Scholarly research largely converges on the argument that trust is of paramount importance to drive economic agents toward mutually satisfactory, fair, and ethically compliant behaviors. There is, however, little agreement on the meaning of trust, whose conceptualizations differ with respect to actors, relationships, behaviors, and contexts. At present, we know much better what trust does than what trust is. In this article, we present an extensive review and analysis of the most prominent articles on trust in market relationships. Using computer-aided (...) content analysis and network analysis methods, we identify key, recurring dimensions that guided the conceptualization of trust in past research, and show how trust can be developed as a multifaceted and layered construct. Our results are an important contribution to a convergence of research toward a shared and common view of the meaning of trust. This process is important to ensure the body of trust research's internal theoretical consistency, and to provide reliable and common principles for the management of business relationships — a context in which opportunism and imperfect information may induce economic actors to cheat and stray from fair and ethically compliant behaviors. (shrink)

This paper is an examination of the role of trust in the previous seven papers in this issue of the Journal. Trust and trustworthiness are briefly characterized; their importance in business itself and in business ethics is briefly described; and each paper is discussed in relation to how trust figures in the ethical issues it raises. The overall discussion brings out the need for further work on the nature of trust and on the elements in business, such as transparency, that (...) apparently help to sustain it. (shrink)

The influence of corporate social performance on stakeholders is one of the focal issues in corporate social responsibility research. Using data of listed companies in China, this paper examines whether CSR behavior in the form of charitable donations garners a positive reaction from suppliers. Results derived from both level and change model regressions show that superior CSP makes it easier for a firm to obtain trade credit from suppliers, although the effect is significant only in non-state-owned enterprises. The results are (...) robust to various measures of CSP and endogeneity tests. The results support the strategic philanthropy view and apply stakeholder theory in supply chain, that strategic CSR can help firms to attract suppliers and consolidate cooperative relationships with them, which in turn benefits the firms in terms of more trade credit financing from suppliers. This paper also shows that state-owned enterprises and non-SOEs have different CSR intentions and use CSR to achieve strategic goals in different ways. The conclusions drawn from this study provide practical guidance on CSR strategy, suggesting that CSR activities can help a firm in transition economies to enhance its corporate image, establish and consolidate the good relationship with suppliers, and obtain economic benefits or achieve long-term business objectives. (shrink)

Drawing on both a managerial discipline perspective and an information intermediary perspective, we explore how media coverage of a firm’s controlling shareholder influences firm valuation in corporate China. Using 366 listed family firms in China from 2003 to 2006, we find that firms in which controlling shareholders receive more neutral media reports enjoy higher valuation, whereas negative media reports on controlling shareholders impose adverse effects on firm valuation. Interestingly, favorable media coverage of the controlling shareholders does not enhance firm value. (...) Further analyses reveal that ownership structure and audit quality moderate the relationship between media coverage and firm valuation. Our study complements the emerging literature on the monitoring role of the media on the stock markets. (shrink)

Drawing on stakeholder theory and the concept of enlightened self-interest, we argue that firms that actively engage in corporate philanthropic giving also tend to demonstrate greater concern for investors’ interests by providing more transparent financial information and avoiding corporate misconduct. Moreover, the relationships between corporate giving, financial information transparency, and corporate misconduct vary significantly according to the firm’s ownership type, which affects the fundamental motivations for corporate philanthropy. In a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms from the 2003–2009 period, we (...) find a positive relationship between corporate giving and financial transparency, and note that the relationship is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises. We also find a significantly negative association between corporate giving and corporate misconduct for non-SOEs, but not for SOEs. Taken together, these findings suggest that responsibility to both stakeholders and shareholders is a vital part of building trust and reputations in China’s non-SOE sector. (shrink)

We examine enforcement action in China’s emerging markets by focusing on the agents that impose this action and the role played by supervisory boards. Using newly available databases, we find that supervisory boards play an active role when Chinese listed companies face enforcement action. Listed firms with larger supervisory boards are more likely to have more severe sanctions imposed upon them by the China Security Regulatory Commission, and listed companies that face more severe enforcement actions have more supervisory board meetings. (...) Our findings are of interest, as supervisory boards in China are generally perceived to be dysfunctional. This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we shed light on the effects of supervisory boards whose role in a fraud setting has not yet been examined. Second, the study has important policy implications for governance reform. Finally, our analyses provide the most up-to-date picture of fraud and governance issues in China’s ever-growing markets. (shrink)

I examine social capital’s impact on financial reports. Based on the social capital literature, I predict that the quality of the financial reports is higher when a firm is headquartered in a region with high social capital. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the firms that are headquartered in this type of region in the USA have a lower probability of committing fraud by misrepresenting financial information. Further, I find that the firms in regions with high social capital have (...) lower levels of discretionary accruals and much more readable annual reports. (shrink)

Firms located in communities in which people are, on average, more trusting enjoy some benefits in terms of the power of CEO contracts. We present two pieces of empirical evidence to support this claim: (1) higher average trust in a county is associated with “flatter” executive contracts and (2) when an exogenous shock occurs (such as a scandal involving an important social institution), both trust and contracting move in similar directions. We obtain the first result in a panel specification and (...) the second in a “difference-in-difference” specification that uses the revelation of sex scandals involving the Catholic Church across different U.S. localities. (shrink)

In China, Buddhism and Taoism are two major religions. Using a sample of 10,363 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2001–2010, I provide strong and robust evidence that religion (i.e., Buddhism and Taoism on the whole) is significantly negatively associated with owner-manager agency costs. In particular, using firm-level religion data measured by the number of religious sites within a radius of certain distance around a listed firm’s registered address, I find that religion is significantly negatively (...) (positively) associated with expense ratio (asset utilization ratio), the positive (reverse) proxy for owner-manager agency costs. This finding is consistent with the following view: religiosity has remarkable effects on the way how an individual thinks and behaves, and thereof can curb managers from unethical business practices. Moreover, my findings suggest that the negative association between religion and owner-manager agency costs is attenuated for firms with strong external monitoring mechanisms such as higher Marketization and high-quality auditors. Furthermore, after separating Buddhism from Taoism, my finding indicates that above conclusions are only available for Buddhism, suggesting that different religions may have asymmetric influence on owner-manager agency costs. Above results are robust to various measures of religiosity and a variety of robustness checks. (shrink)

Combining principles of individual rational choice with a sociological conception of collective action, James Coleman recasts social theory in a bold new way. The result is a landmark in sociological theory, capable of describing both stability and change in social systems. This book provides for the first time a sound theoretical foundation for linking the behavior of individuals to organizational behavior and then to society as a whole. The power of the theory is especially apparent when Coleman analyzes corporate actors, (...) such as large corporations and trade unions. He examines the creation of these institutions, collective decision making, and the processes through which authority is revoked in revolts and revolutions. Coleman discusses the problems of holding institutions responsible for their actions as well as their incompatibility with the family. He also provides a simple mathematical analysis corresponding to and carrying further the verbal formulations of the theory. Finally, he generates research techniques that will permit quantitative testing of the theory. From a simple, unified conceptual structure Coleman derives, through elegant chains of reasoning, an encompassing theory of society. It promises to be the most important contribution to social theory since the publication of Talcott Parsons' Structure of Social Action in 1936. (shrink)