In this critique, Martha Nussbaum argues that our dominant theories of development have given us policies that ignore our most basic human needs for dignity and self-respect.

This article elaborates upon how memory and justice are connected within the philosophical project of Paul Ricoeur, and thus it aims to explore the broader context and meaning of his intriguing term “a just allotment of memory.” First, the concept of justice will be contextualized within the framework of Ricceur’s philosophical anthropology in general, and second, more specifically, with respect to his "little ethics.” Thereafter, issues relating to the manner in which memory generates questions of justice, and, indeed, why memory (...) needs history in order to be just, will be explored. Finally, some crucial questions about the limits of justice, and the challenges associated with the presence of justice and injustices in limit-situations will briefly be raised. (shrink)

This article summarizes some of the results of the BIOMED II project “Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw” connected to a research project of the Danish Research Councils “Bioethics and Law”. The BIOMED project was based on cooperation between 22 partners in most EU countries. The aim of the project was to identify the ethical principles of respect for autonomy, dignity, integrity and vulnerability as four important ideas or values for a European bioethics and biolaw. The research concluded (...) that the basic ethical principles cannot be understood as universal everlasting ideas or transcendental truths but they rather function reflective guidelines and important values in European culture. The method of the research was conceptual, philosophical analysis of the cultural background of the four values or normative ideas that people use and find important in their existence. Moreover, this was combined with analysis of empirical legal material and policy documents. Also, a number of qualitative interviews with relevant experts were carried out. Another important result of the BIOMED project was the partner's Policy Proposals to the European Commission, the Barcelona Declaration, unique as a philosophical and political agreement between experts in bioethics and biolaw from many different countries. The Policy Proposals are reprinted here at the end of the article. (shrink)

Although a widely used concept in health care, person‐centred care remains somewhat ambiguous. In the field of palliative care, person‐centred care is considered a historically distinct ideal and yet there continues to be a dearth of conceptual clarity. Person‐centred care is also challenged by the pull of standardization that characterizes much of health service delivery. The conceptual ambiguity becomes especially problematic in contemporary pluralistic societies, particularly in the light of continued inequities in healthcare access and disparities in health outcomes. Our (...) aim was to explicate premises and underlying assumptions regarding person‐centred care in the context of palliative care with an attempt to bridge the apparently competing agendas of individualization versus standardization, and individuals versus populations. By positioning person‐centredness in relation to the hermeneutics of the self according to Paul Ricœur, dialectics between individualization and standardization, and between individuals and populations were constructed. The competing agendas were related in a dialectic manner in the way that population health is of importance for the individual, and standardization is of importance for the population. The analysis suggests that person‐centred care is an ethical stance, which gives prominence to both suffering and capability of the individual as a person. The dialectic analysis points towards the importance of extending person‐centred care to encompass population and societal perspectives and thereby avoiding a problematic tendency of affiliating person‐centred care with exclusively individualistic perspectives. Considerations for person‐centred palliative care on micro‐, meso‐ and macrolevels conclude the paper. (shrink)

Health services internationally struggle to ensure health care is “person-centered” (or similar). In part, this is because there are many interpretations of “person-centered care” (and near synonyms), some of which seem unrealistic for some patients or situations and obscure the intrinsic value of patients’ experiences of health care delivery. The general concern behind calls for person-centered care is an ethical one: Patients should be “treated as persons.” We made novel use of insights from the capabilities approach to characterize person-centered care (...) as care that recognizes and cultivates the capabilities associated with the concept of persons. This characterization unifies key features from previous characterisations and can render person-centered care applicable to diverse patients and situations. By tying person-centered care to intrinsically valuable capability outcomes, it incorporates a requirement for responsiveness to individuals and explains why person-centered care is required independently of any contribution it may make to health gain. (shrink)