I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets.

This is a philosophical and historical investigation of the role of inconsistent representations of the same scientific phenomenon. The logical difficulties associated with the simultaneous application of inconsistent models are discussed. Internally inconsistent scientific proposals are characterized as structures whose application is necessarily tied to the confirming evidence that each of its components enjoys and to a vision of the general form of the theory that will resolve the inconsistency. Einstein's derivation of the black body radiation law is used as (...) an example application of such a strategy and is contrasted with planck's derivation. (shrink)

Still, it is but fair for me to point out that several of the mainstays of the present proposal owe very little to the influence of the philosophers whose epistemological views have attracted me most — or for that matter to that of other analytical philosophers. I am referring to my acknowledging degrees of truth and existence and, consequently, degrees of knowledge, too.