In latter-day discussions on corporate morality, duties of commission are fiercely debated. Moral institutionalists argue that duties of commission—such as a duty of assistance—overstep the boundaries of moral duty owed by economic agents. " Moral institutionalism" is a newly coined term for a familiar position on market morality. It maintains that market morality ought to be restricted, excluding all duties of commission. Neo-Classical thinkers such as Baumol and Homann defend it most eloquently. They underpin their position with concerns that go (...) to the core of liberalism—the dominant western political theory that sustains the ideals of both the free market and the free, rational person. Those authors claim that liberalism calls for a fully differentiated market because it resents the politicization of the market. Fully differentiated markets exclude duties of commission. They also claim that full differentiation of the market closes the troublesome gap between moral motivation and moral virtue. Full differentiation redeems the promise of "easy virtue". In this paper moral institutionalism will be rejected from a Kantian point of view, mostly inspired by Herman's thesis on the invisibility of morality. Liberalism may perhaps ban the politicization of the market; it does not forbid its moralization. The idea of a fully differentiated market must also be rejected because it is either morally over-demanding (to the morally autonomous person) or morally hazardous (to the person with failing moral motivation). Contrary to what the moral institutionalists claim, right action, morally, is actually quite difficult in fully differentiated markets. (shrink)

Contemporary liberalism, which prescribes state regulation of property for purposes of welfare but proscribes state regulation of the expression of thought and conscience, may seem inherently paradoxical. Kant's analysis of property, however, shows that political liberalism is coherent and indeed necessitated by Kantian moral principles. For property rights are constituted by interpersonal agreement to defer to an owner's claim to an object; and if such agreement is to be rightfully, that is, freely obtained, then it can only be obtained under (...) conditions of fairness that would make it rational for all affected by the claim to so defer, and can rightfully be restricted to such conditions by political means. Freedom of thought and expression, however, has no inherent dependence on the agreement of others, and thus gives rise to no right for the state to regulate it except in marginal cases which can be analyzed as ordinary action rather than thought and its expression. Fundamental differences in ontology thus give rise to fundamental differences in the rightful use of political regulation. Der heutige Liberalismus, der einerseits die staatliche Regulierung des Eigentums für Zwecke der Wohlfahrt fordert, andererseits die staatliche Regulierung des Ausdrucks von Gedanken und Gewissen verbieten möchte, könnte schon an sich selbst betrachtet als paradox erscheinen. Kants Deutung des Eigentums zeigt jedoch, daß der politische Liberalismus kohärent ist und aus Kants moralischen Prinzipien auch tatsächlich folgt. Eigentumsrechte entstehen aus der Übereinkunft zwischen Personen, die Ansprüche, die Eigentümer auf ihre Sachen erheben, auch anzuerkennen. Wenn eine derartige Übereinkunft rechtmäßig und also frei zustandekommen soll, kann sie nur unter der Bedingung der Fairneß zustandekommen, die es für alle Betroffenen als vernünftig erscheinen läßt, die fraglichen Eigentumsansprüche anzuerkennen. Deshalb kann die Übereinkunft auch durch politische Mittel auf die Bedingung der Fairneß eingeschränkt werden. Die Freiheit der Gedanken und des Ausdrucks von Gedanken dagegen steht in keiner inneren Abhängigkeit von der Zustimmung anderer, und das bedeutet, daß der Staat kein Recht hat, sie zu regulieren, außer in Randbereichen, in denen gewisse Äußerungen eher als Handlungen im gewöhnlichen Sinne denn als Ausdruck von Gedanken eingestuft werden können. Grundsätzliche Unterschiede in der Ontologie führen so zu grundsätzlichen Unterschieden im rechtmäßigen Gebrauch politischer Regulierung. (shrink)

Abstract:Building on John Rawls’s account of the Law of Peoples, this paper examines the grounds and scope of the obligations of transnational corporations (TNCs) that are owned by members of developed economies and operate in developing economies. The paper advances two broad claims. First, the paper argues that there are conditions under which TNCs have obligations to fulfill a limited duty of assistance toward those living in developing economies, even though the duty is normally understood to fall on the governments (...) of developed economies. Second, by extending Rawls’s account to include a right to protection against arbitrary interference, the paper argues that TNCs can be said to have negative and positive obligations in the areas of human rights, labor standards, and environmental protection, as outlined in the U.N. Global Compact. More generally, the paper aims to further our understanding of the implications of Rawls’s account of justice. (shrink)