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A Challenge to Anti-Criterialism

Erkenntnis 79 (2):283-296 (2014)

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  1. Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    According to Peter van Inwagen, visible inanimate objects do not, strictly speaking, exist. In defending this controversial thesis, he offers fresh insights on such topics as personal identity, commonsense belief, existence over time, the phenomenon of vagueness, and the relation between metaphysics and ordinary language.
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  • (1 other version)Material Beings.Peter van Inwagen - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):701-708.
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  • (3 other versions)Personal identity.R. G. Swinburne - 1974 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:231 - 247.
    EMPIRICIST THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY STATE THAT THE IDENTITY OF A PERSON OVER TIME IS A MATTER OF BODILY CONTINUITY AND/OR SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER. IN CONTRAST, THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT WHILE BODILY CONTINUITY AND SIMILARITY OF MEMORY AND CHARACTER ARE EVIDENCE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, THEY DO NOT CONSTITUTE IT. IT IS SOMETHING UNDEFINABLE. THE DIFFICULTY OF KNOWING WHAT TO SAY IN PUZZLE CASES DOES NOT SHOW THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY EXISTS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OR THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE (...)
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  • Criteria of Identity and the 'Identity Mystics'.Dean Zimmerman - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):281 - 301.
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  • The phenomenal self.Barry Dainton - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather (...)
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  • (1 other version)Personal identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by Richard Swinburne.
    What does it mean to say that this person at this time is 'the same' as that person at an earlier time? If the brain is damaged or the memory lost, how far does a person's identity continue? In this book two eminent philosophers develop very different approaches to the problem.
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  • Personal identity, concerns, and indeterminacy.Matti Eklund - 2004 - The Monist 87 (4):489-511.
    Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are (...)
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  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • (2 other versions)How to live forever without saving your soul: Physicalism and immortality.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 183-201.
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  • (3 other versions)Personal Identity.Harold W. Noonan - 1989 - New York: Routledge.
    What is the self? And how does it relate to the body? In the second edition of Personal Identity, Harold Noonan presents the major historical theories of personal identity, particularly those of Locke, Leibniz, Butler, Reid and Hume. Noonan goes on to give a careful analysis of what the problem of personal identity is, and its place in the context of more general puzzles about identity. He then moves on to consider the main issues and arguments which are the subject (...)
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  • What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
    This paper is about the neglected question of what sort of things we are metaphysically speaking. It is different from the mind-body problem and from familiar questions of personal identity. After explaining what the question means and how it differs from others, the paper tries to show how difficult it is to give a satisfying answer.
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  • More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms.Edward Jonathan Lowe - 2009 - Oxford and West Sussex, England: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Taking into account significant developments in the metaphysical thinking of E. J. Lowe over the past 20 years, _More Kinds of Being:A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms_ presents a thorough reworking and expansion of the 1989 edition of _Kinds of Being_ Brings many of the original ideas and arguments put forth in _Kinds of Being_ thoroughly up to date in light of new developments Features a thorough reworking and expansion of the earlier work, rather (...)
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  • Of Mr. Locke's account of our personal identity.Thomas Reid - 1975 - In John Perry (ed.), Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 113--118.
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  • There are no criteria of identity over time.Trenton Merricks - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):106-124.
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  • Pain, personal identity, and the deep further fact.Harold Langsam - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (2):247-271.
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  • (1 other version)The self and the SESMET.G. Strawson - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (4):99-135.
    Response to commentaries on keynote article.
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  • (3 other versions)Person and Object.Roderick Chisholm - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (2):281-283.
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  • (1 other version)The Identity of the Self.Geoffrey Madell - 1981 - Edinburgh University Press.
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  • The Identity of the Self.Geoffrey Madell - 1983 - Philosophy 58 (223):130-132.
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  • The Irrelevance/Incoherence of Non-Reductivism About Personal Identity.David W. Shoemaker - 2002 - Philo 5 (2):143-160.
    Before being able to answer key practical questions dependent on a criterion of personal identity (e.g., am I justified in anticipating surviving the death of my body?), we must first determine which general approach to the issue of personal identity is more plausible, reductionism or non-reductionism. While reductionism has become the more dominant. approach amongst philosophical theorists over the past thirty years, non-reductionism remains an approach that, for all these theorists have shown, could very well still be true. My aim (...)
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  • (1 other version)The self and the SESMET.Galen Strawson - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (4):99-135.
    Response to commentaries on keynote article.
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  • (2 other versions)How to Live Forever without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - In Kevin Corcoran (ed.), Soul, body, and survival: essays on the metaphysics of human persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
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  • Personal Identity.Harold W. NOONAN - 1989 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 58 (4):779-780.
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  • (3 other versions)Personal identity.Sydney Shoemaker, Richard Swinburne, David Armstrong, Norman Malcolm & Richard Bernstein - 1985 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (4):567-569.
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