ABSTRACT Nanotechnologies are an expression of the human ability to control and manipulate matter on a very small scale. Their use will enable an even and constant monitoring of human organisms, in a new and perhaps less invasive way. Debates at all levels – national, European and international – have pointed out the common difficulty of giving a complete, clear definition of nanotechnologies. This is primarily due to the variety of their components, to the fact that there is not just (...) one technology but several. The most significant medical applications of nanotechnologies are in the diagnostic and the therapeutic fields, eg biosensors and molecular imaging, providing diagnosis and drug delivery with no invasive methods involved. Like any other emerging field, such technologies imply new possibilities for improving health but, on the other hand, they are still at an experimental stage and therefore should be implemented under rigorous safety testing before going on general release. For this purpose, the ethical, legal and social implications (ELSI) of nanotechnologies have been elaborated by study groups, in order to develop solutions before the results of the tests are diffused into medical practice. The aim of this paper is to define some of the ethical issues concerning biomedical applications and to evaluate whether there is a need for new or additional guidelines and regulations. (shrink)

A member of the two federal advisory panels on artificial hearts reflects that the nuclear‐powered artificial heart, had it been developed, would have posed a physical threat to others. Today's artificial heart poses a different threat. Because of the high costs, many people may be deprived of access to other forms of medical care and other social goods.

The 21st-century translational science campaign could lead to an increase in first-in-human trials. As tests of investigational interventions move from the laboratory to human research, scientists, officials, and review committees should address ongoing concerns about the ethics of FIH trials. In this article, I describe three ethical considerations relevant to all FIH trials: the requirement for adequate preclinical research; study design safeguards; and choice of subject population. I also examine specific ethical considerations relevant to the three subject populations involved in (...) FIH research. I recommend a variety of actions that could increase subject protection and the value of the information generated in FIH trials. (shrink)

Translational science is a 21st century mission. Government officials and industry leaders are making huge investments in an attempt to transform more basic science discoveries into therapeutic applications. Scientists and policymakers express great excitement about the medical advances that could come with the current bench-to-bedside campaign.A key step in translational science is the move from animal and other preclinical studies to initial human testing. Researchers ability to predict human effects is limited, and first-in-human tests present significant uncertainty. Participants in this (...) form of research face risks and can experience serious, even lethal, harm. Well-known incidents involving Jolee Mohr and Jesse Gelsinger, as well as subjects in the 2006 study of the investigational agent TGN1412, show the dangers that can arise in early human research.The bench-to-bedside campaign will need many volunteers to participate in early human testing. Investigators and regulators must not allow the policy enthusiasm for translational science to overshadow the commitment to protect human subjects. Participants in exploratory research are diverse and as a group lack characteristics usually associated with vulnerable populations, such as impaired decisional ability or economic or educational disadvantage. (shrink)

First-in-human clinical trials represent a critical juncture in the translation of laboratory discoveries. However, because they involve the greatest degree of uncertainty at any point in the drug development process, their initiation is beset by a series of nettlesome ethical questions [1]: has clinical promise been sufficiently demonstrated in animals? Should trial access be restricted to patients with refractory disease? Should trials be viewed as therapeutic? Have researchers adequately minimized risks? The resolution of such ethical questions inevitably turns on claims (...) about future events like harms, therapeutic response, and clinical translation. Recurrent failures in clinical translation, like Eli Lilly's Alzheimer candidate semagacestat, highlight the severe limitations of current methods of prediction. In this case, patients in the active arm of the placebo-controlled trial had earlier onset of dementia and elevated rates of skin cancer [2]. Various authoritative accounts of human research ethics state that decision-making about risk and benefit should be careful, systematic, and non-arbitrary [3]–[5]. Yet, these sources provide little guidance about what kinds of evidence stakeholders should use to ensure their estimates of such events ground responsible ethical decisions. In this article, we suggest that investigators, oversight bodies, and sponsors often base their predictions on a flawed and inappropriately narrow preclinical evidence base. (shrink)

Unrealistic optimism is a bias that leads people to believe, with respect to a specific event or hazard, that they are more likely to experience positive outcomes and/or less likely to experience negative outcomes than similar others. The phenomenon has been seen in a range of health-related contexts—including when prospective participants are presented with the risks and benefits of participating in a clinical trial. In order to test for the prevalence of unrealistic optimism among participants of early-phase oncology trials, we (...) conducted a survey with patients over 18 years of age who were enrolled in a phase I, phase I/II, or phase II clinical cancer trial in the New York City area between August 2008 and October 2009. Participants in our study were asked to compare their own chances of experiencing a range of risks and benefits related to the trial they were enrolled in with the chances of the other trial participants. We found a significant optimistic bias in their responses. Respondents tended to overestimate the benefits of the trial they were enrolled in and underestimate its risks. In addition, we found no significant relationship between respondents’ understanding of the trial’s purpose and how susceptible they were to unrealistic optimism. Our findings suggest that improving the consent process for oncology studies requires more than addressing deficits in understanding. (shrink)