R G Collingwood is an important twentieth century historian, archaeologist and philosopher whose works are the subject of continued interest, analysis and study. There is an unquestionable need to support this research activity with the provision of a reference guide which is fully up-to-date, informed and authoritative. The Companion will therefore list all primary and secondary material relevant to the study of Collingwood in all his fields of expertise - historical theory, philosophy and archaeology. It will also provide a guide (...) to archive material relevant to his life, together with sources and locations. The resulting volume will provide an essential companion to the understanding of the life and thought of R G Collingwood. (shrink)

Comprises of critical essays on Collingwood's contribution to all the major areas of philosophy.

Why should modern philosophers read the works of R. G. Collingwood? His ideas are often thought difficult to locate in the main lines of development taken by twentieth-century philosophy. Some have read Collingwood as anticipating the later Wittgenstein, others have concentrated exclusively on the internal coherence of his thought. This work aims to introduce Collingwood to contemporary students of philosophy through direct engagement with his arguments. It is a conversation with Collingwood that takes as its subject matter the topics that (...) interested him 'philosophy and method, philosophy of mind, language and logic, the historical imagination, art and expression, action, metaphysics and life' and which still preoccupy us today. --the first introductory book on this major modern philosopher --includes critical investigation of his thought --there is no similar work available. (shrink)

Knowledge, including historical knowledge, is dependent upon the procedure by which it is acquired. Nowell-Smith attempts to drive a logical wedge between the assertion of historical statements and the objects to which they refer. This distinction between assertion and referent, however, does not exist in the practice of history. In historical study there is no way to acquire knowledge except through the construction of theory. The brute sensory data which form an essential part of an understanding of the present are (...) not available to historians. As far as the epistemology of history is concerned, the real past has no influence on historical knowledge. Though truth may be the object of the historical enterprise, it cannot be obtained except through theory, and is, therefore, inseparable from the infrastructure of that enterprise. (shrink)

A critique of Collingwood's re-enactment concept.

Lorsqu'on cherche à comprendre l'enjeu des discussions actuelles entre les philosophes anglophones de l'histoire, l'on est fatalement conduit, à un moment ou l'autre, à étudier les vues de R.G. Collingwood. Depuis la publication en 1946 de son livre posthumeL'Idée de l'histoire, les idées de Collingwood ont été à la fois un stimulant et une source de problèmes constants pour ceux qui se préoccupent de définir l'histoire comme mode d'investigation rationnelle. Au cours des trois dernières décennies, la littérature aussi bien critique (...) qu'exégétique consacrée à son œuvre s'est développée à un point tel qu'il est devenu difficile d'ignorer ses idées. (shrink)

Central to R. G. Collingwood's philosophy of history, and among the most controvrsial of his doctrines, is the contention that historical understanding requires a re-anactment of past experience or a re-thinking of past thought. Some critics have found this contention in it-self incoherent or otherwise unsatisfactory, even as applied to what Collingwood apparently regarded as paradigm cases of historical thinking: for example, accounting for Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon in terms of his political ambitions. Others, while accepting the applicability of (...) notions like re-enactment and re-thinking to such cases, have nevertheless rejected them as a basis for a general theory of historical understanding on the ground that their range of application is too narrow to encompass anything like the normal concerns of historians. In particular, these notions have been held to throw little light on what historians have had to say about largescale social events, conditions and processes. (shrink)

This paper seeks to clarify the precise sense in which Collingwood's “metaphysics without ontology” is a descriptive metaphysics. It locates Collingwood's metaphysics against the background of Strawson's distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics and then defends it against the claim that Collingwood reduced metaphysics to a form of cultural anthropology. Collingwood's metaphysics is descriptive not because it is some sort of historicised psychology that describes temporally parochial and historically shifting assumptions, but because it is a high level form of conceptual (...) analysis premised on the claim that ontological questions are actually internal ones and that metaphysics, understood as an attempt to answer external questions, is not a possible philosophical enterprise. This non-historicist reading of what it means to take the ontology out of metaphysics has broader implications which go beyond a scholarly debate in so far as it shows that it is possible to maintain objectivity in the absence of strong ontological underpinnings. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood is not normally associated with analytic philosophy, neither negatively nor positively. He neither regarded himself, nor was regarded by his contemporaries and their successors, as an analytical philosopher. However, the story is more interestingly complex than this, both because Collingwood is one of the few pre-analytics in the UK who continues to be of interest to current analytical philosophers, especially in relation to the philosophy of art and history and his conception of metaphysics, and because he mounted a (...) critique of analytical philosophy in the years of its emergence. (shrink)

In so far as Collingwood is branded an ‘idealist’, the corresponding assumption is that he subscribed to the broad themes associated with the ‘English idealists or Hegelians’; in so far as he is thought to have broken free from their pernicious influence he is regarded as a proto-Kuhn or Wittgenstein who saw the error of his early ways. This paper suggests that neither picture is fully accurate, and that while the figure of F.H. Bradley perhaps played a more significant part (...) in Collingwood’s philosophical development than is often recognised, his role was that of a spur or challenge to his thinking. Coming to terms with Bradley was a struggle throughout his philosophical career. I suggest that Collingwood took from Bradley the dual problematic of the method appropriate to philosophical thought and the tangled question of the nature of metaphysics. These were both problems which he wrestled with throughout his life, and Bradley’s work can be seen as setting the agenda for his thought on these matters. (shrink)

Rethinking R.G. Collingwood reviews Collingwood's thought via his own rethinking of Hegel. It establishes the revisionary character of Collingwood's defence of liberal civilization in theory and practice. Collingwood is seen as avoiding the pitfalls of Hegel's teleological historicism by developing an open and contestable reading of the rationality of liberal civilization, which neither reduces practice to theory nor philosophy to history. The contemporary relevance of Collingwood's standpoint is demonstrated by comparing it with those of recent defenders and critics of liberalism (...) Rawls, Lyotard and MacIntyre. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Significance of R. G. Collingwood’s Principles of HistoryDavid BoucherThe Principles of History is the work that Collingwood saw as his principal philosophical enterprise, the book for which his whole intellectual life had been a preparation. It was to have been a work divided into three books. 1 In the first there was to be a discussion of the characteristics that make the special science of history distinctive. In (...) the second history was to be compared with other sciences. Third, he intended to investigate the relationship between history and practical life. He thought of beginning his project by giving a brief account of the different senses of the concept of history. Book one was divided into four chapters. The first was to concentrate on evidence and testimony relating them to scissors-and-paste history. Chapter two was to present a theory of action, res gestae, or action expressive of thought, in contrast with the idea of process, or change, associated with pseudo-history. In chapter three reenactment was to be discussed and contrasted with the idea of a dead past. Chapter four was to argue that history in contrast with other purported pretenders to the title can justifiably claim to be the science of the mind. Book two was divided into three chapters. Chapter one was to discuss history and natural science, showing that neither could be reduced to each other. He also wanted to contend that the natural sciences are themselves historical achievements in that they depend upon the historical facts of observation and thought. Chapter two was to deal with history and the human sciences, such as economics, which he describes as crypto-histories. In the third chapter Collingwood intended to explore the relation between history and philosophy. In book three, which is described less precisely, he wanted to argue that history overcomes the distinction between theory and practice, and that reenactment overcomes the dualism between mind and its objects. This, he thought, would enable him to give a characterization of historical morality and historical civilization in contrast with their utilitarian counterparts.He began writing the book on 15 February 1939 and had finished the first three chapters by 23 February. Over a month later, on 26 and 27 March, he began chapter four but was unable to formulate his thoughts on the past, and the relation between history and philosophy. At this point he stopped, never to return to the manuscript again. What we have left of The Principles of History deviates considerably from the original plan. Only three chapters were written, the third of which does not contain the crucial discussion of re-enactment. In addition, uncompleted fragments of the beginnings of a fourth chapter remain.In this paper I intend to look at why Collingwood’s explicit authorization to publish the Principles of History was disregarded by Knox and Oxford University Press. In addition, I want to look at three aspects of the rediscovered manuscript. In the second and third sections, on the method and subject matter of history respectively, I examine the extent to which Knox’s suppression of the Principles of History contributed to a good deal of the confusion surrounding the interpretation of Collingwood’s key ideas. What emerges from the pages of the Principles of History is how integral The Principles of Art and An Essay on Metaphysics are to understanding Collingwood’s later philosophy of history, a connection that is distorted by the patchwork nature of The Idea of History.In the fourth section of the paper I suggest that the most significant omission to which Collingwood never returned was the theory of reenactment. Reenactment more than any other aspect of his writings has been placed by interpreters at the centre of Collingwood’s philosophy of history. W. H. Dray’s new book is wholly focused upon this theme. Dray did not, however, see The Principles of History in time to incorporate the implications for reenactment theory of Collingwood’s broadening of the subject matter of history to include the emotions. 2 The theory of reenactment could no longer be sustained by the earlier argument found in The Idea of History, because Collingwood, in The Principles of... (shrink)

This paper explores R.G. Collingwood's argument that a new type of archaeology, taking fairy tales as its subject matter, is capable of expanding our historical knowledge of cultural practices. I suggest that it is interesting from the point of view of current discussions about cosmopolitanism and communitarianism and also for understanding past practices, such as magic, without having to attribute failure of reasoning or a breakdown in mentality to the participants, as Le Roy Ladurie does. Collingwood maintains that the natural (...) sciences are unsuitable models for the human sciences. They are incapable of distinguishing between the inside and outside of an event. They do not acknowledge that a historical process is very different from a natural process. In addition, the natural sciences cannot take account of the self-critical or criteriological aspect of thought. Human sciences are criteriological in that they are capable of taking individuals who formulate intentions and purposes, and employ criteria to judge the extent to which they succeed or fail. Thought is self-critical, and to say that a certain thought conforms to a type of neurosis is to ignore its criteriological character. The implication is that when magic is viewed as bad science, or a failure in rationality, the criteriological character of magical thought is being denied. When magic is understood as an integral part of fairy tales and as a practice designed to arouse specific emotions to be channelled into practical effects, such as to inspire courage in warriors in battle, its character as purposive and intentional thought is being acknowledged. (shrink)