- Weakness and compulsion: the essential difference.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):81-97.details
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Action individuation: a normative functionalist approach.Chauncey Maher - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):99-116.details
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Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.details
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The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
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Agency and control.Jesus H. Aguilar - unknowndetails
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Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires.Attila Tanyi - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):67-89.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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The Explanatory Power of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Garrett Pendergraft - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):249-266.details
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
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Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss.Joseph K. Campbell - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):71-76.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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What is human freedom?Lynne Rudder Baker - unknowndetails
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Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom.John Martin Fischer - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):203 - 228.details
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In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.details
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Agency, consciousness, and executive control.Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.details
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A Reflection on our Freedom.Matthew H. Slater - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):327-330.details
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Motivation in agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.details
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What is self-control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.details
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Intention, intentional action, and moral responsibility.Alfred Mele & Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (3):265 - 287.details
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Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
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Intention, cognitive commitment, and planning.Robert Audi - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):361-378.details
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Emotion and action.Jing Zhu & Paul Thagard - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):19 – 36.details
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Is there a place for intention in an analysis of intentional action?Alfred Mele - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (3-4):419-432.details
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At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies: Hornsby's Account of Action.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.details
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Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.details
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The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.details
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Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.details
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The body in action.Thor Grunbaum - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):243-261.details
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The concept of intentional action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology.Joshua Knobe - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.details
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The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.details
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Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism.Tomis Kapitan - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (August):231-43.details
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Autonomy and manipulated freedom.Tomis Kapitan - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):81-104.details
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Active control, agent-causation and free action.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.details
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Dennett on the basic argument.John Martin Fischer - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (4):427-435.details
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Compatibilist alternatives.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.details
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A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will.Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):379-406.details
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Agency and Virtues.Zahra Khazaei - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 21 (3):119-140.details
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The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert.Michael McKenna - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):241-255.details
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Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydneydetails
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Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect.Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5457-5490.details
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Action explanation and its presuppositions.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):123-146.details
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Robust Individual Responsibility for Climate Harms.Gianfranco Pellegrino - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):811-823.details
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A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will.Mark Balaguer - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):379-406.details
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Free Will and Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2019 - In Klaus von Stosch Saskia Wendel (ed.), Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und theologische Beiträge. Schoeningh/Brill. pp. 41-62.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle G. Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.details
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On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
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