- What is self-control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.details
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Semicompatibilism: no ability to do otherwise required.Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):308-321.details
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Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):173-188.details
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Autonomy in R. S. Peters' Educational Theory.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (supplement s1):189-207.details
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Reid's Regress.Terence Cuneo & Randall Harp - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):678-698.details
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Endless Future: A Persistent Thorn in the Kalām Cosmological Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):165-187.details
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Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
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Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Because She Wanted To.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.details
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Reasons Explanation and Agent Control.John Ross Churchill - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):241-253.details
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Unintentional collective action.Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.details
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Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise.Justin A. Capes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):1-15.details
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Incompatibilism and fatalism: Reply to loss.Joseph K. Campbell - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):71-76.details
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Farewell to direct source incompatibilism.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):36 - 49.details
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Compatibilist alternatives.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):387-406.details
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Individualism and the metaphysics of actions.Matias Bulnes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.details
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Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.details
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Causalisms Reconsidered.Andrei A. Buckareff & Jing Zhu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):147-.details
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Compatibilism and doxastic control.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.details
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Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Theoria 77 (4):312-332.details
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The myth of source.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.details
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The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.details
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Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will.Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):379-406.details
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A Coherent, Naturalistic, and Plausible Formulation of Libertarian Free Will.Mark Balaguer - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):379-406.details
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Intention, cognitive commitment, and planning.Robert Audi - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):361-378.details
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On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
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Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons.Caroline T. Arruda & Daniel J. Povinelli - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (5):441-459.details
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Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.details
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Free will, narrative, and retroactive self-constitution.Roman Altshuler - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):867-883.details
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Reasonology and False Beliefs.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):91-118.details
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Interpersonal Interactions and the Bounds of Agency.Jesús H. Aguilar - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):219-234.details
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Agency, consciousness, and executive control.Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):21-30.details
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The metaphysical importance of the compatibility question: comments on Mark Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-12.details
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Causing Things and Doing Things.Helen Steward - 2014 - In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.details
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Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):101-111.details
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Engaging with Pike: God, Freedom, and Time.John Martin Fischer, Patrick Todd & Neal Tognazzini - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):247-270.details
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Free Will and Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2019 - In Klaus von Stosch Saskia Wendel (ed.), Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und theologische Beiträge. Schoeningh/Brill. pp. 41-62.details
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Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Omnirationality.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (1):1-21.details
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The accomplishment of plans: a new version of the principle of double effect.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69.details
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A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.details
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Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson's Ontological Prejudice.John Michael McGuire - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (3):459-479.details
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The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.details
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Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):59 - 70.details
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Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.details
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Emotion and action.Jing Zhu & Paul Thagard - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):19 – 36.details
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Hume and the phenomenology of agency.Joshua M. Wood - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):496-517.details
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