Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe.Juliane Kaminski, Josep Call & Michael Tomasello - 2008 - Cognition 109 (2):224-234.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • Evidence for kind representations in the absence of language: Experiments with rhesus monkeys.Webb Phillips & Laurie R. Santos - 2007 - Cognition 102 (3):455-463.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Object individuation using property/kind information in rhesus macaques.Laurie R. Santos, Gregory M. Sulkowski, Geertrui M. Spaepen & Marc D. Hauser - 2002 - Cognition 83 (3):241-264.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • (1 other version)Core knowledge.Elizabeth S. Spelke - 2000 - American Psychologist 55 (11):1233-1243.
    Complex cognitive skills such as reading and calculation and complex cognitive achievements such as formal science and mathematics may depend on a set of building block systems that emerge early in human ontogeny and phylogeny. These core knowledge systems show characteristic limits of domain and task specificity: Each serves to represent a particular class of entities for a particular set of purposes. By combining representations from these systems, however human cognition may achieve extraordinary flexibility. Studies of cognition in human infants (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   213 citations  
  • (1 other version)Core knowledge.Elizabeth S. Spelke & Katherine D. Kinzler - 2007 - Developmental Science 10 (1):89-96.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   148 citations  
  • Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) spontaneously compute addition operations over large numbers.Jonathan I. Flombaum, Justin A. Junge & Marc D. Hauser - 2005 - Cognition 97 (3):315-325.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Representing Space and Objects in Monkeys and Apes.Josep Call - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (3):397-422.
    Primate foraging can be construed as a set of interconnected problems that include finding food, selecting efficient travel routes, anticipating the positions of moving prey, and manipulating, and occasionally, extracting food items using tools. The evidence reviewed in this paper strongly suggests that both monkeys and apes use three types of representation (i.e., static, dynamic, and relational) to solve various problems. Static representations involve recalling certain features of the environment, dynamic representations involve imagining changes in the trajectories of moving objects, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The origins of belief representation: Monkeys fail to automatically represent others’ beliefs.Alia Martin & Laurie R. Santos - 2014 - Cognition 130 (3):300-308.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations