Switch to: Citations

References in:

Understanding and the facts

Philosophical Studies 132 (1):33 - 42 (2007)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1999 - Princeton University Press.
    Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she argues (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   156 citations  
  • True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Science relies on models and idealizations that are known not to be true. Even so, science is epistemically reputable. To accommodate science, epistemology should focus on understanding rather than knowledge and should recognize that the understanding of a topic need not be factive. This requires reconfiguring the norms of epistemic acceptability. If epistemology has the resources to accommodate science, it will also have the resources to show that art too advances understanding.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   201 citations  
  • Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols.Nelson Goodman - 1968 - Indianapolis,: Bobbs-Merrill.
    . . . Unlike Dewey, he has provided detailed incisive argumentation, and has shown just where the dogmas and dualisms break down." -- Richard Rorty, The Yale Review.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   565 citations  
  • True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.
    Truth is standardly considered a requirement on epistemic acceptability. But science and philosophy deploy models, idealizations and thought experiments that prescind from truth to achieve other cognitive ends. I argue that such felicitous falsehoods function as cognitively useful fictions. They are cognitively useful because they exemplify and afford epistemic access to features they share with the relevant facts. They are falsehoods in that they diverge from the facts. Nonetheless, they are true enough to serve their epistemic purposes. Theories that contain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   302 citations  
  • Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1996 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    The book contains a unique epistemological position that deserves serious consideration by specialists in the subject."--Bruce Aune, University of Massachusetts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   127 citations  
  • Considered Judgement.Bruce Aune - 2000 - Mind 109 (434):334-337.
    Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she argues (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  • Languages of Art.Nelson Goodman - 1970 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 3 (1):62-63.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   606 citations  
  • The language of theories.Wilfrid Sellars - 1961 - In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (eds.), Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science. New York. pp. 57--77.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations