The following demarcates the sense of the human person in Orthodox-Catholic bioethics from the family of senses proper to secular bioethics and philosophy. The radically different sources of knowledge about the senses proper to each discipline suggest that the importation of philosophical and secular psychological distinctions and analyses into true Christianity's concern with the human person, is fundamentally misguided. This suggestion is confirmed by examination of the articles of Crosby, Glannon, Hoswepian, and Meador and Shuman.

This article summarizes some of the results of the BIOMED II project “Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw” connected to a research project of the Danish Research Councils “Bioethics and Law”. The BIOMED project was based on cooperation between 22 partners in most EU countries. The aim of the project was to identify the ethical principles of respect for autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability as four important ideas or values for a European bioethics and biolaw. The research concluded (...) that the basic ethical principles cannot be understood as universal everlasting ideas or transcendental truths but they rather function reflective guidelines and important values in European culture. The method of the research was conceptual, philosophical analysis of the cultural background of the four values or normative ideas that people use and find important in their existence. Moreover, this was combined with analysis of empirical legal material and policy documents. Also, a number of qualitative interviews with relevant experts were carried out. Another important result of the BIOMED project was the partner's Policy Proposals to the European Commission, the Barcelona Declaration, unique as a philosophical and political agreement between experts in bioethics and biolaw from many different countries. The Policy Proposals are reprinted here at the end of the article. (shrink)

Most of the world now accepts the idea, first proposed four decades ago, that death means “brain death.” But the idea has always been open to criticism because it doesn't square with all of our intuitions about death. In fact, none of the possible definitions of death quite works. Death, perhaps surprisingly, eludes definition, and “brain death” can be accepted only as a refinement of what is in fact a fuzzy concept.

This article addresses death as a biological event and attempts to approach it as a mystery within the light of the Orthodox Christian theology and tradition. First, the value of the last moments of the life of a human being is analyzed; then the state of living is differentiated from the state of surviving that results, in some extreme cases, from the intrusion of technology in medicine. The article elaborates on the sacred and spiritual character of death which, when viewed (...) within the light of Christ’s resurrection, is transformed into a great blessing. The last part of the article focuses on the newly emerged issue of euthanasia and the reasons behind it. It poses certain vital questions that ought to be answered before legalization gets on its way. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the position of the Orthodox Church of Greece on death, dying and euthanasia. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Death: A Persistent Controversial StateKevin Wm. Wildes S.J. (bio)Along with the moral questions surrounding research and experimentation, the moral questions of death and dying have ranked among the most central and formative sets of issues for the field of bioethics. While the questions of death and dying have a long history (Wildes 1996), the attempt to address them as secular questions is an element of what established bioethics as (...) a field of inquiry.The controversies of death and dying are not only formative of bioethics, but also are among the most persistent bioethical controversies. Today, almost 30 years after the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee’s definition of death and 20 years after the Quinlan decision, the questions of death and dying are still with us. Recently, the question of physician-assisted suicide once again gained national [End Page 378] attention with the trials of Dr. Kevorkian and the decisions of the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts on the constitutionality of the Washington and New York state laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. At the same time, questions and controversies about the appropriate extent of treatment and the determination of death in relationship to treatment continue to be problematic in health care.As I reviewed the literature in the area of death and dying, one central question emerged: Why, after so much reflection, energy, and discussion, do the problems around death and dying continue to persist? There is a recurring character to these questions that is indeed a wonder. In reviewing these moral controversies, one might ask what these controversies and their persistent character tell us about bioethics that can help us to understand the issues and the field.Some might blame the development of medical technology for the persistence of these issues of death and dying. The development and use of technological resources certainly is an important element of these continuing controversies. The use of medical technologies at the end of life allows us the possibility to sustain lives that would have been lost just a few decades ago. However, while medical technology certainly opens new horizons and possibilities, the development and deployment of technology does not sufficiently explain why these issues are so difficult and persistent. The question underlying the use of medical technology at the end of life is the question about which criteria are to be used to make judgments about the appropriate use of such technology. If the use of medical technology depends on the moral views one holds about death, suffering, and the appropriate use of resources, then such issues will be morally controversial in a society that is morally pluralistic.To address these questions, it is important to remember what is all too obvious and yet often forgotten. Death is not only a medical event. In this century, particularly in the last 40 years, we have reduced death to a medical event, yet, the medical meanings do not exhaust the event (see Engelhardt 1996, pp. 189–238). Death is also a social, cultural, and often religious event and the medical realities of death must be interpreted within these different contexts. As such, death will be the locus of different meanings and interpretations. By keeping these different structures of interpretation in mind, we are better able to understand why controversies around death and dying persist. Just as the meaning of death will vary from culture to culture, so too will the criteria of death vary. Different moral communities have different criteria for death—e.g., pulmonary or cognitive function. Put another way, different communities and cultures will have different views of what constitutes a good life, and those views influence the way death is understood. How one understands the obligations to support life also varies according to one’s moral commitments and values.One’s view of what counts as death, or what counts as a good death, is influenced [End Page 379] by the moral commitments that one holds. The persistent controversies over death and dying are a symptom of deep, widespread moral and cultural pluralism. These views are controversial because, in many ways, our deaths are no longer private. That is, the way we die often is tied to a health... (shrink)

The Islamic philosophical, mystical, and theological sub-traditions have each made characteristic assumptions about the human person, including an incorporation of substance dualism in distinctive manners. Advances in the brain sciences of the last half century, which include a widespread acceptance of death as the end of essential brain function, require the abandonment of dualistic notions of the human person that assert an immaterial and incorporeal soul separate from a body. In this article, I trace classical Islamic notions of death and (...) the soul, the modern definition of death as "brain death," and some contemporary Islamic responses to this definition. I argue that a completely naturalistic account of human personhood in the Islamic tradition is the best and most viable alternative for the future. This corporeal monistic account of Muslim personhood as embodied consciousness incorporates the insights of pre-modern Muslim thinkers yet rehabilitates their characteristic mistakes and thus has the advantages of neuroscientific validity and modern relevance in trans-cultural ethical discourse; it also helps to alleviate organ shortages in countries with majority Muslim populations, a serious ethical impasse of recent years. (shrink)

The Islamic philosophical, mystical, and theological sub‐traditions have each made characteristic assumptions about the human person, including an incorporation of substance dualism in distinctive manners. Advances in the brain sciences of the last half century, which include a widespread acceptance of death as the end of essential brain function, require the abandonment of dualistic notions of the human person that assert an immaterial and incorporeal soul separate from a body. In this article, I trace classical Islamic notions of death and (...) the soul, the modern definition of death as “brain death,” and some contemporary Islamic responses to this definition. I argue that a completely naturalistic account of human personhood in the Islamic tradition is the best and most viable alternative for the future. This corporeal monistic account of Muslim personhood as embodied consciousness incorporates the insights of pre‐modern Muslim thinkers yet rehabilitates their characteristic mistakes and thus has the advantages of neuroscientific validity and modern relevance in trans‐cultural ethical discourse; it also helps to alleviate organ shortages in countries with majority Muslim populations, a serious ethical impasse of recent years. (shrink)

Turkish culture is based on tolerance, the product of the unique Islam–Turkish synthesis. This synthesis is crucial today for a more balanced perception of Islam because it opposes extremism and the terror that is associated with it. The Turkish–Ottoman Empire followed earlier traditions and set up a system based on tolerance towards its ethnically diverse subjects. It was due to this exceptional system assuring stability and freedom of conscience that the Empire was able to hold together people of different religions, (...) languages and races, and to protect and preserve different cultures and languages. This tradition of tolerance and harmony lives on in modern Turkey. Although today there are bound to be certain misinterpretations of Islam, the majority of Turks firmly oppose intolerance and terrorism. (shrink)

People everywhere search for answers by using the resources of their traditions. They wish to do so in a legitimate way, and so they consult official institutions, specialists, and skilled individuals for their opinions; regardless of religious or cultural contexts, the common aim of these experts is to produce security, unity, and trust. Therefore, the norm-finding processes in Islamic and Western contexts share fundamental similarities: the problem of finding a final ground for judgment, the strategies of constructing coherence and of (...) organizing consensus, and the difficulties of obtaining legitimacy. What makes one debate "Islamic" and the other one "Western" is the different semantic materials, the different authorities, the different languages, and the different juridical frameworks. In my comparison of Muslim and Western discourses and practices, I conclude that Muslim and non-Muslim scholars tend to overemphasize the uniqueness of Muslim legal and practical responses to bioethical challenges, because they restrict their purview to legal opinions, ignoring larger dynamics of legitimization. (shrink)

The traditional Western understanding of life and death as a strict dichotomy is challenged by a more descriptively accurate model of life's progressive cessation. Dying can be defined by a bounded zone of residual states of life that fits better with moral intuition and more sensitively guides action toward the dying.

Cover title: Justice, peace, & human rights. Bibliography: p. 227-252. Includes index.