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  1. Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism.Monton Bradley & Fraassen Bas C. Van - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405 - 422.
    James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term 'observable' has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are objective, non-modal facts about what is observable. Both modal nominalism and constructive empiricism require clarification in the face (...)
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  • On accepting Van Fraassen's image of science.Jeff Foss - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):79-92.
    In his book, The Scientific Image, van Fraassen lucidly draws an alternative to scientific realism, which he calls "Constructive Empiricism". In this epistemological theory, the concept of observability plays the pivotal role: acceptable theories may be believed only where what they say solely concerns observables. Van Fraassen develops a concept of observability which is, as he admits, vague, relative, science-dependent, and anthropocentric. I draw out unacceptable consequences of each of these aspects of his concept. Also, I argue against his assumption (...)
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  • Studies in Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin & Andre Kukla - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):109.
    Why be a scientific realist? The predominant motivation is explanationist: we need realism to understand the successfulness of science. Why be an antirealist? The predominant motivation is skeptical: theory systematically exceeds the reach of empirical warrant. Antirealists deny that explanatory power is evidential; realists deny that the reach of empirical warrant summarily terminates at the boundary of the observable. But these counterarguments are mere protection of philosophical stances to which the adversaries independently incline.
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  • Taking theories seriously.Richard Creath - 1985 - Synthese 62 (3):317 - 345.
    This paper defends scientific realism, the doctrine that we should interpret theories as being just as ontologically committing as beliefs at the observational level. I examine the character of observation to show that the difference in interpretation suggested by anti-realists is unwarranted. Second, I discuss Wilfrid Sellars'' approach to the issue. Finally, I provide a detailed study of recent work by Bas van Fraassen. While van Fraassen''s work is the focus of the paper, the conclusions are far broader: That a (...)
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  • The Scientific Image by Bas C. van Fraassen. [REVIEW]Michael Friedman - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.
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