- Rigid/non-rigid grounding and transitivity.Mark Makin - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):136-150.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.details
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An essay on free will.Peter van Inwagen & A. Phillips Griffiths - 1985 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (4):557-558.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.details
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(2 other versions)Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.details
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Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525.details
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On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.details
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Free will and the necessity of the past.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):105-111.details
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Foundational Grounding and the Argument from Contingency.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8.details
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An infinitely descending chain of ground without a lower bound.Jon Erling Litland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1361-1369.details
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What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):644-664.details
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Grounding, transitivity, and contrastivity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 122-138.details
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A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.Robert Stalnaker - 1981 - In William Leonard Harper, Robert Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 87-104.details
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A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.details
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A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism.Thomas J. McKay & David Johnson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):113-122.details
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(2 other versions)Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities.Christopher Taylor & Daniel Dennett - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 257--277.details
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Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.details
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In Defence of the Mind Argument.Erik Carlson - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):393-400.details
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Natural Freedom.Daniel C. Dennett - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)On what grounds what.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.details
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Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.details
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Basic conditional logic.Brian F. Chellas - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):133 - 153.details
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(1 other version)On an argument for incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1987 - Analysis 47 (January):37-41.details
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(1 other version)An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The mind argument and libertarianism.Alicia Finch & Ted A. Warfield - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):515-28.details
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Incompatibilism and the transfer of power necessity.Erik Carlson - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):277-290.details
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A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
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(1 other version)On an argument for incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):37-41.details
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On Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498-500.details
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On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Mind 100 (3):390-394.details
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Dennett on the basic argument.John Martin Fischer - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (4):427-435.details
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