This review essay examines H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.'s The Foundations of Bioethics, a contemporary nonfeminist text in mainstream biomedical ethics. It focuses upon a central concept, Engelhardt's idea of the moral community and argues that the most serious problem in the book is its failure to take account of the political and social structures of moral communities, structures which deeply affect issues in biomedical ethics.

These days, discussions of what might be the ‘essence’ or the ‘core’ of nursing and nursing practice sooner or later end in a discussion about the concept of care. Most of the ‘newer’ nursing theories use this concept as a theoretical core concept. Even though these theoretical approaches use the concept of care with very different philosophical foundations and theoretical consistency, they concur in defining care as the essence of nursing and thereby glorify goodness as the decisive characteristic of nursing. (...) These theoretical approaches neglect the fact that nursing is above all a profession with a societal task and is characterized by an asymmetrical power relation between nurses and their patients. Based on the results of a research project that analysed the role nurses played in the killing of psychiatric patients in Germany during the Nazi regime, I demonstrate that an approach based on the concept of care is not able to explain how nurses were able to commit crimes of such atrocity. These crimes were bound to an emotional investment that sustained the production of ‘life unworthy of living’. In the case of nurses under the Nazi regime, certainly a kind of sadism was at issue that can only be explained if we recognize that the social bond is characterized by a certain tension; ‘goodness’ that caring theories assign to the social bond always coexists with the capacity for destruction. Using the Foucauldian theoretical framework of biopower and biopolitics enables one to analyse violence and power as integral parts of nurses' practice. Seen from this perspective, the killing of patients was part of a biopolitical programme and not a relapse into barbarism. The concept of care obscures the political agenda of nursing and does not provide a critical and political framework to analysing nursing practice. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty's claim in Phenomenology of Perception (1962) that the anonymous body guarantees an intersubjective world is problematic because it omits the particularities of bodies. This omission produces an account of "dialogue" with another in which I solipsistically hear only myself and dominate others with my intentionality. This essay develops an alternative to projective intentionality called "hypothetical construction," in which meaning is socially constructed through an appreciation of the differences of others.

The author considers the way in which psychic life is generated by the social operation of power, and how that social operation of power is concealed and fortified by the psyche that it produces. Power is no longer understood to be 'internalized' by an existing subject, but the subject is spawned as an ambivalent effect of power, one that is staged through the operation of conscience. To claim that power fabricates the psyche is also to claim that there is a (...) fictional and fabricated quality to the psyche. The figure of a psyche that 'turns against itself' is crucial to this study, and offers an alternative to describing power as 'internalized'. Although most readers of Foucault eschew psychoanalytic theory, and most thinkers of the psyche eschew Foucault, the author seeks to theorize this ambivalent relation between the social and the psychic as one of the most dynamic and difficult effects of power. (shrink)

Contributing to both ageing research and queer-feminist scholarship, this article introduces feminist philosopher Margrit Shildrick’s queer notion of the monstrous to the subject of ageing and the issue of dealing with frailty within ageing research. The monstrous, as a norm-critical notion, takes as its point of departure that we are always already monstrous, meaning that the western ideal of well-ordered, independent, unleaky, rational embodied subjects is impossible to achieve. From this starting point the normalizing and optimizing strategies of ageing research (...) – here exemplified through the concept of successful ageing and the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease – can be problematized. The notion of the monstrous instead suggests a view on ageing and ‘monstrous’ embodiment which provides room for other, different ways of being recognized as an embodied subject, and for dealing with difference, vulnerability and frailty. (shrink)