proper recognition of this fact. And the central issue at dispute for philosophers is whether the fact of difference—plurality—licences a view—pluralism— that it is legitimate, rather than just inevitable, that such difference should persist. (shrink)

Le Phèdre est considéré comme un dialogue portant sur le beau. Mais du beau il n’est question qu’à travers trois discours qui portent sur l’amour. La tradition des commentaires du Phèdre, telles les scholies d’Hermias, fait état d’une forme d’initiation qui permet de passer de la beauté singulière d’un corps à la beauté des logoi (éloges, discours amoureux), puis à la connaissance de la seule beauté vraie puisque parfaite, la beauté intelligible. C’est la leçon de Diotime, du Banquet, qui serait (...) ainsi appliquée par Socrate à Phèdre dans le dialogue éponyme afin de transformer la fascination pour la rhétorique en amour de la sagesse et passer de l’imitation des belles paroles à la perfection de l’identité avec le beau dans l’Un. Cependant, la beauté évoquée par Socrate est visible et ne correspond pas à cette perfection de l’identité dans l’intelligible à laquelle aspire l’amant de la sagesse, puisque l’âme l’atteint non par un nécessaire exercice sur elle-même mais par un acte de reconnaissance qui la transcende. À l’inverse de ce qui se produit dans le Banquet, dans le Phèdre ce n’ est pas le beau qui conduit à l’amour, mais l’amour qui prépare l’âme à reconnaître le beau. Parler du beau revient alors à confier à l’âme, et à elle seule dans ce cas, l’accès aux vertus épiphaniques du logos. Ces dialogues sont revisités par Plotin dans deux textes consacrés à la question du beau (Ennéades I, 6, «Sur le Beau» [T.1] et V, 8, «Sur la beauté intelligible» [T.31]). Le modèle du discours amoureux demeure toujours le moyen privilégié pour définir le beau en même temps que pour s’exercer au perfectionnement de soi. Pourquoi la réflexivité de l’éros est-elle appelée à jouer un rôle essentiel à l’égard du beau, cette catégorie appelée plus tard transcendantale? (shrink)

An examination of Plotinus’s treatise on matter, II 4[12], reveals interesting paradoxes. He seems to use Aristotle’s matter to explain Plato’s receptacle. Attention to the text reveals that both matter and the receptacle are, in fact, recast in terms of the otherness of Plato’s Sophist. By this, Plotinus articulates how matter and the receptacle function as the condition of possibility for the sensible cosmos. His analysis of related terms further supports this rapprochement: privation and substrate exclude quality and quantity as (...) attributes of matter; and the indefinite, the unlimited, size and mass echo the paradoxical language of the Timaeus. (shrink)